Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Jupiter Perps
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 74 → 66 (-8)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 424054062
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-03T15:30:08.574Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 8Dk3V8sWGe3BYofvxEG36sHDVui5XbqtzUwFCDnUEuj2
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1525 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-03T15:30:08.378Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"6539e14c-8eb6-4307-8cf9-bd28d784c81c","new_score":66,"page_slug":"jupiter-perps","prev_score":74,"reason":"The page is substantially accurate across 20 of 27 verified claims. The most significant issue is that claim_findings[18] describes the April 2026 Drift exploit as using 'compromised Drift admin keys', which three Tier 1 sources (TRM Labs, Elliptic, The Hacker News) consistently characterize as social engineering of multisig signers via Solana's durable nonce mechanism — not a direct key compromise. This mischaracterization appears in the high-severity security section and should be corrected for accuracy, though the surrounding material facts (dollar amounts, JLP exposure, DPRK attribution) are confirmed. Additionally, claim_findings[13] may slightly overstate the severity of the malicious keeper finding (medium, not high), and claim_findings[22] on Meow's wBTC co-founder role is broadly but not definitively supported by the primary cited source. Two hub.jup.ag audit PDF URLs are link-rotted, though both audits remain accessible via the canonical developers.jup.ag page. Two high-priority coverage gaps — on-chain upgrade authority status and regulatory exposure for the 250x leverage offering — are material omissions that should be addressed in revision.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}