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← Terra/Lunareviewed 2026-10-15 · 22 claims checked

Fact-check findings

What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Terra/Luna against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.

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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.

“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.

Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.

disputed

3 claims

The reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.

  1. #4[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Anchor Protocol — Unsustainable 20% Yields
    “Terraform Labs was forced to inject $70 million into the yield reserve in July 2021 when it threatened depletion, and contributed a further $470 million in February 2022.”
    reviewerTerraform Labs contributed a further $470 million to Anchor's yield reserve in February 2022The page's own cited source for this claim reports $450 million, not $470 million, and attributes the funding to the Luna Foundation Guard (a separate Singapore non-profit per the page's own later section), not Terraform Labs directly. The same error recurs in the timeline.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    Terraform Labs was forced to inject $70 million into the yield reserve in July 2021 when it threatened depletion, and the Luna Foundation Guard contributed a further $450 million in February 2022.
  2. #5[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Anchor Protocol — Unsustainable 20% Yields
    “A governance proposal to reduce yields to 4% was rejected by the Terra community in early 2022.”
    reviewerA governance proposal to reduce Anchor yields to 4% was rejected by the Terra community in early 2022This claim mischaracterizes both the timing (May 2022, during the collapse, not early 2022 as a pre-collapse warning sign) and the outcome (vote was still open per the cited source, not reported as rejected); the chain halted on May 13 before the May 18 vote deadline.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    A governance proposal to reduce yields to 4% was put to a vote in May 2022, as UST was already losing its peg, with the vote still underway when the Terra blockchain halted days later.
  3. #9[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Victim Impact
    “In the US civil trial, 315 victim impact statements were submitted to the court.”
    reviewer315 victim impact statements were submitted to the court in the US civil trialThe page misattributes the 315 victim letters to the civil trial; contemporaneous reporting ties this figure specifically to the criminal sentencing proceeding in December 2025.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    At Do Kwon's December 2025 federal sentencing, 315 victim impact statements were submitted to the court.

unverifiable

3 claims

No source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.

  1. #2[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Background and History
    “A whistleblower and internal chat logs showed that Chai processed payments through traditional means and merely mirrored records to the Terra blockchain in parallel, while Terraform Labs used at least $145 million of its own stablecoins to fund sham transactions that mimicked Chai's payment volume.”
    reviewerTerraform Labs used at least $145 million of its own stablecoins to fund sham Chai transactionsThe core allegation (Chai payments were not on-chain and were mirrored) is well supported, but no source I could find corroborates the specific $145 million figure or the existence of 'internal chat logs' as described; this detail may be a fabricated or misattributed specific.
  2. #10[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Victim Impact
    “Six of those letters came from individuals who stated they had considered suicide following the collapse.”
    reviewerSix of the victim letters came from individuals who stated they had considered suicideCould not find a source confirming the specific figure of six letters referencing suicide; plausible but not independently verifiable.
  3. #19[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Daniel Shin and South Korean Proceedings
    “South Korean courts rejected prosecutors' arrest warrants for Shin on two separate occasions, and he remained free as of early 2025 while facing trial on fraud-related charges.”
    reviewerSouth Korean courts rejected arrest warrants for Daniel Shin on two separate occasionsPlausible given reported difficulty prosecuting Shin, but I could not independently confirm the specific 'two separate occasions' detail.

partially supported

2 claims

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

  1. #8[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Victim Impact
    “Documented tragedies include: a Taiwanese investor who died by suicide in May 2022 after reportedly losing approximately $2 million — roughly 99% of his Terra holdings — within two days of the crash; and a South Korean family of three who were found dead in circumstances police suspected were related to financial losses from the Luna collapse.”
    reviewerA Taiwanese investor died by suicide in May 2022 after losing approximately $2 millionThe loss amount (~$2 million, ~99% of holdings) is well corroborated, but the page states the Taiwanese investor 'died by suicide' as settled fact, while reporting at the time described it as a fall under police investigation with suicide only suspected -- less certain than the page's phrasing, and inconsistent with the appropriately hedged treatment given to the Korean family case in the same sentence.
  2. #12[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Contagion Effects — Triggering the 2022 Crypto Winter
    “Three Arrows Capital (3AC), a prominent Singapore-based crypto hedge fund, had accumulated an estimated $460-560 million in LUNA exposure by late April 2022, which had been reduced to approximately $2,700 in value by May 14.”
    reviewerThree Arrows Capital had $460-560 million in LUNA exposure by late April 2022, reduced to approximately $2,700 by May 14The $2,700 residual value and the general late-April exposure are corroborated at ~$462 million; the page's wider $460-560 million range is not fully supported since the most commonly cited court-document figure is the single point estimate of ~$462 million.

confirmed

14 claims

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

  1. #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Background and History
    “The project raised substantial venture funding and reached a peak market capitalization of approximately $41 billion for LUNA alone in April 2022, making it one of the largest crypto projects by market cap at the time.”
    reviewerLUNA reached a peak market capitalization of approximately $41 billion in April 2022Independently corroborated outside the page's own citations; the ~$41B figure and April 2022 timing match contemporaneous market-cap reporting.
  2. #3[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Anchor Protocol — Unsustainable 20% Yields
    “This yield was a primary driver of UST adoption, with Anchor attracting approximately 72% of all circulating UST into its system at peak.”
    reviewerAnchor Protocol attracted approximately 72% of all circulating UST at peakWidely corroborated figure (70%+ range) across multiple contemporaneous sources.
  3. #6[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Luna Foundation Guard — Bitcoin Reserve Defense
    “By the time UST began losing its peg, LFG held approximately 80,394 BTC worth roughly $2.4 billion, making it one of the largest known institutional Bitcoin holders at the time.”
    reviewerLFG held approximately 80,394 BTC worth roughly $2.4 billion as UST began losing its pegBTC-holding figure is well corroborated; dollar valuation is reasonably consistent with BTC's price around the May 9-10 deployment window.
  4. #7[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Luna Foundation Guard — Bitcoin Reserve Defense
    “On May 9, 2022, LFG announced it would loan $750 million in BTC and $750 million in UST to trading firms to help stabilize the peg.”
    reviewerLFG deployed $750 million in BTC and $750 million in UST to trading firms on May 9, 2022Matches cited source directly.
  5. #11[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Victim Impact
    “South Korean prosecutors estimated approximately 200,000 local investors were affected, with local losses totaling approximately $204 million.”
    reviewerSouth Korean prosecutors estimated approximately 200,000 local investors affected, with losses totaling approximately $204 millionInvestor count and loss figure both corroborate against independent reporting, though the page cites no inline source for this specific statistic.
  6. #13[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Criminal Charges and Civil Fraud Verdict
    “In August 2025, Kwon pleaded guilty to two federal fraud charges and agreed to forfeit $19 million as part of a plea agreement.”
    reviewerDo Kwon pleaded guilty to two federal fraud charges in August 2025 and agreed to forfeit $19 millionMatches independent reporting; minor imprecision in 'two federal fraud charges' (one conspiracy count, one substantive wire fraud count) is an acceptable paraphrase.
  7. #14[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Criminal Charges and Civil Fraud Verdict
    “The judge, who called the government's recommended 12-year term 'unreasonably lenient,' described the scheme as 'a fraud on an epic, generational scale' given that it caused approximately $40 billion in losses.”
    reviewerJudge Paul A. Engelmayer sentenced Do Kwon to 15 years, calling the government's 12-year recommendation 'unreasonably lenient' and the scheme 'a fraud on an epic, generational scale'Both quotes are independently corroborated by multiple outlets covering the December 11, 2025 sentencing.
  8. #15[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Criminal Charges and Civil Fraud Verdict
    “The settlement required Terraform to pay approximately $3.59 billion in disgorgement, $467 million in prejudgment interest, and a $420 million civil penalty; Kwon was required to pay approximately $110 million in disgorgement, $14.3 million in prejudgment interest, and an $80 million civil penalty.”
    reviewerTerraform Labs and Kwon agreed to a $4.47 billion SEC settlement with a specific disgorgement/interest/penalty breakdownFigures internally consistent and match Bloomberg Law's reporting of the settlement breakdown.
  9. #16[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Terraform Labs Bankruptcy and Wind-Down
    “Under the wind-down plan, creditors are expected to receive between approximately $184.5 million and $442.2 million in distributions.”
    reviewerTerraform Labs' wind-down plan is expected to produce distributions between approximately $184.5 million and $442.2 millionCited source is live and supports the claim; figures align closely.
  10. #17[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Terraform Labs Bankruptcy and Wind-Down
    “The Three Arrows Capital liquidators separately filed a $1.3 billion claim against Terraform Labs as part of the bankruptcy proceedings, alleging that Terraform had manipulated the market for LUNA and UST in ways that induced Three Arrows to purchase the tokens at artificially inflated prices.”
    reviewerThree Arrows Capital liquidators filed a $1.3 billion claim against Terraform LabsMatches cited source and independent corroboration.
  11. #18[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Daniel Shin and South Korean Proceedings
    “Prosecutors alleged that Shin played a significant role in the fraud, with the director of the Seoul Southern District Prosecutors' Office's financial crime team stating he believed Shin's role may have been greater than Do Kwon's — specifically alleging that Shin orchestrated the false appearance that Chai fiat payments were being processed on the Terra blockchain.”
    reviewerDaniel Shin's role in the fraud may have been greater than Do Kwon's, per Seoul prosecutorsDirectly supported by the cited, live source.
  12. #20[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Contagion Effects — Triggering the 2022 Crypto Winter
    “Celsius Network, a crypto lending platform with significant Terra exposure and a business model offering high yields to depositors, froze customer withdrawals on June 13, 2022, and filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in July 2022. Voyager Digital, which had extended over $670 million in loans to Three Arrows Capital that went into default, filed for bankruptcy in July 2022.”
    reviewerCelsius Network froze withdrawals June 13, 2022 and filed Chapter 11 in July 2022; Voyager Digital extended over $670 million in loans to 3AC and filed for bankruptcy in July 2022Well-established facts from the 2022 contagion period; minor variance in the exact Voyager loan figure across outlets is immaterial.
  13. #21[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Terra 2.0 and LUNC — Fork and Revival Attempts
    “The proposal was approved by network validators with approximately 65% approval on May 25, 2022.”
    reviewerTerra 2.0 fork was approved with approximately 65% validator approval on May 25, 2022, and launched May 28, 2022Consistent with contemporaneous and retrospective reporting on the fork.
  14. #22[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Terraform Labs Bankruptcy and Wind-Down
    “On January 21, 2024, Terraform Labs filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.”
    reviewerTerraform Labs filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on January 21, 2024 in the District of DelawareDirectly matches cited, credible source.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.