Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Verus Protocol (VRSC)
- Sequence
- #8
- Score
- 23 → 23 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 464297285
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-02T00:40:50.997Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-02T00:41:18.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-02T00:41:18.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 9bAhiSzrxgMfUZnK2xvHytaWDy9wb6RL3FDTymjSUtov
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1392 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"8a1a5c7bfc06447103d9e609637be23c","decided_at":"2026-11-02T00:40:50.930Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.2,"findings_hash":"7ZzDXg6QdQiibtuPSAqwPyJx1aSAAJuAnRa1L9wCPXsh","investigation_id":"8b05afa2-b3b1-4812-a3c2-2b69513839e8","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":23,"omissions":{"material":1,"total":2},"page_content_hash":"ae8e727c9defcb2df8e56104f2f99f02e35a7b26b252c02b79c3dba6c61e4461","page_slug":"verus-protocol-vrsc","prev_score":23,"reason":"The core incident facts hold: the two bridge exploits, their amounts and dates, the May bounty deal, and the lack of a Verus statement on July. The page overstates that both exploits came from the identical missing checkCCEValues validation and that the bridge reopened with no patch. Rekt News reports the May patch held and July used a different gap, and that reserves were redeposited with the v1.2.17 release. The page also omits that release. Background, v1.2.14-2 and several details such as the EOA and tx hash were not verified.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":8,"subject_status":"exploited","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}