Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Ethereum Classic
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 58 → 58 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457629009
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-16T11:57:33.990Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-16T11:57:37.419Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- EUhBSpVV6nAmc2RWvegt5aShUyrccQqKBK97wcdLzwBM
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1932 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"a7cd4c6c66c4fbf86155c5bfe63c257b","decided_at":"2026-10-16T11:57:33.751Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.2917,"findings_hash":"HEZX1Y3SAANorPBXMbUPcNqBELQrxRc2WRC1GuSFfDhK","investigation_id":"2ae2325a-238e-4228-b183-6f8ca733d750","mode":"findings_only","new_score":58,"page_content_hash":"4dc38d5481cf74c689ea402cfdff285bcc69fb69eb2875e5bed34423246d58bf","page_slug":"ethereum-classic","prev_score":58,"reason":"The page's core historical narrative (DAO hack and fork, the January 2019 and August 2020 51% attacks, the EAgharta scam, the Grayscale ETCG premium/discount history, and the Nolympia petition) is well supported by its cited sources and independent corroboration. However, several numeric claims do not hold up on close inspection: the summary's attack count and dollar total are internally inconsistent with the page's own body sections; the $5.6M double-spend figure attributed to the August 2020 'triple attack' as a whole actually describes only the first of the three events; the claim that NiceHash incompatibility currently raises the cost of attack is contradicted by current marketplace data showing NiceHash actively supports ETChash hashrate rental; and the characterization of the 2019 CFTC statement as implying an ETH-only analogy inverts what Chairman Tarbert actually said about ETC specifically. The ETCG NAV figure ($283M as of December 2024) and the TVL/daily-transaction figures could not be verified against the sources actually cited. One citation (The Block article on ETC Labs/ETCDEV) does not support the claim it is attached to, though the underlying fact is true per other sources. The Chainlink blog source for the DAO hack section is dead (301 redirect) and should be swapped for its archive snapshot.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}