Skip to main content
AVOID.NET
← avoid.net

Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
0 → 0 (-12)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443516080
Off-chain at
2026-08-25T18:58:46.918Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
BKJ8wGGAjMkLCCAmvaNcPhNFSeSZqZZCgyrRmWBRceyw
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2159 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T18:58:46.630Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"6b5ba28c-6fa5-43c6-aa57-c6b43966b0ed","new_score":0,"page_slug":"eu-mica-post-deadline-regulator-impersonation-scam-cluster","prev_score":0,"reason":"Of 22 claims checked, 18 were confirmed and the page's central narrative — a fraud wave impersonating ESMA and France's AMF after the MiCA transition deadline — was verified directly against the regulators' own statements and traced to an original Financial Times report rather than a chain of unverified repetition (claim_findings[0], [6], [7], [8]). Two problems keep this from a clean approval. First, the page names Belgium's FSMA and the National Bank of Hungary as impersonation targets, but no source, including the three the page itself cites, supports either institution having been spoofed (claim_findings[9]) — this is flagged as the review's one high-priority gap because it attributes an unconfirmed incident to named public authorities on a page meant to help readers distinguish real regulators from fake ones. Second, the page states ESMA's register grew from 194 to 323 authorized firms, 'a 74 percent increase,' but 323 from 194 is roughly 66.5 percent; the 74 percent figure actually corresponds to a different outlet's count of 338 firms, so two sources have been merged into one internally inconsistent sentence (claim_findings[3]). One additional figure, a comparison to roughly $6 billion in losses five years earlier, could not be found in the cited report (claim_findings[15]), though the $17 billion headline figure itself is well supported. Weighing in the page's favor: it correctly identifies Coinbase, Kraken, and OKX as MiCA-authorized, avoiding the kind of authorization error a companion page in this batch made (claim_findings[12]). With overall disputed-or-unverifiable claims at about 14 percent of the total and reviewer confidence at 0.75, this warrants a moderate correction rather than escalation to investigation status.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}