Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Gala
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 28 → 28 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457400520
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-15T22:15:07.055Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-15T22:15:35.364Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 8HhTGaXHy2NYwk8pYMhEMewr8YYoULvzg6omLUuBZhmd
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1680 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"4437307ef099ce35de4e0b34a91c69b6","decided_at":"2026-10-15T22:15:06.885Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.087,"findings_hash":"8rnDtfSc1bfVTKciACvhoMvy6aU5hy9GK9Np9NbmwHRs","investigation_id":"4991dfd1-1833-4d76-9cf6-f0ef98dcf786","mode":"findings_only","new_score":28,"page_content_hash":"025dcd22fbc1227aad16df11638328526d1d2f82908c59c86c31e906ff83fc9f","page_slug":"gala","prev_score":28,"reason":"The page is substantially well-sourced: the core narrative of the 2023 co-founder lawsuits (8.6B tokens, $130M, 43 wallets, $750M countersuit), the March 2023 SEC Green United case, the August 2024 court ruling, and the May 2024 minting exploit (5B tokens, ~$200-240M, 45-minute response, batches of up to 100 ETH, CEO's 'we messed up' quote) all check out against primary or credible secondary sources I fetched directly. The main problems are: an unverifiable/likely-inflated '40 live games' figure that the page's own cited source does not support; a specific naming of 'Coinbase and Kraken' as liquidation venues that no accessible source corroborates (appearing twice); a description of the exploit's unsold tokens as merely 'rendered non-transferable' when Gala's own incident report and third-party analysis say they were burned following a governance vote; and two dead/blocked source URLs (blockworks.com, beincrypto.com) cited a combined three times, both already marked unarchivable in the page's own metadata, for which I located live replacement sources covering the same facts.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}