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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
2214 (-8)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443505432
Off-chain at
2026-08-08T02:03:48.796Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
Ag5ycKSuvQTzsjWAFA2ee1Ljtu4erma33TFm2jfRQgx8
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1681 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-08T02:03:48.633Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"faec5800-9619-42f7-95f7-64b6ca22289d","new_score":14,"page_slug":"allbridge-core-solana-flash-loan-exploit-july-2026","prev_score":22,"reason":"The page's core factual record is well-supported: the $1.65M exploit amount, Kamino flash loan mechanism, attacker wallet addresses, fund routing through Railgun and Zcash privacy pools, the 2023 BNB Chain precedent, and the CCTP/LayerZero relaunch plan are all confirmed by multiple Tier 1 and Tier 2 sources. Reviewer computed disputed_pct at 6%, which falls in the approve band, but two high-priority coverage gaps push the verdict to revise: the absence of on-chain transaction hashes for independent verification of the specific USDT/USDC figures, and the lack of any identified audit coverage of the Solana deployment post-2023 — a gap directly relevant to the negligence characterization on the page. Additionally, claim_findings[10] identifies a material editorial error: a passage is presented as a verbatim quote from the Allbridge Medium postmortem but does not appear in that document; the actual postmortem language differs, and the cited text reads as analyst paraphrase. claim_findings[7] notes a secondary discrepancy between the page's $573K 2023 loss figure and the official postmortem's $650K figure, with secondary sources partially bridging the gap. These issues do not undermine the investigation's core findings but require correction before the page can be approved.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}