Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · DeFi Governance Attack Wave 2026
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 0 → 0 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457427378
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-15T23:52:02.095Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-15T23:52:17.194Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 5wu3GJ9Z4SET1A7Sxtit32zuDb63DQnSs6Fx4PgUjFHL
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2183 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"c277f4cbc6532d3b5e4161ead0835e7b","decided_at":"2026-10-15T23:52:01.946Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.24,"findings_hash":"5mFAEt6jNkQofLdJd4nKJS3RcdhNfm8qMVkWMLyWAHKs","investigation_id":"6b0b5653-4ab1-4c49-8ab8-cc603345bb23","mode":"findings_only","new_score":0,"page_content_hash":"88d501a49f702323d28b6f75408183c82769f91504b716767b5d53e64b4d7a12","page_slug":"defi-governance-attack-wave-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's reporting on the five best-documented incidents (BonkDAO, Term Finance, Token of Power, Panther Protocol, and the broader 2026 DeFi exploit context) is largely accurate and well-sourced, with precise dollar figures, dates, and mechanics confirmed against both the page's own cited sources and independent reporting. However, the BarnBridge section contains a clear quantitative error (320,000 BOND tokens vs. the ~32,000 BOND figure given by the page's own cited BlockSec source and two independent outlets) and a sourcing error (attributing on-chain confirmation to GoPlus Security when all available reporting credits BlockSec Phalcon). The Term Finance timelock narrative is disputed by the page's own cited SpotedCrypto source, which describes the seven-day timelock and LP veto as still active but unexercised, not removed or lapsed as the page states in two places. A timeline entry misdates Term Labs' public confirmation by one day (August 24 vs. the sourced August 23). There is also an unresolved internal inconsistency between the 'seven protocols' framing (borrowed from Blockaid's June 9-August 6 count, which excludes Term Finance) and the page's own protocol list and $22-30M range, which appears to add Term Finance's loss on top of Blockaid's bounded figure. The specific DefiLlama '$25.1 million / five incidents' classification, cited twice, is plausible but not supported by any of the sources inline-cited for it, though it was confirmed via an outlet not used by the page. No accepted community submissions were available to spot-check.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}