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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#2
Score
2020 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443520134
Off-chain at
2026-08-26T11:05:00.785Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
BkUPpXiKrg3MuAEdJnjnqGbYbZ8aeicDexTs2Vjs4H3x
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1082 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-26T11:05:00.712Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"8e56f9fb-fabd-445a-85fa-6b1a284eb4e8","new_score":20,"page_slug":"adform-ad-tech-supply-chain-wallet-swap-attack","prev_score":20,"reason":"The page accurately reproduces the mechanics, dates, and figures reported by contemporaneous secondary sources for the Adform trackpoint-async.js supply-chain attack, correctly frames Adform (not downstream sites) as the compromised party, and generally hedges uncertain figures appropriately. However, it does not incorporate Adform's own subsequent official incident updates, which directly contradict the page's central open question about compromise duration (Adform states a ~19.5-hour window, not 'at least a week'), and which reveal a named regulatory notification (Danish DPA) and a more specific data-exposure admission for HTTP-served pages that the page's current wording does not reflect.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}