Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Maya Protocol
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 28 → 16 (-12)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443523384
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-27T03:47:51.304Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 611EZ6Vd3iuzk3d2M9qLGzoxRuE3pZUn4HjtZ3E7vrp5
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2042 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-27T03:47:51.144Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"e892733a-1f37-4939-86a7-e4a859bbf6b0","new_score":16,"page_slug":"maya-protocol","prev_score":28,"reason":"Of 25 claims checked, 19 were confirmed and the central exploit narrative — the chained-bug mechanism, block numbers, dollar and CACAO figures, the attacker's Bitcoin address, the price collapse, the network halt, and the recovery plan — held up against multiple independent outlets and Maya's own documentation. One claim (claim_findings[15]) was disputed on solid grounds: the page lists 'Fable 5' as a second audit firm alongside Halborn, but the reviewer traced the source article's own hyperlink to an unrelated Anthropic AI-model announcement rather than any audit firm, and confirmed Maya's own audit documentation names only Halborn. This overstates the protocol's independent security coverage on a page whose purpose is risk assessment, and it sits beside a confirmed statement that the exploited bugs went undetected for years 'despite multiple audits' — making the inflated audit count a meaningful, subject-favorable inaccuracy rather than a cosmetic slip. A second claim (claim_findings[16]), describing THORChain's July 2021 losses as 'two exploits,' was only partially supported since other retrospectives describe three incidents; this concerns a comparator protocol's history rather than Maya's own conduct and is a lesser issue. One citation had gone dead (claim_findings[3]) though the underlying fact remains independently confirmable, and two claims were unverifiable due to weak or contradictory sourcing rather than being contradicted outright. Disputed-plus-partially-supported claims total 12% (3 of 25), placing this within the range warranting revision rather than approval or denial; no coverage gap was rated high priority, so no status change is triggered.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}