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AVOID.NET
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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
0 → 0 (-14)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443510841
Off-chain at
2026-08-25T03:11:22.699Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
AkKdcMTaq6WAvpno4KCCtWs2SkTx2xavgaZtsY9gdfk3
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1747 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T03:11:22.447Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"d2e83b50-26b3-4b94-bf76-3e25e8acd59c","new_score":0,"page_slug":"crypto-whale-25-6m-repeat-phishing-drain-august-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"Of 27 factual claims checked against independent reporting, 22 were confirmed, 2 partially supported, 2 unverifiable (both absence-of-evidence claims), and 1 disputed — an 11% dispute rate. The disputed item, claim_findings[4], carries more weight than its 1-in-27 share suggests: it is the page's only concrete on-chain wallet attribution, naming address 0x8fEB...F95Ae as the 2026 attacker's wallet. Two outlets covering the same event (CryptoRank, BitcoinWorld) instead describe that same address as belonging to the repeatedly-targeted victim, and the page presents its own source's framing as settled without noting the conflict. A high-priority coverage gap in the review points to the same root cause — no primary on-chain reference (Etherscan, Arkham, or the original Specter post) is cited anywhere on the page to resolve which framing is correct. Because address attributions on a risk-intelligence platform can be mechanically consumed and propagated by exchanges or blocklisting tools, an unresolved victim-vs-attacker mix-up carries a different, higher-stakes risk profile than a wrong date or figure, which is why this page requires revision rather than approval even though every other major claim — all dollar amounts, dates, the 2023 incident, and the July 2024 restitution — was strongly corroborated across multiple independent outlets.","score_delta":-14,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}