Fact-check findings
What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Tinyman against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.
These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.
“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.
Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.
disputed
1 claimThe reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.
- #18[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Audit History and Security Posture Prior to Exploit
“Runtime Verification completed an initial security audit of Tinyman's v1 smart contracts on September 21, 2021, approximately ten weeks before the exploit.”
reviewerRuntime Verification completed the initial v1 audit on September 21, 2021, approximately ten weeks before the exploitThe audit date of September 21, 2021 is correct, but the elapsed time to the January 1, 2022 exploit is approximately 102 days (~14.6 weeks), not "approximately ten weeks."Proposed correction (not yet applied)Runtime Verification completed an initial security audit of Tinyman's v1 smart contracts on September 21, 2021, approximately fourteen weeks before the exploit.
unverifiable
5 claimsNo source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.
- #8[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: January 2022 Exploit: Attack Mechanism
“Beginning at approximately 19:03 UTC on January 1, 2022, a group of 13 unique wallet addresses exploited a previously unknown logic flaw in Tinyman's pool smart contracts.”
reviewerExploit began at approximately 19:03 UTC on January 1, 2022, via 13 unique wallet addressesThe 13-address figure is independently corroborated by multiple secondary sources, but the specific 19:03 UTC start time could not be confirmed or refuted from any source I could access (the primary Medium posts return HTTP 403 to automated fetch and web.archive.org could not be fetched in this environment). - #10[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: January 2022 Exploit: Attack Mechanism
“The first attacker completed approximately 16 transactions within one hour; subsequent attackers detected and replicated the exploit roughly six hours later.”
reviewerFirst attacker completed ~16 transactions within one hour; subsequent attackers replicated the exploit roughly six hours laterCould not independently confirm the one-hour / six-hour timing breakdown; secondary sources describe wave structure differently (by wallet count) rather than by elapsed time. - #13[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Financial Losses and Affected Users
“Secondary perpetrators collectively extracted an additional estimated $210,000 across a further 12 wallets.”
reviewerSecondary perpetrators extracted an additional ~$210,000 across 12 wallets12 wallets is arithmetically consistent with 13 total attacker addresses minus Account 1, but the specific $210,000 figure could not be located or confirmed in any source I could access. - #14[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Financial Losses and Affected Users
“Approximately 250 liquidity providers held positions in the affected goBTC and goETH pools.”
reviewerApproximately 250 liquidity providers held positions in the affected poolsNo corroborating or contradicting source found for this specific LP count. - #16[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Financial Losses and Affected Users
“The Tinyman team estimated that community reaction saved between 90 and 95 percent of total protocol liquidity.”
reviewerTinyman estimated community reaction saved between 90 and 95 percent of total protocol liquidityNo source located states a 90-95% saved figure; secondary summaries of Tinyman's reports credit fast community response with limiting losses but give no percentage. This specific statistic could not be confirmed.
link rot
3 claimsA cited source no longer resolves or no longer says what the page attributes to it.
- #29[link rot][awaiting moderator]in section: Incident Response and Compensation
“https://coin.fyi/news/algorand/tinyman-re-launch-on-mainnet-and-next-steps-snrs1f”
reviewerSource for January 19, 2022 relaunch (coin.fyi) is live and supports the claimThis is the sole cited source for the Jan 19, 2022 relaunch / two-audit-firm claim in this section; it no longer resolves to any content. No live archive copy exists (sources_used lists archive_status: unarchivable for this URL). - #30[link rot][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“https://coin.fyi/news/algorand/tinyman-re-launch-on-mainnet-and-next-steps-snrs1f”
reviewerTimeline: Tinyman v1.1 relaunches on mainnet Jan 19, 2022, source coin.fyiSame underlying dead source as the Incident Response and Compensation section citation; grouped under the same defect. - #31[link rot][awaiting moderator]in the cited sources
“https://coin.fyi/news/algorand/tinyman-re-launch-on-mainnet-and-next-steps-snrs1f”
reviewersources_used listing for coin.fyi is a usable sourceThird occurrence of the same dead source; grouped under the same defect group as the other two.
partially supported
4 claimsThe cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.
- #7[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Overview
“Founder Kaan Eryilmaz described the platform as a gateway DeFi primitive for the Algorand ecosystem.”
reviewerFounder Kaan Eryilmaz described the platform as a "gateway DeFi primitive" for the Algorand ecosystemThe cited source exists and is credible but does not support this specific characterization of the founder's words; no other source was found using this phrasing. - #17[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Financial Losses and Affected Users
“Separately, arbitrageurs extracted an estimated additional 1.2 million ALGO-equivalent value from the disrupted pool ratios during the attack period, bringing the aggregate ecosystem loss to approximately 3 million ALGO-equivalent.”
reviewerArbitrageurs extracted an additional ~1.2M ALGO-equivalent, bringing aggregate ecosystem loss to ~3M ALGO-equivalentThe underlying Tinyman post expresses these figures in ALGO units, while the page's earlier sentence in the same section states total direct losses were "approximately $3 million" in USD; the page's "ALGO-equivalent" framing elides this unit distinction and could read as the arbitrage figure re-deriving the same $3M already stated, rather than being additive to it. - #20[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Incident Response and Compensation
“On January 19, 2022, Tinyman relaunched with patched v1.1 contracts; the updated contracts had been reviewed by two audit firms and had also passed an internal bug-bounty process that surfaced a minor separate issue before relaunch.”
reviewerOn January 19, 2022, Tinyman relaunched v1.1, reviewed by two audit firms, with an internal bug bounty that found a minor issue before relaunchThe two-audit-firm detail is independently corroborated via Tinyman's docs (Runtime Verification + Coinspect). The January 19, 2022 relaunch date and the "minor separate issue surfaced by an internal bug-bounty process" detail could not be independently confirmed, and the page's sole cited source for this section (coin.fyi) is dead -- see linked link_rot finding. - #22[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Incident Response and Compensation
“Wallets with losses under 1 ALGO and wallets that added liquidity after block 18,403,162 (approximately 36 hours post-attack) were excluded.”
reviewerWallets with losses under 1 ALGO and wallets adding liquidity after block 18,403,162 (~36 hours post-attack) were excluded from compensationThe general exclusion rules are confirmed; the specific block number (18,403,162) and the "approximately 36 hours" framing could not be independently verified from any source I could access.
confirmed
18 claimsThe cited evidence supports the claim as written.
- #1[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary
“Tinyman is an automated market maker (AMM) and decentralized exchange (DEX) built on the Algorand blockchain, launched on mainnet in October 2021.”
reviewerTinyman is an Algorand AMM/DEX that launched on mainnet in October 2021Consistent across CoinDesk and multiple secondary blog sources. - #2[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary
“On January 1, 2022, attackers exploited a logic flaw in the protocol's pool-token burn function to drain approximately $3 million in wrapped Bitcoin and Ethereum assets across 43 pools.”
reviewerOn January 1, 2022, attackers exploited a burn-function logic flaw draining approximately $3 million in goBTC/goETH across 43 pools43 pools / 13 addresses / 360 transactions figure corroborated by independent search of Tinyman's own technical report. - #3[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary
“Tinyman subsequently patched the contracts, launched a compensation program covering all affected liquidity providers, and released a fully re-audited v2.0 protocol in early 2023.”
reviewerTinyman patched contracts, ran a compensation program for all affected LPs, and released a re-audited v2.0 in early 2023Compensation program and v2.0 re-audit independently corroborated. - #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Overview
“The protocol launched on Algorand mainnet in October 2021, positioning itself as the first fully operational DEX on the network.”
reviewerTinyman positioned itself as the first fully operational DEX on Algorand at mainnet launchCorroborated only by blog-tier sources rather than a primary announcement; characterization is consistent but not from a tier-1 outlet. - #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Overview
“Prior to the January 2022 exploit, Tinyman held approximately $43 million in total value locked, making it the dominant liquidity venue on Algorand.”
reviewerTinyman held approximately $43 million TVL prior to the exploitFigure consistent with independent reporting. - #6[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Overview
“The project raised $2.5 million in a pre-launch funding round with investors including Borderless Capital, Arrington Capital, Digital Currency Group, BlockTower Capital, and GoldenTree Asset Management.”
reviewerTinyman raised $2.5 million from Borderless Capital, Arrington Capital, Digital Currency Group, BlockTower Capital, and GoldenTree Asset ManagementAll five named investors appear in the CoinDesk article; the list is non-exhaustive ("including") which is accurate. - #9[confirmed][no action needed]in section: January 2022 Exploit: Attack Mechanism
“This was not a flash-loan attack; it was a smart contract logic error that any account could exploit by calling the standard burn transaction with a specially crafted transaction group.”
reviewerThis was not a flash-loan attack but a smart-contract logic error exploitable by any accountConsistent with Halborn and TRM Labs descriptions of the mechanism. - #11[confirmed][no action needed]in section: January 2022 Exploit: Attack Mechanism
“Across all perpetrators, 360 malicious transactions were executed against 43 separate pools.”
reviewer360 malicious transactions were executed against 43 separate poolsMatches Tinyman's own January 6, 2022 technical report figures. - #12[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Financial Losses and Affected Users
“The primary attacker (Account 1) extracted 13,576 ALGO, 29.218 goBTC, and 137.656 goETH across 16 transactions, totalling approximately $1.8 million at attack-time prices.”
reviewerAccount 1 extracted 13,576 ALGO, 29.218 goBTC, and 137.656 goETH across 16 transactions, ~$1.8M, ~70% of total damageThe 16-transaction count specifically could not be cross-checked against the wave/wallet breakdown described in secondary summaries, but the asset amounts and percentage are a strong match. - #15[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Financial Losses and Affected Users
“The broader TVL impact was significant: total value locked dropped from approximately $43 million to $21 million within 12 hours of the initial attack, though the majority of that decline reflected users withdrawing their own liquidity in response to Tinyman's public warning rather than direct theft.”
reviewerTVL dropped from ~$43M to ~$21M within 12 hours, mostly from voluntary withdrawalsEndpoint figure differs by about $1M between sources ($20M vs $21M) but is within normal reporting variance. - #19[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Audit History and Security Posture Prior to Exploit
“The Halborn post-mortem attributed this to the difficulty of verifying control-flow correctness in low-level TEAL code.”
reviewerHalborn attributed the missed vulnerability to difficulty verifying control-flow correctness in low-level TEAL codeMatches Halborn's published analysis. - #21[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Incident Response and Compensation
“Funding came 10% from the protocol's transaction-fee treasury and 90% from investor capital drawn from Borderless Capital, Meld Ventures, and Jump Capital.”
reviewerCompensation was funded 10% from treasury and 90% from investor capital (Borderless Capital, Meld Ventures, Jump Capital)Strongly corroborated via independent search of the primary compensation post's own wording. - #23[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Incident Response and Compensation
“Payments were made in ALGO regardless of the original asset type lost.”
reviewerPayments were made in ALGO regardless of original asset lostMatches independently located summary of the compensation post. - #24[confirmed][no action needed]in section: V2.0 Protocol and Post-Exploit Security Improvements
“Tinyman announced v2.0 at the Algorand Decipher event in Dubai on November 30, 2022, with mainnet launch targeted for January 2023.”
reviewerTinyman announced v2.0 at Decipher Dubai on November 30, 2022, with Tealish rewrite, RV multi-level audit, and $250K Immunefi bountyDirectly confirmed by the press release fetched in full. - #25[confirmed][no action needed]in section: V2.0 Protocol and Post-Exploit Security Improvements
“Tinyman also launched a public bug bounty program on Immunefi, with up to $250,000 in rewards funded with support from the Algorand Foundation.”
reviewerTinyman launched an Immunefi bug bounty with up to $250,000, supported by the Algorand FoundationExact figure confirmed directly. - #26[confirmed][no action needed]in section: On-Chain Forensics and Attacker Tracing
“TRM Labs conducted on-chain forensic analysis of the attack and confirmed that the primary attacker's wallet was pre-funded from a centralized exchange prior to the exploit.”
reviewerTRM Labs confirmed the primary attacker's wallet was pre-funded from a centralized exchangeDirectly confirmed by fetching the TRM Labs article. - #27[confirmed][no action needed]in section: On-Chain Forensics and Attacker Tracing
“As of January 6, 2022, the primary wallet still held approximately 21 goBTC that had not been moved.”
reviewerAs of January 6, 2022, the primary wallet still held approximately 21 goBTCDirectly confirmed by fetching the TRM Labs article. - #28[confirmed][no action needed]in section: On-Chain Forensics and Attacker Tracing
“No public attribution to named individuals or groups had been made as of available reporting, and it is not publicly known whether law enforcement actions resulted in any recoveries or prosecutions.”
reviewerNo public attribution to named individuals or groups, and no known recoveries/prosecutionsAs of this review (Oct 2026), no subsequent reporting of attribution or prosecution was found, consistent with the page's hedge.