Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 0 → 0 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457479716
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-16T03:00:45.268Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-16T03:01:18.369Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- ahgFfZreoBnsNmye2ypYBvTYYiAZwep3N5smNFhkSJ1
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2035 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"766d40104020a286d4b94447e5efcf14","decided_at":"2026-10-16T03:00:45.040Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.0909,"findings_hash":"F8Ca3XLRdK8gNPomrrDkuvLMiZkDNkju2dDdd1wB2Q1K","investigation_id":"670b2f92-11e7-4afe-8903-69e7c97cfcaa","mode":"findings_only","new_score":0,"page_content_hash":"7bd3a055ad006110757a5361457729d5a8de9dbc3cfe6561400a4d2c4e3fcccc","page_slug":"fake-sparrow-wallet-apple-app-store","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's core narrative — a counterfeit iOS Sparrow Wallet app that passed App Store review, drained roughly $1.8-1.84 million in Bitcoin from three victims between May and August 2025, Craig Raw's prior warnings, and the July 24, 2026 federal lawsuit (case 5:26-cv-07713) — is well supported by multiple independent, credible outlets and holds up under review. Two factual errors were found: Apple's cited platform-safety statistics conflate a $9 billion/2020-2024 figure from an unrelated, earlier Apple report with the 193,000-account/2025 figure actually tied to this story (the correct paired figure is $2.2 billion in 2025), and the Kaspersky 26-app campaign is misdated to 'late 2024' when Kaspersky's own release says 'fall 2025.' Neither of the page's own cited sources actually states either wrong figure, suggesting both were introduced during drafting rather than copied from a source. A softer issue is the page's claim of a continuous 'over three months' operational span on the App Store, which the cited reporting does not actually establish (only the two victim download dates are documented), and a minor timing ambiguity in the Swiftcrypt side-reference. The page has no accepted community submissions to assess. The most significant gap is the total absence of on-chain/blockchain analysis of the stolen funds, which is a notable omission for a platform built around on-chain-anchored evidence.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}