Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_approve · Bryan Pellegrino (LayerZero CEO)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 42 → 42 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 461975473
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-27T06:51:18.256Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-27T06:51:29.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-27T06:51:29.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- FNyZfLTL6KjotSQDUxdZPq6nhMP275RFSBuT6MEEDD7M
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1524 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"1a5338f01cf90029f7db41ec1482c9e0","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T06:51:17.743Z","decision":"review_approve","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0,"investigation_id":"186066c7-fdf8-4d1c-9560-49ffb3278cf4","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":42,"page_slug":"bryan-pellegrino-layerzero-ceo","prev_score":42,"reason":"None of the 10 checked claims was disputed or unverifiable (0%), and the reviewer found no omissions and no change in the subject's status; the core facts hold up, including the $292M exploit amount and date, the lawsuit defendants and claims, and Pellegrino's quotes (claim_findings[4]-[6], [8], [9]). The defects are minor and suited to a correction: one timeline entry cites a CoinDesk article that does not attribute the attack, though LayerZero's incident report does (claim_findings[0]); the apology date is probably May 8, not May 9 (claim_findings[2], [3]); the wording 'malware' and 'DDoS' is stronger than the incident report's 'session keys' and 'DoS' (claim_findings[1]); and a January 2025 endorsement date was not found in the sources read (claim_findings[7]). Open coverage gaps (funding totals, court docket link) call for expansion, not a penalty.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}