Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Taiko Bridge SGX Key Exploit (June 2026)
- Sequence
- #8
- Score
- 34 → 26 (-8)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 462277661
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-28T00:42:01.109Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-28T00:43:22.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-28T00:43:22.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 6L64bjz8Gsq4xT74v8poFNDdthDrmi7gn4BrCEREiKkz
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1535 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"5ee8f69f78d200532819562385cfd0b1","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-10-28T00:42:00.822Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.125,"investigation_id":"906525a5-b86d-4d1f-bfd6-a3c27a894f5d","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":26,"page_slug":"taiko-bridge-sgx-key-exploit-june-2026","prev_score":34,"reason":"The core incident facts (the $1.7M loss, the exposed SGX signing key, the on-chain attack sequence, the asset breakdown, the July 2 reopening and user restitution) were confirmed by Tier 1 and Tier 2 sources. One finding was unverifiable (claim_findings[8], the Kelp DAO and PeckShield context, not checked), giving 1 of 8 countable findings, or 12.5%; one finding was blocked by the source (claim_findings[5], the Singapore report) and is excluded from that count. Two further claims were only partially supported: the $189,000 TAIKO transfer is misattributed to CoinDesk, which reports about $170,000 (claim_findings[3]), and the eight-minute containment window rests on a Tier 3 source (claim_findings[6]). A high-priority coverage gap, the lack of primary Taiko sources, also supports a minor revision rather than approval.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-8,"scored_claims":8,"sequence_num":8,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}