Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Thetanuts Finance
- Sequence
- #7
- Score
- 61 → 51 (-10)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 461983438
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-27T07:19:22.166Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-27T07:19:45.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-27T07:19:45.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- HXGjXEnKYwEo3TqF8awKZ4bK1Ei5HpdGXDRTQqXUzJSo
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1449 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"a8c669ba93dfaaa82872f77489954ed8","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T07:19:21.613Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.2857,"investigation_id":"a147deee-ab3a-4dd3-bd1b-cd50d1abe93e","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":51,"page_slug":"thetanuts-finance","prev_score":61,"reason":"2 of 7 checked claims (29%) were disputed or could not be verified: claim_findings[0] says five audit firms when the official security docs list six, and claim_findings[6] (Three Arrows bankruptcy) was not checked. The core facts hold: the funding rounds, the June 15, 2026 exploit amounts and whitehat recovery, and the per-audit dates and scopes were confirmed. Three further claims were only partly supported: the vulnerability is described more specifically than sources show (claim_findings[3]), the returning-investor detail is unconfirmed (claim_findings[4]), and the TVL decline is 98% by the page's own figures, not 97% (claim_findings[5]). The only omission is a pending post-mortem, rated minor, and the project is still operating, so the penalty is kept at the modest end of the band.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-10,"sequence_num":7,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}