Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Port3 Network
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 58 → 58 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 464346357
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-02T03:36:08.131Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-02T03:36:36.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-02T03:36:36.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 8WQBtWzHq4dnjeT9gph78EKPENYhumhYyWoRkCP2Cfjw
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2305 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"621868989c910c3ba462c6869635c49b","band_override":{"actual_delta":-28,"actual_verdict":"review_revise","disputed_pct":0.6,"expected_delta_range":[-50,-30],"expected_verdict":"review_deny","rationale":"Of 10 checked claims, 2 were disputed and 4 could not be verified, giving 60% disputed or unverifiable, which sits on the line between the significant and failed bands. The core exploit account (CATERC20 flaw, 1 billion tokens minted, 80% price drop, 1:1 migration with burn) is confirmed (claim_findings[0], [6]), but claim_findings[4] shows the Kraken December 2025 delisting is contradicted by Kraken's own notice, claim_findings[1] gives a wrong attack date, and claim_findings[5], [8] and [9] leave a Coinone timeline entry and the ZachXBT flag (stated as fact in the summary) with no source. Because the reviewer's confidence is only 0.55 and the central allegation holds up, the page is revised at the top of the significant band rather than failed."},"decided_at":"2026-11-02T03:36:07.841Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.6,"investigation_id":"1b3b0823-c7ff-46a7-ac65-5870db5a63d3","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":58,"page_slug":"port3-network","prev_score":58,"reason":"Of 10 checked claims, 2 were disputed and 4 could not be verified, giving 60% disputed or unverifiable, which sits on the line between the significant and failed bands. The core exploit account (CATERC20 flaw, 1 billion tokens minted, 80% price drop, 1:1 migration with burn) is confirmed (claim_findings[0], [6]), but claim_findings[4] shows the Kraken December 2025 delisting is contradicted by Kraken's own notice, claim_findings[1] gives a wrong attack date, and claim_findings[5], [8] and [9] leave a Coinone timeline entry and the ZachXBT flag (stated as fact in the summary) with no source. Because the reviewer's confidence is only 0.55 and the central allegation holds up, the page is revised at the top of the significant band rather than failed.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}