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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
publish · Furucombo
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#1
Score
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
420848172
Off-chain at
2026-05-19T21:12:23.414Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
28NW7BZR1ovRgYc1Zyu7D93RBkNLgFzjysiCqfj6AAjK
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (5594 chars)
{"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"6d3ecece-e2c4-4c16-98dd-88ea42f5b143","kind":"publish","page_slug":"furucombo","published_at":"2026-05-19T21:12:23.357Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"Furucombo","sections":[{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://furucombo.app/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://docs.furucombo.app/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://etherscan.io/token/0xfFffFffF2ba8F66D4e51811C5190992176930278"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://finematics.com/how-to-use-furucombo/"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://medium.com/furucombo/furucombo-post-mortem-march-2021-ad19afd415e"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-furucombo-evil-contract-hack-feb-2021"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://cryptobriefing.com/defi-tx-bundler-furucombo-hacked-14-million/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://x.com/creamdotfinance/status/1365778386849726466"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.vidma.io/blog/the-furucombo-hack-a-14-million-lesson-in-smart-contract-vulnerabilities"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://etherscan.io/address/0xb624e2b10b84a41687caec94bdd484e48d76b212"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://etherscan.io/address/0x52F9eea36F57d86A0F051419Fd11e4A256359C8f"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://etherscan.io/address/0x9901bac880caecad999e292811db9c1db3e86f8a"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.coinspect.com/learn-evm-attacks/cases/furucombo/"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://cryptobriefing.com/furucombo-will-issue-iou-tokens-compensate-hack-victims/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://medium.com/furucombo/furucombo-post-mortem-march-2021-ad19afd415e"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://cointelegraph.com/news/furucombo-to-issue-ioucombo-tokens-to-repay-victims-of-15m-attack"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://defillama.com/protocol/furucombo"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-furucombo-evil-contract-hack-feb-2021"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.vidma.io/blog/the-furucombo-hack-a-14-million-lesson-in-smart-contract-vulnerabilities"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/furucombodefihack.php"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://cryptobriefing.com/furucombo-will-issue-iou-tokens-compensate-hack-victims/"}]}],"sources_used":[],"summary":"Furucombo is an Ethereum-based DeFi composability protocol launched in March 2020 that enables users to batch complex multi-protocol transactions via a drag-and-drop interface. On February 27, 2021, the protocol suffered a critical 'evil contract' exploit in which an attacker spoofed a new Aave v2 implementation via Furucombo's proxy, draining approximately $14–15 million in ETH and ERC-20 tokens from 22 users who had granted standing token approvals to the platform. The team responded with a compensation plan issuing iouCOMBO tokens subject to a 360-day vesting schedule, but the incident exposed fundamental risks in delegatecall-based proxy architectures and broad token approval models.","timeline":[{"date":"2020-03-01","event":"Furucombo launches on Ethereum mainnet as a DeFi composability and transaction batching platform.","source":""},{"date":"2021-02-27","event":"At approximately 16:47 UTC, an attacker deploys an evil contract and exploits Furucombo's proxy via an uninitialized Aave v2 upgradeable proxy, draining approximately $14–15 million in ETH and ERC-20 tokens from 22 user addresses in under one hour.","source":""},{"date":"2021-02-27","event":"Cream Finance confirms its treasury lost $1.1 million in the Furucombo attack via a public Twitter post.","source":""},{"date":"2021-02-27","event":"At approximately 17:46 UTC, Furucombo removes the Aave v2 lending pool from its registry contract, halting the attack approximately 59 minutes after it began.","source":""},{"date":"2021-02-27","event":"Attacker begins moving stolen funds through Tornado Cash to obscure on-chain trail. Attacker address 0xb624e2b10b84a41687caec94bdd484e48d76b212 holds ~4,560 ETH and ~$7M in ERC-20 tokens post-attack.","source":""},{"date":"2021-03-01","event":"Furucombo publishes post-mortem, acknowledges vulnerability, commits to compensating all affected users, and deploys replacement proxy contract at 0xA013AfbB9A92cEF49e898C87C060e6660E050569.","source":""},{"date":"2021-03-08","event":"Furucombo announces iouCOMBO token compensation plan: 5 million iouCOMBO tokens (1M from core team, 4M from community fund) subject to a 360-day linear vesting schedule starting March 1, 2021.","source":""},{"date":"2021-04-01","event":"iouCOMBO tokens scheduled for distribution to hack victims following completion of security audits. COMBO token price had fallen approximately 18.7% within 24 hours of the compensation announcement.","source":""}]},"v":1}