Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Wanchain-Cardano Bridge NIGHT Token Exploit (July 2026)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 18 → 8 (-10)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443506735
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-10T18:35:17.960Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 5a7SPnzagLL2gkqJP9nVtxgSh9cTbnbWmAb3tgwV1UES
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1728 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-10T18:35:17.736Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"210a0f6a-9ef4-461b-9083-03e89ed7e0c7","new_score":8,"page_slug":"wanchain-cardano-bridge-night-token-exploit-july-2026","prev_score":18,"reason":"The page's core narrative -- the TreasuryCheck signature-encoding exploit, the ~515.2M NIGHT / $9-13M loss, market reaction, and the Midnight Foundation and Hoskinson statements -- is well corroborated, with a disputed rate of only 7% (claim_findings summary). The verdict is nonetheless a revise rather than an approve because of two compounding issues: a high-priority coverage gap (coverage_gaps[0]) showing that on July 31, 2026, Wanchain publicly offered the attacker a white-hat recovery deal, a material development that falls inside the page's own claimed 'late July 2026' window but is not reflected anywhere on the page; and a directly related stale finding (claim_findings[9]) in the high-severity 'Wanchain's Response and Leadership' section, which currently states no compensation or recovery framework had been announced. Two minor inaccuracies were also found: the van Rossem hard fork is dated one day earlier than confirmed sources show (claim_findings[6], disputed), and the claim that ADA 'approached $0.20' overstates the actual reported range of ~$0.175-0.177 (claim_findings[5], partially supported). None of these affect the page's central allegations, but the staleness on the bridge operator's response -- the section most relevant to accountability -- warrants revision before the page is treated as current.","score_delta":-10,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}