Skip to main content
AVOID.NET
← avoid.net

Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#5
Score
15 → 0 (-20)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
464362121
Off-chain at
2026-11-02T04:32:29.799Z
Anchored at
2026-11-02T04:32:53.000Z
Block time
2026-11-02T04:32:53.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
3ZtQjXteij486R2xvvYu9EdUpaSWxGEWC1FGmhizSyxR
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1830 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"336d7b6deaa08405a5892cc48015b2fa","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T04:32:29.548Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.2143,"investigation_id":"4abf1a64-b6e0-4878-8180-781d9c05d9ce","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":0,"page_slug":"humanity-protocol-staged-hack-allegation-zachxbt","prev_score":15,"reason":"The core account holds up: the private key compromise, ZachXBT's 'possibly staged' allegation and his same-day update separating the hack from the market-maker concerns match reliable sources (claim_findings[0], [1], [8], [9]). About 36% of checkable claims were disputed or unverified (5 of 14, with 1 blocked source excluded). Two statements that no third-party forensic report existed are out of date, because Quantstamp published one around June 12 (claim_findings[4], [5]). Several specifics could not be sourced (Elton's analysis, the 3-of-6 and 3-of-5 Safe thresholds, the Halborn post), and the page omits the DPRK attribution. Reviewer confidence was moderate, so the penalty sits in the lower half of the band.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-20,"scored_claims":14,"sequence_num":5,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"significant","from_band":"minor","reason":"The review reports a material omission: the page does not mention Quantstamp's June 2026 attribution of the attack to North Korean state-linked actors, which bears directly on the page's staged-hack framing. The percentage band already reaches significant, and the omission supports keeping it there."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}