← TrapDoor Supply Chain Attackreviewed 2026-10-27 · 12 claims checked
Fact-check findings
What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read TrapDoor Supply Chain Attack against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.
Read this first
These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.
“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.
Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.
unverifiable
1 claimNo source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.
- #2[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Campaign Overview
“SlowMist described TrapDoor as 'one of the largest cross-platform supply chain attacks seen in 2026.'”
reviewerSlowMist quote 'one of the largest cross-platform supply chain attacks seen in 2026'The exact quoted wording could not be checked because the source was blocked.
partially supported
5 claimsThe cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.
- #1[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in the summary
“Security firm Socket and blockchain security firm SlowMist both described TrapDoor as one of the most significant supply chain attacks of 2026.”
reviewerSocket and SlowMist both described TrapDoor as one of the most significant supply chain attacks of 2026The SlowMist characterization is supported by the headline of the CryptoTimes article. No source consulted shows Socket making a comparable superlative claim, so the 'both' attribution is unsupported. - #3[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Campaign Overview
“TrapDoor is a multi-ecosystem malware campaign first detected by Socket's threat intelligence team on May 22, 2026, at approximately 20:20 UTC, when the earliest confirmed artifact — eth-security-auditor 0.1.0 — was uploaded to PyPI.”
reviewerFirst detected by Socket on May 22, 2026 ~20:20 UTC, when eth-security-auditor 0.1.0 was uploaded to PyPIThe upload time is correct, but the page presents it as the detection time. One secondary analysis in search results argues activity began as early as May 19. - #9[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Data Exfiltration Targets
“CoinDesk noted that crypto and DeFi developers are particularly valuable targets because they”
reviewerCoinDesk noted developers may have wallet files, SSH keys... on the same machineThe wording is real, but it is Socket's statement relayed by CoinDesk, not CoinDesk's own finding. - #10[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“Socket formally reports all 34+ identified malicious packages to npm, PyPI, and Crates.io registries for removal.”
reviewerSocket formally reported all packages to registries on 2026-05-29Reporting to registries is supported. The May 29 date is the date CoinDesk wrote about it, not a documented reporting date. Socket's own post on May 24 already existed, so the actual report was likely earlier. - #11[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“The Hacker News publishes initial public coverage of the TrapDoor supply chain campaign, citing Socket's research.”
reviewerThe Hacker News published initial public coverage on 2026-05-25The May 25 date is correct. Calling it the 'initial' coverage is inaccurate because Socket published on May 24.
confirmed
6 claimsThe cited evidence supports the claim as written.
- #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Campaign Overview
“The campaign spans three package registries (npm, PyPI, and Crates.io) and 34+ distinct malicious packages across 384+ versions”
reviewer34+ packages across 384+ versions on npm, PyPI, Crates.ioMatches Socket and The Hacker News. - #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Malicious Packages
“npm (21 packages): async-pipeline-builder, build-scripts-utils, chain-key-validator”
reviewerPackage lists: npm 21, PyPI 7, Crates.io 6, with namesPer-registry counts and names match. - #6[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Technical Execution and Payload Mechanics
“1,149-line JavaScript payload named 'trap-core.js'”
reviewertrap-core.js is 1,149 linesConfirmed by Socket. - #7[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Infrastructure and Attribution
“average response time of 5 minutes and 56 seconds across 381 package-version records, with a median detection time of 5 minutes and 27 seconds”
reviewerDetection latency statisticsMatches Socket. - #8[confirmed][no action needed]in section: AI Coding Assistant Poisoning
“browser-use/browser-use, langchain-ai/langchain, langflow-ai/langflow, run-llama/llama_index, FoundationAgents/MetaGPT, and OpenHands/OpenHands”
reviewerPull requests against six AI projects by ddjidd564Matches Socket. - #12[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Detection and Registry Response
“Socket stated it did not identify specific victims or confirmed stolen funds at the time of initial disclosure.”
reviewerNo confirmed victims or stolen amountsConsistent with Socket and CoinDesk.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.