Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Onyx Protocol
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 22 → 6 (-16)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 464358090
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-02T04:18:09.142Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-02T04:18:29.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-02T04:18:29.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- E5hPvi44k88g9pNYvsjmJ2jpMMyeg1ivdvAm2k5wMvQS
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1393 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"ea28413de2ed5a3a024dd51416e3981c","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T04:18:08.913Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.5714,"investigation_id":"ef9d20ac-7b82-459a-84c2-2560148b7857","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":6,"page_slug":"onyx-protocol","prev_score":22,"reason":"Of 7 claims reviewed, 3 could not be verified and 1 was disputed, giving a disputed share of about 57%. The core facts (the February 2023 CertiK warning, the $2.1M exploit in November 2023 and the $3.8M exploit in September 2024) were confirmed by CertiK and Rekt (claim_findings[0], [1], [3]). However, claim_findings[4] was disputed because Rekt credits Cyvers, not PeckShield, with flagging the second exploit first. claim_findings[2], [5] and [6] (attacker address and ETH amount, the relaunch as Onyx Core, the XCN rebrand) were not verified, and several of those were not checked at all. The penalty is kept at the lower end of the band because the reviewer's confidence is low (0.4) and the confirmed claims cover the central allegations.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-16,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}