Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Zilliqa
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 61 → 61 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443520624
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-26T11:33:29.231Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- FAHMmWPWqukb4SH3FiJYMXufgrrvEb9MPUaXCyEJGDG5
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1474 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-26T11:33:29.061Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"ce7cc7ce-9d4c-4917-970b-fdb83d8d0837","new_score":61,"page_slug":"zilliqa","prev_score":61,"reason":"The page's background/legitimacy claims (founding, founders, mainnet history, audits, absence of regulatory action) and the February 2025 X-Bridge exploit narrative are all well-sourced and independently confirmed. The page's most distinctive feature — careful, hedged treatment of the unresolved July 2026 cold-wallet theft as an open question between exchange custody and Zilliqa wallet-software fault — was an accurate characterization of reporting as of July 21, 2026, but has been overtaken by Zilliqa's own official post-mortem (published August 20, 2026), which names the affected exchange (KuCoin), quantifies the theft, and definitively attributes the root cause to a legacy Ledger wallet defect. One claim about a 'separate, distinct March 2025 incident' linking Bithumb could not be corroborated by any of the page's own cited sources or by independent search, and appears to conflate the March 2026 start of the same continuous theft window with a nonexistent earlier 2025 event. All 16 listed sources are actually cited within the page's sections (no evidence of source-list padding), though one link (BitRss) is dead.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}