Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Crypto Whale — $25.6M Repeat Phishing Drain (August 2026)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 0 → 0 (-14)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443510841
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T03:11:22.699Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- AkKdcMTaq6WAvpno4KCCtWs2SkTx2xavgaZtsY9gdfk3
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1747 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T03:11:22.447Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"d2e83b50-26b3-4b94-bf76-3e25e8acd59c","new_score":0,"page_slug":"crypto-whale-25-6m-repeat-phishing-drain-august-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"Of 27 factual claims checked against independent reporting, 22 were confirmed, 2 partially supported, 2 unverifiable (both absence-of-evidence claims), and 1 disputed — an 11% dispute rate. The disputed item, claim_findings[4], carries more weight than its 1-in-27 share suggests: it is the page's only concrete on-chain wallet attribution, naming address 0x8fEB...F95Ae as the 2026 attacker's wallet. Two outlets covering the same event (CryptoRank, BitcoinWorld) instead describe that same address as belonging to the repeatedly-targeted victim, and the page presents its own source's framing as settled without noting the conflict. A high-priority coverage gap in the review points to the same root cause — no primary on-chain reference (Etherscan, Arkham, or the original Specter post) is cited anywhere on the page to resolve which framing is correct. Because address attributions on a risk-intelligence platform can be mechanically consumed and propagated by exchanges or blocklisting tools, an unresolved victim-vs-attacker mix-up carries a different, higher-stakes risk profile than a wrong date or figure, which is why this page requires revision rather than approval even though every other major claim — all dollar amounts, dates, the 2023 incident, and the July 2024 restitution — was strongly corroborated across multiple independent outlets.","score_delta":-14,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}