Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Payy Network
- Sequence
- #6
- Score
- 45 → 45 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 464534465
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-02T14:47:46.050Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-02T14:48:15.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-02T14:48:15.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- Edo5NNTzpkh4kpoyQeknbYVLNVxqYfg3PXKL23To7SdV
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1864 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"9eae0d2f289db34d3f2d88a44c54121d","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T14:47:45.763Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.3333,"investigation_id":"acfcb1c5-d03f-4e67-ae2f-60e8a37a8d1c","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":45,"page_slug":"payy-network","prev_score":45,"reason":"Of 12 countable claims (one blocked-source claim excluded), 3 were disputed and 1 could not be found in any source, giving about 33%, which falls in the significant-issues band. The disputed claims (claim_findings[5], [6], [7]) all concern the page's framing that Payy relied on a long-unmaintained proving dependency. Tier 1 advisory evidence shows only the reporter's test build and a flaw in Payy's own circuit. The page also omits a material point: CryptoBriefing reports the advisory flaw was patched before the drain. The incident facts (amounts, date, halt, funding) are well supported, the claims-process section could not be checked against a source, and reviewer confidence is moderate, so the penalty sits mid-band and the page is not denied.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":12,"sequence_num":6,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"significant","from_band":"significant","reason":"The review reports a material omission: CryptoBriefing says the June 2026 advisory flaw was patched in v1.3.0 before any funds were lost, and the page does not say so. This bears directly on the page's central causal framing. The percentage band is already significant, so the omission confirms that band and rules out a milder one."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}