Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Fake Sparrow Wallet (Apple App Store)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 0 → 0 (-8)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443516436
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T19:19:09.402Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- GWm5GtpWxu4gcrCD8Q9xgQRm1NepS3Bju6nyxSFP9Zg3
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2035 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T19:19:09.245Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"670b2f92-11e7-4afe-8903-69e7c97cfcaa","new_score":0,"page_slug":"fake-sparrow-wallet-apple-app-store","prev_score":0,"reason":"The reviewer confirmed 13 of 18 claims, including the core narrative: a counterfeit iOS app impersonating the desktop-only Sparrow Wallet drained roughly $1.84 million from three victims and led to a federal lawsuit against Apple (claim_findings[0]-[6], [8], [10], [12], [14]-[16]). Critically, the page keeps a clean line between the genuine Sparrow Wallet project and its creator Craig Raw on one hand, and the fraudulent app on the other, and attributes Apple's public statements to Apple rather than presenting them as verified fact (claim_findings[2], [10]) -- avoiding the most damaging error this kind of story could make. One claim is disputed: the page says Apple cited '$9 billion blocked between 2020-2024' in its response to this incident, but all three of the page's own cited sources report Apple citing a different figure, $2.2 billion for 2025 alone, in that context; the $9B figure is real but belongs to an unrelated May 2025 Apple press release (claim_findings[11]). Two claims are unverifiable due to source access limits rather than contradiction -- an unconfirmed 54-page complaint length and an unconfirmed June 1, 2026 reversal date where sources only support 'June 2026' (claim_findings[7], [17]) -- and two are partially supported, including a Kaspersky campaign start date off by roughly a year (claim_findings[9], [13]). None of the coverage gaps are high priority. Combined, this supports revision of the specific enforcement-statistic claim and the two imprecise dates, with a modest score penalty rather than escalation, given the overall accuracy of the central allegations and the correct handling of the two uninvolved parties.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}