Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · DuelBits
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 32 → 32 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443520476
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-26T11:19:56.440Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 2CE6RbdTwzaMwBzELywt8QwxsM7ewpLZ6fJahDreNt1e
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1074 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-26T11:19:56.310Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"6eb30c9d-a37f-4690-ad1c-c7b0998cad2e","new_score":32,"page_slug":"duelbits","prev_score":32,"reason":"The page's core factual backbone — the 2020 launch, current Curaçao licensing, the February 2024 $4.6M exploit's amount/date/chains/laundering path, the 2022 Twitch ban, and the two 2025 sponsorship deals — is corroborated by independent reporting. However, the timeline's claim that DuelBits acknowledged the exploit and announced new security measures is contradicted by every source found, which uniformly report DuelBits issued no public statement on the incident, and both the summary and timeline overstate the certainty of the hack's 'private key compromise' cause, which CertiK itself described only as 'possible.' All five content sections are empty, so this review's claim surface is limited to the summary and timeline.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}