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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#1
Score
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
423211623
Off-chain at
2026-05-30T18:33:23.580Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
9x2vvVGWgt8ZFRDSGykS2nYobnsq5M4ZLSGsgsY7H89R
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (5933 chars)
{"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"1d52d2da-2667-498b-8cfc-b5a3fe0ea3a5","kind":"publish","page_slug":"qubit-finance","published_at":"2026-05-30T18:33:23.531Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"Qubit Finance","sections":[{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://pancakebunny.medium.com/introducing-qubit-qbt-innovating-lending-and-borrowing-on-the-bsc-9f3fe6438f44","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://qbt.wiki/en/company/mound-inc/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://github.com/peckshield/publications/blob/master/audit_reports/PeckShield-Audit-Report-Qubit-v1.0.pdf","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://certik.medium.com/qubit-bridge-collapse-exploited-to-the-tune-of-80-million-a7ab9068e1a0","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.theblock.co/post/132157/qubit-finance-bridge-ethereum-bsc-exploited-lost-80-million","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-qubit-hack-january-2022","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://slowmist.medium.com/our-analysis-of-the-80m-qubit-finance-exploit-b0f272cd8c25","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2022/01/28/defi-protocol-qubit-finance-exploited-for-80m","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-qubit-hack-january-2022","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://certik.medium.com/qubit-bridge-collapse-exploited-to-the-tune-of-80-million-a7ab9068e1a0","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://github.com/peckshield/publications/blob/master/audit_reports/PeckShield-Audit-Report-Qubit-v1.0.pdf","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://medium.com/@QubitFin/our-compensation-plan-1-63e7c64738ed","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/hotforsecurity/qubit-pleads-with-hacker-to-return-80-million-of-stolen-funds","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/defi-platform-qubit-finance-hacked-for-80-million-a-18406","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://qbt.wiki/en/company/mound-inc/","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-pancakebunny-protocol-hack-may-2021","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://qbt.wiki/en/company/mound-inc/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://coinmarketcap.com/alexandria/article/the-tragicomedy-of-pancakebunny","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://chainbulletin.com/pancakebunny-suffers-from-flash-loan-attack","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://certik.medium.com/qubit-bridge-collapse-exploited-to-the-tune-of-80-million-a7ab9068e1a0","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://slowmist.medium.com/our-analysis-of-the-80m-qubit-finance-exploit-b0f272cd8c25","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://losslessdefi.medium.com/qubit-finance-hack-post-mortem-the-trail-the-hacker-left-behind-f8afa8a0d010","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.merklescience.com/blog/hack-track-analysis-of-qubit-finance-exploit","type":"other","url":""}]}],"sources_used":[],"summary":"Qubit Finance was a BSC-based DeFi lending and borrowing protocol developed by South Korean firm Mound Inc., the same team behind PancakeBunny. On January 27, 2022, an attacker exploited a logical flaw in the protocol's Ethereum-BSC cross-chain bridge (QBridge), minting 77,162 qXETH without depositing any real ETH on Ethereum, ultimately draining approximately $80 million in user funds. No funds were recovered, the attacker's identity was never established, and the compensation plan announced by the team was never verifiably fulfilled.","timeline":[{"date":"2020-04","event":"Mound Inc. incorporated in South Korea.","source":""},{"date":"2021-04","event":"Mound Inc. receives $1.6 million seed investment from Binance Labs and IDEO CoLab.","source":""},{"date":"2021-05-19","event":"PancakeBunny, Mound's yield aggregator, suffers a flash loan attack draining approximately $45 million.","source":""},{"date":"2021-07","event":"Qubit Finance (QBT) launched on BSC as a new lending protocol by Mound Inc.","source":""},{"date":"2022-01-27","event":"Attacker exploits QBridge's zero-address bypass to mint 77,162 qXETH on BSC without depositing any ETH on Ethereum, beginning at approximately 21:36 UTC.","source":""},{"date":"2022-01-28","event":"Qubit Finance confirms the exploit, identifies attacker wallet 0xd01ae1a708614948b2b5e0b7ab5be6afa01325c7, disables X-Bridge functions, and offers a $250,000 bounty for fund return.","source":""},{"date":"2022-01-28","event":"CertiK, SlowMist, and other security firms publish independent post-mortem analyses of the exploit.","source":""},{"date":"2022-02-08","event":"Qubit Finance publishes compensation plan: team surrenders its token holdings and announces intent to raise $10 million+ via debt financing. No confirmed disbursements subsequently verified.","source":""},{"date":"2022-02","event":"CTO Aaron Yooshin Kim allegedly deletes his LinkedIn profile; alleged removal of victims from official Telegram channels reported by victim advocacy groups.","source":""},{"date":"2022-02","event":"Protocol goes dark with no further verified team communications or compensation updates.","source":""}]},"v":1}