Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Venus Protocol THE Token Flash-Loan Exploit (March 2026)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 12 → 5 (-7)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 425397440
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-09T20:10:07.158Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 49SZRwTmrRQKq2xcUKgtNcgUNsNHMsaodVzJcE1xxpKN
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1533 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-09T20:10:06.915Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"5dde6d54-ddb2-4220-9e80-934d4b9c9016","new_score":5,"page_slug":"venus-protocol-the-token-flash-loan-exploit-march-2026","prev_score":12,"reason":"The reviewer confirmed 26 of 32 claims outright and found no fully disputed claims; however, five claims are partially supported with sourcing discrepancies that warrant correction. The most material is claim_findings[28], where the page states approximately $14 million in bad debt from the May 2022 LUNA collapse, while three independent sources (The Record, BeInCrypto, Crypto Times) consistently report approximately $11 million — a 27% overstatement in a historical context section. Claim_findings[24] records six markets frozen where the official Venus post-mortem lists eight. Claim_findings[30] presents the September 2025 phishing figure as '$27 million' without clarifying that CoinTelegraph corrected the net loss to $13.5 million. The core technical and financial claims about the March 2026 incident itself — the exploit mechanism, attacker addresses, funding chain, bad debt total, and oracle behavior — are all confirmed by Tier 1 sources including the official Venus post-mortem. One high-priority coverage gap (bad debt repayment vote outcome) is time-sensitive and should be addressed when the governance result is known.","score_delta":-7,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}