Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_approve · Gate.io
- Sequence
- #6
- Score
- 32 → 32 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 462188596
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-27T19:26:22.589Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-27T19:26:55.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-27T19:26:55.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- CLcYokxHPpFBREncqRYhf2f8TFDvR64WnDYQf7SVdQtU
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1790 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"b3a0b02d881e3c0dce6ace707e3064dc","band_override":null,"blocked_count":2,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T19:26:22.161Z","decision":"review_approve","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0,"investigation_id":"8cb38982-caca-4f41-81b3-f93e7d056a99","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":32,"page_slug":"gate","prev_score":32,"reason":"Of 8 claims checked, 2 could not be read because the source blocked the reviewer (claim_findings[5], [6]) and are left out of the calculation. Of the remaining 6, none were disputed or unverifiable, so the disputed share is 0%. The CIMA notice, the 2015 Bter loss, the StatCounter attack and the ZachXBT publication date matched their sources. One wording point stands: the fetched CryptoSlate article does not name the Lazarus Group (claim_findings[2]), though the page presents it as an allegation. The rebrand month is also uncertain (claim_findings[7]). Neither changes the outcome. The reviewer's confidence is moderate (0.5) and several sections were not independently verified, which is a coverage limit and not a defect of the page.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":6,"sequence_num":6,"severity_override":{"applied":false,"band":null,"from_band":"approve","reason":"The review reports no material or critical omissions and no contradiction with the subject's status. The two omissions (a July 2026 user-theft dispute seen only in search snippets, and Bter's earlier 2014 NXT hack) are minor, and the subject is reported as operating with no sanction or shutdown."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}