Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Banana Gun
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 37 → 37 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 464373043
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-02T05:11:30.730Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-02T05:11:58.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-02T05:11:58.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 31vxq6TTj3BZQNHFcxgLeiEQ9xpEiFNbTsDQfUSG31QP
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1633 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"5b74a93dd28d9c4307838ef555fec6f2","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T05:11:30.514Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.1333,"investigation_id":"e2751303-feeb-4ea9-9290-cc4fd3a5f2a4","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":37,"page_slug":"banana-gun","prev_score":37,"reason":"The core incident narrative (the September 2023 token launch bug, the September 2024 Telegram oracle exploit of about $3M across 11 users, and the treasury-funded refund pledge) is confirmed by Tier 2 sources (claim_findings[5], [6], [8], [10]). Two of 15 checkable claims (about 13%) could not be verified (claim_findings[4], [15]), and one further claim could not be checked because its source blocked the reviewer (claim_findings[7]); that is a coverage limit, not a defect. Several statements need correction: the uncited Unibot and Maestro 'oracle-style' comparison (claim_findings[0]), the October 2023 Titan date, which sources place around December 2023 (claim_findings[1]), and wording that overstates 2FA and 'confirms' reimbursement (claim_findings[9], [10]). The Titan allegations rest on a single analyst's figures that are internally inconsistent, and the review lists independent corroboration as a high-priority gap (claim_findings[2]).","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":15,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}