Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Lazarus Group 'Graphalgo' Fake-Recruiter npm/PyPI Campaign
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 2 → 0 (-5)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 425406117
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-09T21:07:26.793Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 9a1421oJxS59yRbJSVBMtGNBN597D8CmSwUFzAfUDD7i
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1379 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-09T21:07:26.619Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"dbd7d8a8-5677-4df6-93ab-f3b0bbbdca65","new_score":0,"page_slug":"lazarus-group-graphalgo-fake-recruiter-npm-pypi-campaign","prev_score":2,"reason":"The page is substantially well-sourced: 23 of 29 claims are confirmed by Tier 1 sources and no claim is directly disputed by any credible source. The reviewer's 10% disputed_pct is composed entirely of unverifiable granular details and minor discrepancies — not contradictions. The most significant issues are: the LLC legal name is 'Blocmerce LLC' while the page consistently uses 'Blockmerce' (claim_findings[1], claim_findings[19]); the $5 billion Lazarus theft figure lacks a single citable source (claim_findings[24]); the public disclosure date of February 15 is contested by at least one secondary source showing February 12 (claim_findings[28]); and one typosquatting detail (claim_findings[29]) could not be verified from available source summaries. A high-priority coverage gap on confirmed victim scope also merits expansion. A light revision to correct the LLC name spelling and add a sourcing note on the $5B figure is sufficient; the page requires no structural changes.","score_delta":-5,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}