Skip to main content
Sign in
← avoid.net

Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#1
Score
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
423217213
Off-chain at
2026-05-30T19:10:28.777Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
E2gMtFxHPMzSUMBHTHebG3pdRhFeXPxd7hbKruLEq1wr
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (6098 chars)
{"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"38e6185e-4f23-4b8e-bba3-079c35de72e6","kind":"publish","page_slug":"pickle-finance","published_at":"2026-05-30T19:10:28.687Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"Pickle Finance","sections":[{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://cointelegraph.com/news/kind-of-a-big-dill-picklefinance-tvl-exceed-347m-in-4-days","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://picklefinance.medium.com/pickle-finance-launch-beea2eb8eacb","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://docs.pickle.finance","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://cryptotesters.com/review/what-is-pickle-finance","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://thedefiant.io/news/defi/pickle-finance-sounds-like-a-joke-but-it-wants-to-bring-stability-to-defi","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-defi-protocol-pickle-finance-hack-nov-2020","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://github.com/banteg/evil-jar/blob/master/readme.md","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://rekt.news/pickle-finance-rekt","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://picklefinance.medium.com/pickle-was-hacked-and-there-has-been-a-loss-of-funds-414b99969c29","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://rekt.news/pickle-finance-rekt","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://docs.pickle.finance/security/audits-and-timelock/smart-contract-audits","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://immunebytes.com/blog/pickle-finance-exploit-nov-21-2020-detailed-analysis/","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://picklefinance.medium.com/pickle-was-hacked-and-there-has-been-a-loss-of-funds-414b99969c29","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://rekt.news/pickle-finance-rekt","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-defi-protocol-pickle-finance-hack-nov-2020","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.theblock.co/post/85585/defi-merger-yearn-pickle-finance","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://cointelegraph.com/news/yearn-finance-absorbs-pickle-to-boost-defi-rewards","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://x.com/picklefinance/status/1331287296637693954","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/defi-protocol-pickle-finance-token-loses-almost-half-its-value-after-$19.7m-hack-2020-11","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://picklefinance.medium.com/pickle-finance-closing-the-jar-7996fe4ecd94","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-defi-protocol-pickle-finance-hack-nov-2020","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://rekt.news/pickle-finance-rekt","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://decrypt.co/49149/pickle-finance-hack","type":"other","url":""}]}],"sources_used":[],"summary":"Pickle Finance was a DeFi yield aggregator launched in September 2020 that allowed users to auto-compound returns via tokenized strategy vaults called 'Jars.' On November 21, 2020, an attacker exploited a combination of smart contract vulnerabilities in the unaudited ControllerV4 contract to drain 19,759,355 DAI (~$19.7 million) from the pDAI Jar in what analysts described as one of the most technically complex DeFi exploits of its era. The protocol subsequently partnered with Yearn Finance, issued a CORNICHON compensation token to victims, and continued operating until it announced a full shutdown effective October 1, 2025.","timeline":[{"date":"2020-09-11","event":"Pickle Finance launches on Ethereum at block 10838600 with a fair-launch PICKLE token distribution and no pre-mine.","source":""},{"date":"2020-09-15","event":"Protocol TVL surpasses $347 million within four days of launch, driven by DeFi Summer yield farming demand.","source":""},{"date":"2020-10-03","event":"MixBytes commences a smart contract audit covering ControllerV3 and existing Jar strategy contracts.","source":""},{"date":"2020-10-20","event":"HAECHI AUDIT completes its review of Pickle Finance smart contracts, covering ControllerV3 scope.","source":""},{"date":"2020-10-23","event":"ControllerV4 is deployed to mainnet with the new swapExactJarForJar() function, outside the scope of both completed audits.","source":""},{"date":"2020-11-21","event":"Attacker drains 19,759,355 DAI from the pDAI PickleJar using the 'Evil Jar' exploit, combining unvalidated jar swaps, code injection via CurveProxyLogic, and incorrect dust classification of cDAI. PICKLE token falls ~50%.","source":""},{"date":"2020-11-22","event":"Pickle Finance governance multi-sig granted emergency powers via Timelock at 3:15 PM UTC. CurveProxyLogic converter revoked from Controller one minute later, eliminating the attack vector.","source":""},{"date":"2020-11-24","event":"Yearn Finance and Pickle Finance announce a collaboration. CORNICHON compensation token introduced and distributed proportionally to hack victims based on pDAI Jar balance snapshot.","source":""},{"date":"2025-07-01","event":"Pickle Finance announces protocol shutdown, citing bear market conditions and saturated yield-aggregator market. 170,280 USDC treasury to be distributed to token holders.","source":""},{"date":"2025-10-01","event":"Pickle Finance UI disabled. Protocol fully sunsets after approximately five years of operation.","source":""}]},"v":1}