Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Clober Liquidity Vault
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 42 → 42 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443508874
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-18T21:01:33.499Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 7D44QZyr2ekoMmffyqbXmybkE2wgJW6RNV6DjPmNnnVi
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1245 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-18T21:01:33.406Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"1a79704b-57a7-48c8-a46e-fc27bd4c6d12","new_score":42,"page_slug":"clober-liquidity-vault","prev_score":42,"reason":"The core facts of the Dec 10, 2024 Clober Liquidity Vault exploit — amount (~133.7 ETH / $501k), mechanism (reentrancy in a post-audit change to the Rebalancer _burn function), flash-loan details, and Clober's public 20% bounty offer — are well corroborated across independent post-mortems (rekt.news, CertiK, QuillAudits, SolidityScan). The page's closing claim that the attacker moved funds to Tornado Cash after bounty negotiations failed on Dec 31, 2024 could not be corroborated by any source checked and should be treated as unverified. The page also omits exculpatory context: the core Clober protocol and other chains were unaffected, and the project has continued active development and expansion (Monad, Starknet) with no reported repeat incidents through 2026, which is relevant to how severely this single, disclosed, contained incident should weigh against the entity today.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}