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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · Maya Protocol
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#3
Score
28 → 16 (-12)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443523384
Off-chain at
2026-08-27T03:47:51.304Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
611EZ6Vd3iuzk3d2M9qLGzoxRuE3pZUn4HjtZ3E7vrp5
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2042 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-27T03:47:51.144Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"e892733a-1f37-4939-86a7-e4a859bbf6b0","new_score":16,"page_slug":"maya-protocol","prev_score":28,"reason":"Of 25 claims checked, 19 were confirmed and the central exploit narrative — the chained-bug mechanism, block numbers, dollar and CACAO figures, the attacker's Bitcoin address, the price collapse, the network halt, and the recovery plan — held up against multiple independent outlets and Maya's own documentation. One claim (claim_findings[15]) was disputed on solid grounds: the page lists 'Fable 5' as a second audit firm alongside Halborn, but the reviewer traced the source article's own hyperlink to an unrelated Anthropic AI-model announcement rather than any audit firm, and confirmed Maya's own audit documentation names only Halborn. This overstates the protocol's independent security coverage on a page whose purpose is risk assessment, and it sits beside a confirmed statement that the exploited bugs went undetected for years 'despite multiple audits' — making the inflated audit count a meaningful, subject-favorable inaccuracy rather than a cosmetic slip. A second claim (claim_findings[16]), describing THORChain's July 2021 losses as 'two exploits,' was only partially supported since other retrospectives describe three incidents; this concerns a comparator protocol's history rather than Maya's own conduct and is a lesser issue. One citation had gone dead (claim_findings[3]) though the underlying fact remains independently confirmable, and two claims were unverifiable due to weak or contradictory sourcing rather than being contradicted outright. Disputed-plus-partially-supported claims total 12% (3 of 25), placing this within the range warranting revision rather than approval or denial; no coverage gap was rated high priority, so no status change is triggered.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}