Skip to main content
AVOID.NET
← avoid.net

Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#5
Score
0 → 0 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
457903899
Off-chain at
2026-10-17T04:29:05.728Z
Anchored at
2026-10-17T04:29:08.157Z
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
C8dYQGB5MF9uHFhTKz2QGdMT5ThQmT8FahgKRV3e26sm
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1888 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"9a892db943ca783f045e7f3edf0a286a","decided_at":"2026-10-17T04:29:05.582Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.2069,"findings_hash":"CF4E9kudB7kmHCyKUp2DCgb4vpABiodHsmftG7Dc59bz","investigation_id":"dd0db8d8-86d7-4988-95a1-b35ea4d655cf","mode":"findings_only","new_score":0,"page_content_hash":"7d8b36cfe7ab02dfe1a9ae97c9601314d0061cb50c557b4f1c357d94e4ea2dd1","page_slug":"north-korea-lazarus-group-h1-2026-systematic-crypto-theft-campaign","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's core statistics (H1 2026 totals, Drift and KelpDAO exploit mechanics and amounts, OFAC sanctions details, year-over-year DPRK share percentages, DeFi TVL impact) are well supported by the cited primary sources, which were independently verified via direct fetches of TRM Labs, Chainalysis, LayerZero, Treasury, and CoinDesk reporting. The most significant problems found are: a 2024 DPRK theft figure ($975M/62 incidents) that matches neither TRM Labs' (~$800M) nor Chainalysis' (~$1.34B/47 incidents) actual reported numbers; a repeated conflation of Aave's withdrawal/TVL-decline figures (~$8-8.9B across sources) with a specific, unsupported '$8.54 billion in deposit losses' claim, appearing in two sections; an incorrect timeline date for the Sinbad.io sanction (stored as December 2023, actually November 29, 2023); and two instances of attributed quotes/characterizations ('code red,' 'largest identity-theft operation of its kind,' and one of two Ari Redbord quotes) that could not be traced to any source, including the sources the page itself cites. None of these affect the page's central, well-supported narrative that DPRK-linked actors drove the majority of H1 2026 crypto theft via the Drift and KelpDAO attacks.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}