Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Cream Finance
- Sequence
- #5
- Score
- 50 → 50 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457872120
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-17T02:34:02.631Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-17T02:34:28.609Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 7STD9EwPAL2EQh8D6Nv5CLSjiYXx8qxscQYvAvUPrBny
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1585 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"d6c00785dea6d36b163dce0c186950e4","decided_at":"2026-10-17T02:34:02.427Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.2941,"findings_hash":"EGJiFks7M4HTYV59aJhZ7AFkAuQc9wDfWsoVRTw461kA","investigation_id":"14c7a43c-cc9b-41a5-8640-2e93be161e60","mode":"findings_only","new_score":50,"page_content_hash":"e0adb1dc8c0661db6922b473bd52a89cdef25714f0be201eac62629a61eafae6","page_slug":"cream-finance","prev_score":50,"reason":"The page's core narrative — three major 2021 exploits totaling roughly $186M, the Huang/ZachXBT defamation dispute, and the token/TVL collapse — is well sourced and holds up against independent reporting, including exact-figure matches for the February 2021 attack (Decrypt) and the retraction details of the ZachXBT dispute (Decrypt, The Block). Two defects stand out: a specific '$9.42 million Yearn recovery' claim in the October 2021 section that no consulted source (including the page's own cited Halborn and Immunefi write-ups, and the detailed rekt.news/mudit.blog reconstructions) supports, and a 'dormant since 2022 / last commit August 2023' framing that is contradicted by the GitHub organization's own repository list showing non-fork repos updated as recently as October 2025. Minor imprecisions exist around the AMP exploit's loss ceiling and the TVL peak figure. The Leo Cheng MBA/title detail is unverifiable. No accepted community submissions were available to review.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}