Verify a decision

{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-26T15:36:28.292Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"e3ad1666-117b-460f-add3-88e6cde00c95","new_score":8,"page_slug":"allbridge-core-second-flash-loan-exploit-via-same-unpatched-vector","prev_score":18,"reason":"Fact-checking confirmed the large majority of this page's discrete claims — dates, dollar figures, TVL impact, fund-movement details, and the 2023 incident's specifics — against independent outlets and, in several cases, directly against Allbridge's own postmortem text. However, the page's central allegation embedded in its own title — that the July 2026 exploit ran through the same vector left unpatched since 2023 — rests on a claim the review found to misstate its sources: the sentence stating that two outlets 'reported that the single-pool fix explicitly missed Solana' (claim_findings[21]) is disputed, because both cited articles actually present this as an open, unexplained question rather than a confirmed fact, and a closely related claim making the same underlying point (claim_findings[20]) is independently rated only partially supported for the same reason. The page also does not reflect Allbridge's subsequent public commitment to a full architectural overhaul away from liquidity pools, or a third Allbridge exploit reported in mid-August 2026 that struck the very remediation path adopted after this incident (coverage_gaps, stale findings at claim_findings[31] and [39]). Because the sourcing problem sits at the evidentiary core of the page's framing rather than in a peripheral detail, and because material context postdating the page's research window is missing, the page is sent back for revision rather than approved outright or denied.","score_delta":-10,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}