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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · Ekubo Protocol
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#3
Score
42 → 56 (+14)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443509448
Off-chain at
2026-08-19T16:40:04.990Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
AFuFZQ1fxXKYf2h3Prp9QSJjbr1Y46PwdPJM9KHkUY9V
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1788 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-19T16:40:04.799Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"766c540c-a4ce-4c02-afb8-366643c4aaf1","new_score":56,"page_slug":"ekubo-protocol","prev_score":42,"reason":"This is a suffered third-party hack, not entity fraud: claim_findings[4] and claim_findings[6] confirm the exploit was a smart-contract access-control flaw in Ekubo's EVM router, with the protocol's own funds and LPs unharmed and the loss borne entirely by a single victim wallet that had granted an unlimited approval; claim_findings[7] confirms Starknet core was unaffected and claim_findings[11] confirms same-day transparent disclosure. Per the scoring rubric's fraud-likelihood semantics, a suffered hack with no entity fraud or negligence rising to deceptive conduct caps severity at CAUTIONARY (50-69), so the current WARNING/42 score is treating this as entity-attributable risk the evidence does not support. The page separately has content problems worth fixing before republication — claim_findings[1] shows the 'Uniswap Labs Ventures invested $12M at a $60M valuation' claim misstates its own cited source (an unexecuted 2023 DAO governance RFC, with the valuation drawn from a commenter's speculation, and no entity called 'Uniswap Labs Ventures' appearing in the source), and claim_findings[12] shows the 'refund portal' claim is unsupported by every source checked, including the one specifically cited for it. Both should be corrected or removed, but neither changes the core, well-corroborated finding that this was a suffered hack rather than fraud, so the score should move up even as the page goes back for edits.","score_delta":14,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}