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← UXLINKreviewed 2026-09-09 · 20 claims checked

Fact-check findings

What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read UXLINK against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.

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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.

“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.

Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.

disputed 1unverifiable 1link rot 3partially supported 2confirmed 134 corrections pending · 0 applied

disputed

1 claim

The reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.

  1. #15[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Project Background and Investors
    “UXLINK was founded in 2022 by Mark Wang and Xiao Zihao (also identified as Sean, founder and CEO, and Abao Wu, co-founder and CTO), and is incorporated in Singapore.”
    reviewerUXLINK was founded in 2022 by Mark Wang and Xiao Zihao (also identified as Sean, founder and CEO, and Abao Wu, co-founder and CTO), and is incorporated in Singapore.The parenthetical construction implies 'Xiao Zihao' and 'Sean, founder and CEO' are the same person. No source found supports this; available sources treat Sean and Zihao Xiao as two distinct individuals with different roles (Sean as a co-founder/former CEO, Zihao Xiao as co-founder/Head of Tech). The sentence conflates two people's identities.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    UXLINK was founded in 2022 by Mark Wang and Xiao Zihao, with Sean (co-founder, formerly CEO) and Abao Wu (co-founder and CTO) also identified as part of the founding team, and is incorporated in Singapore.
    citedtracxn.com/d/companies/uxlink/__s2WGdSck…wgJMyQs6XAzuGrZA

unverifiable

1 claim

No source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.

  1. #18[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Project Background and Investors
    “No regulatory actions from the SEC, CFTC, or equivalent bodies against UXLINK or its founders have been identified in publicly available records as of June 2026.”
    reviewerNo regulatory actions from the SEC, CFTC, or equivalent bodies against UXLINK or its founders have been identified in publicly available records as of June 2026.Appropriately hedged as a negative claim limited to 'publicly available records'; no contradicting evidence found, but this class of claim cannot be affirmatively confirmed.

partially supported

2 claims

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

  1. #2[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: September 2025 Multi-Sig Exploit
    “With admin access obtained, the attacker drained over $11.3 million in assets — comprising approximately $4.5 million in stablecoins, as well as ETH, WBTC, and approximately 490 million native UXLINK tokens — and minted an estimated 10 trillion fraudulent UXLINK tokens on the Arbitrum blockchain.”
    reviewerThe attacker drained over $11.3 million in assets, comprising approximately $4.5 million in stablecoins plus ETH, WBTC, and approximately 490 million native UXLINK tokens.Secondary reporting is genuinely split on whether the 490 million UXLINK tokens were part of the $11.3M multi-sig drain or a separate, subsequent dump of freshly-minted supply. The $4.5M stablecoin figure and the $11.3M headline total are solid, but the page states the 490M-token figure as settled fact when multiple outlets treat it as a distinct event from the treasury drain.
    citedcryptopotato.com/uxlink-falls-victim-to-…nges-by-over-70/www.okx.com/en-us/learn/uxlink-tokens-hack-impact-lessons
  2. #20[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
    “UXLINK raises over $9 million in Series A funding led by OKX Ventures in Q1 2024, with additional participation from HashKey Capital and SevenX Ventures; total funding reaches approximately $14–15 million.”
    reviewerUXLINK raises over $9 million in Series A funding led by OKX Ventures in Q1 2024, with additional participation from HashKey Capital and SevenX Ventures; total funding reaches approximately $14-15 million.The $9M and ~$14-15M total figures check out, but labeling the OKX-led round 'Series A' and folding SevenX Ventures into the same round as a co-participant misdescribes two separate rounds (an OKX-led seed round, then a separate SevenX-led round) as one Series A round.
    citedwww.coincarp.com/project/uxlink/

confirmed

13 claims

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

  1. #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: September 2025 Multi-Sig Exploit
    “On September 22, 2025, UXLINK's multi-signature wallet was compromised through a delegateCall vulnerability. The attacker exploited this flaw to execute arbitrary code with administrative privileges, invoking the addOwnerWithThreshold function to replace legitimate owner addresses with their own, thereby seizing full control of the multi-sig.”
    reviewerOn September 22, 2025, UXLINK's multi-sig wallet was compromised via a delegateCall vulnerability, with the attacker using addOwnerWithThreshold to seize control.Well corroborated across multiple independent outlets and the cited sources.
    citedincrypthos.com/security/uxlink-multi-sig…l-vulnerability/cryptopotato.com/uxlink-falls-victim-to-…nges-by-over-70/
  2. #3[confirmed][no action needed]in section: September 2025 Multi-Sig Exploit
    “and minted an estimated 10 trillion fraudulent UXLINK tokens on the Arbitrum blockchain”
    reviewerThe attacker minted an estimated 10 trillion fraudulent UXLINK tokens on Arbitrum.The 10 trillion figure is correct and is the number more widely and more credibly reported (Rekt News, The Block, Hackmanac). However, two of the five sources the page itself cites for this section (CryptoPotato and OKX) actually report 1-2 billion tokens minted, not 10 trillion — those specific citations do not support the sentence they're attached to, even though the sentence's claim is independently true.
    citedcryptopotato.com/uxlink-falls-victim-to-…nges-by-over-70/www.okx.com/en-us/learn/uxlink-tokens-hack-impact-lessons
  3. #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: September 2025 Multi-Sig Exploit
    “The UXLINK token price declined more than 70%, falling from approximately $0.30 to $0.09, erasing an estimated $70 million in market capitalization.”
    reviewerUXLINK token price declined more than 70%, from approximately $0.30 to $0.09, erasing an estimated $70 million in market capitalization.Well corroborated by the cited source and an independent tier-1 outlet.
    citedcryptopotato.com/uxlink-falls-victim-to-…nges-by-over-70/
  4. #6[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Tornado Cash Laundering Activity (2025–2026)
    “In an earlier phase, the exploiter converted stolen WBTC to ETH and routed approximately $6.4 million through Tornado Cash.”
    reviewerThe exploiter had, in an earlier phase, converted stolen WBTC to ETH and routed approximately $6.4 million through Tornado Cash.Consistent with the cited source's headline and reporting.
    citedcryptonews.net/news/security/32968920/
  5. #7[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Tornado Cash Laundering Activity (2025–2026)
    “Beginning around June 17, 2026 — approximately nine months after the initial breach — the exploiter wallet resumed activity, converting approximately 14.6 million DAI into 8,298.6 ETH before depositing a total of 8,340 ETH (valued at approximately $8.1 million at the time) into Tornado Cash via 46 discrete 100 ETH batch transactions, a fragmentation pattern consistent with deliberate obfuscation of transaction trails.”
    reviewerBeginning around June 17, 2026, the exploiter converted approximately 14.6 million DAI into 8,298.6 ETH and deposited 8,340 ETH (~$8.1 million) into Tornado Cash via 46 discrete 100 ETH batch transactions; total laundered reached $19.1 million; ~$16 million remained unrecovered.Strongly corroborated, including against the primary on-chain-analytics source (PeckShieldAlert) itself.
    citedwww.cryptotimes.io/2026/06/18/uxlink-exp…to-tornado-cash/ambcrypto.com/uxlink-exploit-returns-as-…to-tornado-cash/
  6. #8[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Tornado Cash Laundering Activity (2025–2026)
    “A separate Bitcoin address (partially identified as bc1pv8...yc5q) was also linked to the exploiter's fund movements. The laundering activity was flagged publicly by on-chain analytics firm PeckShieldAlert.”
    reviewerA separate Bitcoin address (partially identified as bc1pv8...yc5q) was also linked to the exploiter's fund movements, flagged by PeckShieldAlert.Confirmed against the primary source tweet.
    citedwww.cryptotimes.io/2026/06/18/uxlink-exp…to-tornado-cash/
  7. #9[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Secondary Fraud: Inferno Drainer Targets the Exploiter
    “In an unusual secondary incident reported on September 23, 2025, Scam Sniffer and SlowMist founder Yu Xian reported that the original UXLINK exploiter was themselves victimized by the Inferno Drainer phishing group, a known 'drain-as-a-service' (DaaS) operation. The exploiter signed a malicious increaseAllowance approval to a phishing contract, resulting in the loss of approximately 542 million UXLINK tokens — valued at between $48 million and $50 million at the time based on prevailing token prices — which were moved to phishing addresses controlled by Inferno Drainer.”
    reviewerOn September 23, 2025, the UXLINK exploiter lost approximately 542 million UXLINK tokens (valued between $48-50 million) to an Inferno Drainer phishing attack via a malicious increaseAllowance approval, reported by Scam Sniffer and SlowMist founder Yu Xian.Consistently corroborated across many independent outlets.
    citedcrypto.news/uxlink-exploiter-loses-542m-…phishing-attack/www.bitget.com/amp/news/detail/12560604983146
  8. #10[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Response and Recovery Efforts
    “The team reported the incident to police and relevant authorities and engaged security firms SlowMist and SEAL 911 to assist with on-chain fund tracking. UXLINK coordinated with centralized exchanges to freeze suspicious deposits, and the protocol stated that a substantial portion of the initially stolen assets were frozen through these exchange partnerships.”
    reviewerUXLINK reported the incident to police, engaged SlowMist and SEAL 911, coordinated with exchanges to freeze deposits, and a substantial portion of stolen assets were frozen.Matches cited source.
    citedcrypto.news/uxlink-scrambles-to-contain-…lice-for-action/
  9. #11[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Response and Recovery Efforts
    “In October 2025, UXLINK conducted a token buyback funded by recovered exchange assets; the buyback was approved by community governance with 99.99% support.”
    reviewerIn October 2025, UXLINK conducted a token buyback funded by recovered exchange assets; the buyback was approved by community governance with 99.99% support.The underlying claim is well supported, but one of the two citing sources (weex.com) is dead — see separate link_rot finding.
    citedcrypto.news/uxlink-token-buyback-user-co…ation-plan-2025/www.weex.com/news/detail/uxlink-hack-rec…pensation-183066
  10. #14[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Response and Recovery Efforts
    “A formal 1:1 token swap was announced, migrating the old UXLINK contract to a new Ethereum mainnet contract (0x3991B07b2951a4300Da8c76e7d2c7eddE861Fef3) with an unchanged maximum supply of 1 billion tokens; fraudulently minted tokens were excluded from the swap.”
    reviewerUXLINK announced a 1:1 token swap to a new Ethereum mainnet contract (0x3991B07b2951a4300Da8c76e7d2c7eddE861Fef3) with an unchanged maximum supply of 1 billion tokens, excluding fraudulently minted tokens.Contract address, ratio, and supply figure all confirmed exactly.
    citedcrypto.news/uxlink-hack-token-swap-plans…es-compensation/x.com/UXLINKofficial/status/1971184471274869134
  11. #16[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Project Background and Investors
    “As of mid-2025 the protocol claimed over 54 million registered users and more than 1.5 million token holders.”
    reviewerAs of mid-2025 the protocol claimed over 54 million registered users and more than 1.5 million token holders.Consistent with independently found figures.
    citedmessari.io/report/uxlink-building-the-so…h-layer-for-web3www.bitrue.com/blog/what-is-uxlink-web3-socialfi-guide
  12. #17[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Project Background and Investors
    “UXLINK raised approximately $14–15 million across four funding rounds from approximately 20–30 investors, including OKX Ventures (lead in Q1 2024), HashKey Capital, SevenX Ventures, INCE Capital, Animoca Ventures, and others.”
    reviewerUXLINK raised approximately $14-15 million across four funding rounds from approximately 20-30 investors, including OKX Ventures (lead in Q1 2024), HashKey Capital, SevenX Ventures, INCE Capital, Animoca Ventures, and others.Figures and investor names corroborated by independent press coverage.
    citedtracxn.com/d/companies/uxlink/__s2WGdSck…wgJMyQs6XAzuGrZAwww.coincarp.com/project/uxlink/
  13. #19[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
    “Exploiter wallet shows activity; funds continue to move.”
    reviewerThe 2026-03-20 timeline entry: exploiter wallet shows activity, funds continue to move.Date and underlying activity are confirmed by the cited article, though the event text is vague relative to the specific transaction the source actually describes (5,496 ETH -> ~11M DAI). Not a factual error, just a missed opportunity for precision — noted as a coverage gap rather than a defect.
    citedwww.cryptotimes.io/2026/06/18/uxlink-exp…to-tornado-cash/
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.