Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Humanity Protocol - Staged Hack Allegation (ZachXBT)
- Sequence
- #5
- Score
- 15 → 0 (-20)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 464362121
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-02T04:32:29.799Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-02T04:32:53.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-02T04:32:53.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 3ZtQjXteij486R2xvvYu9EdUpaSWxGEWC1FGmhizSyxR
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1830 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"336d7b6deaa08405a5892cc48015b2fa","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T04:32:29.548Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.2143,"investigation_id":"4abf1a64-b6e0-4878-8180-781d9c05d9ce","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":0,"page_slug":"humanity-protocol-staged-hack-allegation-zachxbt","prev_score":15,"reason":"The core account holds up: the private key compromise, ZachXBT's 'possibly staged' allegation and his same-day update separating the hack from the market-maker concerns match reliable sources (claim_findings[0], [1], [8], [9]). About 36% of checkable claims were disputed or unverified (5 of 14, with 1 blocked source excluded). Two statements that no third-party forensic report existed are out of date, because Quantstamp published one around June 12 (claim_findings[4], [5]). Several specifics could not be sourced (Elton's analysis, the 3-of-6 and 3-of-5 Safe thresholds, the Halborn post), and the page omits the DPRK attribution. Reviewer confidence was moderate, so the penalty sits in the lower half of the band.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-20,"scored_claims":14,"sequence_num":5,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"significant","from_band":"minor","reason":"The review reports a material omission: the page does not mention Quantstamp's June 2026 attribution of the attack to North Korean state-linked actors, which bears directly on the page's staged-hack framing. The percentage band already reaches significant, and the omission supports keeping it there."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}