Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · CoW Swap (CoW Protocol)
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 58 → 58 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 423656066
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-01T19:32:30.271Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- BzRUHUv6fXKParT4VsnDFxUNxLH3VyzdjvbvqgqfLVbE
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1055 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-06-01T19:32:30.158Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"99a79ffe-a739-45dd-9f2c-24975a8e2f06","new_score":58,"page_slug":"cow-swap-cow-protocol","prev_score":58,"reason":"The CoW Swap investigation page is substantially accurate. Core factual claims — the attack date/time, the social engineering vector, Gandi/Traficom roles, user losses ($1.2M and 219 ETH figures), smart contract integrity, CIP-86 governance details, and timeline — are confirmed across multiple independent sources. The primary material inaccuracy is the '90 minutes' phishing duration: multiple sources indicate the phishing frontend remained live for approximately 3.5 hours until migration to cow.finance at ~18:30 UTC, not 90 minutes. The '5M USDC replenishment' is stated as intent in CIP-86, not a completed action. No claims were found to be outright false or to contradict credible sources.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}