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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · Trezor (ShipMonk Data Breach)
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#3
Score
58 → 46 (-12)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443562300
Off-chain at
2026-09-02T00:41:54.108Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
5tGJwQu1F9PBdLmNRaLYVAwQ9gRXKXzDQATmZxabDQNT
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1366 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"fd5f49135da0f19be02399bf0676eee2","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-09-02T00:41:53.904Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.1538,"investigation_id":"1fc16760-3a5f-4e12-910e-b7f5ad1e3754","new_score":46,"page_slug":"trezor-shipmonk-data-breach","prev_score":58,"reason":"The core account of the breach -- the timeline, the 13,689-customer count and exposure breakdown, the CVE-2026-72898 SQL injection mechanism, and the 2024 support-portal breach history -- is confirmed against Trezor's own disclosure and independent tier-1 press (claim_findings[0-5], [9-12]). Two supporting statistics do not hold up: an unpatched-instance figure ('4,309 of ~11,000') that appears in neither cited security-research source and conflicts with a third source's very different estimate (claim_findings[7]), and a 2025 comparison figure ('$41M/72 incidents') the page attributes to Chainalysis but which the review traces to a different firm's incompatible dataset (claim_findings[8]). A version-number detail on the Metabase patch range is also slightly off (claim_findings[6]). None of these affect the page's central allegations, but they warrant correction.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}