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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
00 (-12)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443522940
Off-chain at
2026-08-27T02:07:18.148Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
8G5fXrsaEcmrYEM4YBASYPqHXMGPfFLQSQEpfaQvu5ja
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1983 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-27T02:07:17.877Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"bcc27c32-d908-481f-bc22-6b47a6d8bf2d","new_score":0,"page_slug":"babak-zanjani-network-expanded-ofac-designations-july-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"The reviewer disputed 3 of 27 checked claims (11%), which falls in the minor-issues revision band. One of those three, however, is not a trivial error: the page's 'Regulatory and Legal Status' section states that both the January and July 2026 OFAC actions relied solely on the sanctions-evasion authority (Executive Order 13902), but OFAC's own January designation records show the two exchanges also carried a separate terrorism-financing designation tag tied to IRGC support -- a materially graver basis than the one the page cites, and one it never mentions (claim_findings[8]). The page also applies a $94 billion transaction-volume figure to both exchanges collectively when the underlying Treasury figure and independent reporting attribute it to one exchange alone (claim_findings[10]), and it asserts in one section that Zanjani was 'released' while a later section says he 'remains subject to a 20-year imprisonment sentence,' without acknowledging that his actual custodial status is genuinely unresolved in the sourcing the page itself cites (claim_findings[5], [6]). Two timeline entries also carry placeholder dates that are wrong by months to nearly a year (claim_findings[2], [16]). The large majority of the page's granular financial, corporate, and on-chain claims were independently confirmed against primary sources (OFAC, Treasury, Elliptic, TRM Labs, OCCRP), which keeps this a revision rather than a denial, but the severity of the sanctions-basis omission and the unresolved custody contradiction warrant a penalty toward the upper end of the minor-issues band.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}