Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Ekubo Protocol
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 42 → 56 (+14)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443509448
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-19T16:40:04.990Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- AFuFZQ1fxXKYf2h3Prp9QSJjbr1Y46PwdPJM9KHkUY9V
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1788 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-19T16:40:04.799Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"766c540c-a4ce-4c02-afb8-366643c4aaf1","new_score":56,"page_slug":"ekubo-protocol","prev_score":42,"reason":"This is a suffered third-party hack, not entity fraud: claim_findings[4] and claim_findings[6] confirm the exploit was a smart-contract access-control flaw in Ekubo's EVM router, with the protocol's own funds and LPs unharmed and the loss borne entirely by a single victim wallet that had granted an unlimited approval; claim_findings[7] confirms Starknet core was unaffected and claim_findings[11] confirms same-day transparent disclosure. Per the scoring rubric's fraud-likelihood semantics, a suffered hack with no entity fraud or negligence rising to deceptive conduct caps severity at CAUTIONARY (50-69), so the current WARNING/42 score is treating this as entity-attributable risk the evidence does not support. The page separately has content problems worth fixing before republication — claim_findings[1] shows the 'Uniswap Labs Ventures invested $12M at a $60M valuation' claim misstates its own cited source (an unexecuted 2023 DAO governance RFC, with the valuation drawn from a commenter's speculation, and no entity called 'Uniswap Labs Ventures' appearing in the source), and claim_findings[12] shows the 'refund portal' claim is unsupported by every source checked, including the one specifically cited for it. Both should be corrected or removed, but neither changes the core, well-corroborated finding that this was a suffered hack rather than fraud, so the score should move up even as the page goes back for edits.","score_delta":14,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}