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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#1
Score
10 → 10 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443519683
Off-chain at
2026-08-26T08:03:04.563Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
8TqCDixGcBCrVxrTxP3ubLQsiiLZrNzneoUpQriLEoUb
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1557 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-26T08:03:04.343Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"9ffcaedb-9f9b-46d6-a1c5-992c1f931865","new_score":10,"page_slug":"bridgelink-crossflow-relay-protocol-june-14-cross-chain-exploit-127m","prev_score":10,"reason":"The page is built almost entirely around a single Tier-3 vendor blog post (Nadcab Labs) describing a $127M cross-chain exploit across three named protocols, and the page itself already labels nearly every substantive fact as alleged/unverified. Independent research corroborates the page's core finding: no Tier 1/2 outlet, security firm, or on-chain database mentions this incident, and multiple comprehensive contemporaneous roundups of 2026 bridge/DeFi hacks — which do document smaller incidents — omit it entirely, with one aggregator's total for all of June 2026 crypto losses ($75.87M) being less than the $127M claimed for this single event. The background context in the final section (Kelp DAO, Verus-Ethereum, CrossCurve, Wormhole, Ronin) is accurate and well-corroborated, though the Cybernews '$300M' citation is presented as if describing a fourth, separate incident when it in fact describes the same Kelp DAO event already cited via Chainalysis. This review's evidence supports 'could not corroborate' rather than definitive proof the incident never happened, but the totality of absence across otherwise-thorough sources is substantial.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":1,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}