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Suireviewed 2026-09-07 · 53 claims checked

Fact-check findings

What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Sui against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.

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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.

“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.

Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.

disputed

2 claims

The reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.

  1. #19[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: ZachXBT: $29 Million SUI Token Theft and Tornado Cash Laundering
    In January 2026, blockchain investigator ZachXBT disclosed the details of a theft of approximately $29 million worth of SUI tokens from a major holder that occurred in December 2024.
    reviewerZachXBT disclosed the $29 million SUI theft in January 2026, concerning a theft that occurred in December 2024.The disclosure date is off by exactly one year. Multiple contemporaneous sources place ZachXBT's disclosure on January 26, 2025, not January 2026. This also produces an internal chronology defect: the timeline lists this disclosure (dated 2026-01) before the May 2025 Cetus hack and July 2025 withdrawal announcement, which is inconsistent with the surrounding narrative and with the withdrawal announcement citing this very investigation as a reason for leaving.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    In January 2025, blockchain investigator ZachXBT disclosed the details of a theft of approximately $29 million worth of SUI tokens from a major holder that occurred in December 2024.
  2. #44[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
    2026-01
    reviewerTimeline: ZachXBT's disclosure of the December 2024 SUI theft is dated 2026-01.Same underlying error as the sections[2] finding: the stored date value is one year off. Correcting it also restores correct chronological order relative to the adjacent 2024-12 and 2025-05-22 entries.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    2025-01

unverifiable

2 claims

No source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.

  1. #10[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Cetus Protocol Exploit — $223 Million Hack (May 2025)
    The attacker's primary Ethereum address 0x89012a55cd6b88e407c9d4ae9b3425f55924919b received bridged funds, with approximately $53 million subsequently moved to 0x0251536bfcf144b88e1afa8fe60184ffdb4caf16.
    reviewerAttacker's primary Ethereum address 0x89012a55cd6b88e407c9d4ae9b3425f55924919b received bridged funds; ~$53M was subsequently moved to 0x0251536bfcf144b88e1afa8fe60184ffdb4caf16.Both addresses and the fund-flow relationship are confirmed as attacker-controlled, but the specific $53 million figure could not be independently verified against a source I fetched.
  2. #33[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Token Unlock Schedule and Sell Pressure
    The October 2025 unlock included allocations to Series B investors, contributors, and Mysten Labs, representing approximately $145 million at then-prevailing prices.
    reviewerThe October 2025 unlock included allocations to Series B investors, contributors, and Mysten Labs, representing approximately $145 million at then-prevailing prices.The ~44M token quantity for October 2025 is corroborated elsewhere, but the specific $145M dollar valuation and allocation breakdown could not be independently verified.

partially supported

5 claims

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

  1. #8[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Cetus Protocol Exploit — $223 Million Hack (May 2025)
    Flash loans were used to source temporary balances.
    reviewerFlash loans were used to source temporary balances for the exploit.The substance (borrowed temporary liquidity used to manipulate the pool) is accurate, but several primary technical sources specifically characterize the tool as a flash swap, not a flash loan; the page's terminology is imprecise rather than false.
  2. #12[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Cetus Protocol Exploit — $223 Million Hack (May 2025)
    Affected tokens including CETUS dropped more than 40%, with some pool tokens collapsing by up to 99%. The SUI token price fell approximately 15% in the days following the exploit.
    reviewerCETUS token dropped more than 40%, with some pool tokens collapsing by up to 99%; SUI fell approximately 15%.The SUI figure (~15%) is precisely confirmed. The CETUS and pool-token figures are directionally correct but at the high end of, or slightly beyond, what independent reporting states (33-40% and up to ~96%).
  3. #26[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Token Centralization, Supply Control, and Alleged Insider Selling
    The Sui Foundation responded that locked tokens are custodied by independent third parties — specifically BitGo, Anchorage, and Coinbase Prime — and that 'the founders of Mysten Labs do NOT control the Sui Foundation treasury, the community reserve, stake subsidies, or any tokens allocated to investors.'
    reviewerSui Foundation stated locked tokens are custodied by BitGo, Anchorage, and Coinbase Prime, and that Mysten Labs founders do not control the treasury, community reserve, stake subsidies, or investor tokens.The underlying facts (custodians, non-control claim) are corroborated by independent secondary reporting, but the exact quoted sentence in quotation marks could not be verified word-for-word against a primary source I was able to access.
  4. #34[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Validator Concentration and Governance Risk
    Sui operates with a relatively small active validator set — approximately 114 to 127 validators as of mid-2025 — compared to Ethereum's more than 900,000 validators.
    reviewerSui operates with approximately 114 to 127 active validators as of mid-2025, compared to Ethereum's 900,000+.The lower end of the stated range is well supported; the upper end (127) exceeds the validator counts found in the cited-type source for the same period and could not be independently confirmed.
  5. #40[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Ecosystem Security Infrastructure Deficiencies
    Mysten Labs warned Sui wallet users separately about token spam attacks — where unsolicited tokens are airdropped to user wallets as a phishing vector — indicating active scam activity targeting the ecosystem's user base.
    reviewerMysten Labs warned Sui wallet users about token spam attacks used as a phishing vector.The event itself is confirmed, but it is presented adjacent to 2025-era claims without a date, which could mislead a reader into thinking it is contemporaneous with the Cetus hack and ZachXBT's 2025 statements.

confirmed

43 claims

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

  1. #1[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary
    Sui is a Layer 1 blockchain developed by Mysten Labs, launched in May 2023 and built on the Move programming language.
    reviewerSui is a Layer 1 blockchain developed by Mysten Labs, launched in May 2023, built on Move.Mainnet launch date, developer, and Move language are all independently confirmed by contemporaneous reporting.
  2. #2[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary
    The network suffered one of the largest DeFi exploits of 2025 when Cetus Protocol — its primary DEX — was drained of approximately $223 million in May 2025, triggering a controversial emergency validator vote to freeze and reclaim stolen funds that exposed deep centralization concerns.
    reviewerCetus Protocol, Sui's primary DEX, was drained of approximately $223 million in May 2025.Figure, date, and downstream centralization controversy are corroborated by multiple independent outlets.
  3. #3[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary
    Separately, ZachXBT investigated a $29 million SUI token theft in late 2024 involving Tornado Cash laundering and subsequently announced in July 2025 that he would no longer take Sui ecosystem cases due to inadequate incident-response infrastructure and lack of support from the ecosystem.
    reviewerZachXBT investigated a $29 million SUI token theft from late 2024 and in July 2025 announced he would stop taking Sui ecosystem cases, citing inadequate incident-response infrastructure and lack of ecosystem support.The theft occurred Dec 2024 ('late 2024' as stated), and the July 2025 withdrawal date/reason are both corroborated. Note the disclosure date of the theft itself is misstated elsewhere on the page (see section[2] finding).
  4. #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Cetus Protocol Exploit — $223 Million Hack (May 2025)
    On May 22, 2025, Cetus Protocol — the largest decentralized exchange and liquidity provider on the Sui blockchain — was exploited for approximately $223 million, making it the second-largest DeFi hack of 2025, behind only the $1.46 billion Bybit breach.
    reviewerCetus was exploited for ~$223M on May 22, 2025, the second-largest DeFi hack of 2025 behind the $1.46B Bybit breach.Ranking and figures independently confirmed.
  5. #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Cetus Protocol Exploit — $223 Million Hack (May 2025)
    The attack began at approximately 10:30 UTC.
    reviewerThe attack began at approximately 10:30 UTC.Confirmed by independent source.
  6. #6[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Cetus Protocol Exploit — $223 Million Hack (May 2025)
    The root cause was a faulty overflow check in the checked_shlw function inside the integer-mate u256 math library.
    reviewerThe root cause was a faulty overflow check in the checked_shlw function inside the integer-mate u256 math library.Technical root cause confirmed directly from the cited source.
  7. #7[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Cetus Protocol Exploit — $223 Million Hack (May 2025)
    By exploiting the bug, the attacker could credit themselves with vastly inflated liquidity for a negligible deposit, then withdraw full reserves from 46 affected liquidity pools.
    reviewerThe attacker withdrew full reserves from 46 affected liquidity pools.Pool count confirmed.
  8. #9[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Cetus Protocol Exploit — $223 Million Hack (May 2025)
    Approximately $60 million was bridged from Sui to Ethereum through Wormhole, Circle CCTP, Sui Bridge, and Mayan before intervention was possible.
    reviewerApproximately $60 million was bridged from Sui to Ethereum through Wormhole, Circle CCTP, Sui Bridge, and Mayan.Bridge names and approximate amount independently corroborated.
  9. #11[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Cetus Protocol Exploit — $223 Million Hack (May 2025)
    On Sui, the attacker's wallets — including 0xcdb8962dad278d8b50fa0fe1eb0186bf4cbdecc6d59377214c88d0286a0ac9562 — held approximately $162 million that was frozen via validator intervention.
    reviewerOn Sui, attacker wallets including 0xcdb8962dad278d8b50fa0fe1eb0186bf4cbdecc6d59377214c88d0286a0ac9562 held approximately $162 million frozen via validator intervention.Address and frozen amount independently confirmed.
  10. #13[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Cetus Protocol Exploit — $223 Million Hack (May 2025)
    Security firm Elliptic tracked the cross-chain laundering route and made exploit-associated addresses available for screening across virtual asset service providers.
    reviewerSecurity firm Elliptic tracked the cross-chain laundering route and made exploit-associated addresses available for screening.Confirmed directly from the cited source.
  11. #14[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Validator Censorship and the Centralization Controversy
    The freeze was executed through individual validator configuration files that allow nodes to exclude specific addresses from transaction processing — a mechanism that does not require a protocol-level upgrade but relies on out-of-band coordination among validators.
    reviewerValidators froze ~$162 million via individual validator configuration files, without requiring a protocol-level upgrade.Mechanism description matches the official Sui account of the freeze.
  12. #15[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Validator Censorship and the Centralization Controversy
    The vote concluded with 90.9% of staked validator votes approving the recovery.
    reviewerSui initiated a formal on-chain vote on a smart contract upgrade to forcibly transfer frozen funds to a multisig wallet for restitution; the vote concluded with 90.9% approval.Vote mechanics and percentage independently confirmed.
  13. #16[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Validator Censorship and the Centralization Controversy
    The Sui Foundation announced it would abstain from the vote to maintain neutrality, and conditioned its support on Cetus publicly committing to full customer restitution.
    reviewerThe Sui Foundation announced it would abstain from the vote to maintain neutrality, conditioning support on Cetus committing to full restitution.Confirmed by cited source.
  14. #17[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Validator Censorship and the Centralization Controversy
    Cetus received a $30 million loan from the Sui Foundation to assist in compensating users and relaunched the protocol 17 days after the exploit.
    reviewerCetus received a $30 million loan from the Sui Foundation and relaunched 17 days after the exploit.Loan amount and relaunch timing both independently confirmed.
  15. #18[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Validator Censorship and the Centralization Controversy
    Justin Bons, founder and CIO of Cyber Capital, labeled the action 'the very definition of centralization,' noting Sui operates with only approximately 114 active validators compared to Ethereum's more than 900,000 validators, enabling rapid coordinated action that most decentralized networks could not replicate.
    reviewerJustin Bons called the validator action 'the very definition of centralization,' citing ~114 Sui validators vs. Ethereum's 900,000+.Quote verified verbatim; validator contrast figure verified.
  16. #20[confirmed][no action needed]in section: ZachXBT: $29 Million SUI Token Theft and Tornado Cash Laundering
    According to ZachXBT's investigation, the attacker stole approximately 6.27 million SUI tokens.
    reviewerThe attacker stole approximately 6.27 million SUI tokens.Token amount confirmed.
  17. #21[confirmed][no action needed]in section: ZachXBT: $29 Million SUI Token Theft and Tornado Cash Laundering
    The stolen funds were then bridged from the Sui network to Ethereum using cross-chain bridge tools and subsequently laundered through Tornado Cash in smaller tranches to obscure the trail.
    reviewerStolen funds were bridged from Sui to Ethereum and laundered through Tornado Cash in smaller tranches.Confirmed.
  18. #22[confirmed][no action needed]in section: ZachXBT: $29 Million SUI Token Theft and Tornado Cash Laundering
    ZachXBT noted that the investigation was significantly hampered by the limitations of Sui's on-chain analytics tools and block explorers, which lack the sophistication of Ethereum-based tools such as Etherscan.
    reviewerZachXBT said the investigation was hampered by Sui's on-chain analytics tools/block explorers being less sophisticated than Ethereum's (e.g., Etherscan).Confirmed near-verbatim from ZachXBT's own statement.
  19. #23[confirmed][no action needed]in section: ZachXBT Withdraws from Sui Ecosystem Investigations
    On approximately July 6, 2025, ZachXBT publicly announced that he would no longer accept or pursue investigation cases related to the Sui ecosystem.
    reviewerOn approximately July 6, 2025, ZachXBT publicly announced he would no longer accept Sui ecosystem cases.Date and substance confirmed.
  20. #24[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Token Centralization, Supply Control, and Alleged Insider Selling
    With a total capped supply of 10 billion SUI tokens, critics — most prominently Justin Bons of Cyber Capital — alleged that founders collectively control approximately 84% of the staked supply, noting that the staked amount exceeded 8 billion tokens at peak, with the founder-affiliated stake representing a dominant share.
    reviewerCritics, most prominently Justin Bons, alleged founders collectively control approximately 84% of the staked supply.Confirmed against Bons' original statement, though this criticism dates to mid-2024 rather than a period tied to the 2025 events discussed elsewhere in the section.
  21. #25[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Token Centralization, Supply Control, and Alleged Insider Selling
    Bons specifically highlighted the 52% of total supply designated as 'unallocated' until 2030, raising concerns about whether the Sui Foundation or for-profit entity Mysten Labs effectively controls this stake.
    reviewer52% of total supply is designated 'unallocated' until 2030.Confirmed.
  22. #27[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Token Centralization, Supply Control, and Alleged Insider Selling
    In October 2024, pseudonymous crypto analyst Lightcrypto alleged on X that SUI insiders had sold $400 million worth of tokens during the token's approximately 100% price rally.
    reviewerIn October 2024, Lightcrypto alleged on X that SUI insiders sold $400 million worth of tokens during a ~100% price rally.Confirmed.
  23. #28[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Token Centralization, Supply Control, and Alleged Insider Selling
    The Sui Foundation denied that any insiders — including Foundation employees, Mysten Labs founders, or investors — had sold $400 million in aggregate, and attributed the wallet activity to an 'infrastructure partner' operating under a lockup schedule.
    reviewerThe Sui Foundation denied any insiders sold $400 million in aggregate, attributing the activity to an 'infrastructure partner' under a lockup schedule.Confirmed near-verbatim against the Sui Foundation's own statement.
  24. #29[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Token Centralization, Supply Control, and Alleged Insider Selling
    Kyle Samani of Multicoin Capital publicly noted the response was vague, implying it excluded some categories of participants from the denial.
    reviewerKyle Samani of Multicoin Capital publicly noted the Sui Foundation's response was vague, implying it excluded some categories of participants.Confirmed, though the page cites no source specifically for this sentence; general reporting on the episode corroborates it.
  25. #30[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Token Centralization, Supply Control, and Alleged Insider Selling
    The minimum validator stake requirement of 30 million SUI has also been cited as a barrier to validator entry, further concentrating staking power.
    reviewerThe minimum validator stake requirement of 30 million SUI is a barrier to validator entry.Confirmed against Sui's official documentation.
  26. #31[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Token Centralization, Supply Control, and Alleged Insider Selling
    Sui's Nakamoto coefficient stood at 18–19 as of Q1–Q2 2025, which is above median for proof-of-stake networks per Messari, but critics argue this metric does not fully capture token-level concentration risk.
    reviewerSui's Nakamoto coefficient stood at 18-19 as of Q1-Q2 2025, above median for PoS networks per Messari.Both quarterly figures independently confirmed against Messari's own reports.
  27. #32[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Token Unlock Schedule and Sell Pressure
    Major scheduled unlocks included approximately 74 million SUI on May 1, 2025, 64 million SUI on June 1, 2025, and approximately 44 million SUI in each of July, August, and October 2025.
    reviewerMajor scheduled unlocks: ~74M SUI May 1 2025, 64M June 1 2025, ~44M in each of July/Aug/Oct 2025.Confirmed against independent tokenomics trackers.
  28. #35[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Regulatory Engagement and ETF Consideration
    Mysten Labs met with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's Crypto Task Force in 2025, attended by legal representatives from Sidley Austin LLP, to discuss the regulatory classification of SUI and broader blockchain asset regulation.
    reviewerMysten Labs met with the SEC's Crypto Task Force in 2025, attended by Sidley Austin LLP.Confirmed directly against an SEC.gov primary document.
  29. #36[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Regulatory Engagement and ETF Consideration
    A spot SUI ETF application by 21Shares was under SEC review as of late 2025, with the SEC postponing its decision multiple times, reflecting the broader regulatory uncertainty around classifying SUI as a commodity versus security.
    reviewerA spot SUI ETF application by 21Shares was under SEC review as of late 2025, with the SEC postponing its decision multiple times.Confirmed, though the page cites no direct source for this specific sentence.
  30. #37[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Regulatory Engagement and ETF Consideration
    Mysten Labs also submitted written input to the SEC's Crypto Task Force in May 2025.
    reviewerMysten Labs submitted written input to the SEC's Crypto Task Force in May 2025.The document loads successfully; I could not extract readable text to confirm the letterhead/date directly, but the filename and file validity are consistent with the claim.
  31. #38[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Regulatory Engagement and ETF Consideration
    A spot SUI ETF with staking rewards was listed on the Nasdaq by Canary in February 2026, marking a notable step toward mainstream institutional access.
    reviewerA spot SUI ETF with staking rewards was listed on Nasdaq by Canary in February 2026.Confirmed directly against the cited source and corroborated by Nasdaq's own press release.
  32. #39[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Ecosystem Security Infrastructure Deficiencies
    Unlike Ethereum — which benefits from Etherscan, Dune Analytics, TRM Labs coverage, and a large ecosystem of independent forensics tooling — Sui's block explorer and analytics ecosystem remained underdeveloped as of mid-2025.
    reviewerSui's block explorer and analytics ecosystem remained underdeveloped as of mid-2025 relative to Ethereum's tooling.Corroborated by the pattern of ZachXBT's public statements across both incidents covered on this page.
  33. #41[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
    Sui mainnet launched by Mysten Labs.
    reviewerSui mainnet launched by Mysten Labs, dated 2023-05.Date field confirmed.
  34. #42[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
    Pseudonymous analyst Lightcrypto alleges $400 million in SUI insider selling during a token price rally of approximately 100%. Sui Foundation denies the allegation, attributing activity to an infrastructure partner.
    reviewerTimeline: Lightcrypto's $400M insider-selling allegation and Sui's denial dated 2024-10.Date field confirmed.
  35. #43[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
    Approximately $29 million worth of SUI tokens (6.27 million SUI) stolen from a major holder. Funds are subsequently bridged to Ethereum and laundered through Tornado Cash.
    reviewerTimeline: ~$29 million SUI theft (6.27M SUI) dated 2024-12.Date field confirmed.
  36. #45[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
    Cetus Protocol — Sui's largest DEX — exploited for approximately $223 million via a math library overflow bug. Approximately $60 million bridged to Ethereum before validators intervene.
    reviewerTimeline: Cetus Protocol exploited for ~$223 million, dated 2025-05-22.Date field confirmed.
  37. #46[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
    Sui validators coordinate emergency freeze of approximately $162 million in attacker-controlled addresses on Sui, preventing further bridging of stolen funds.
    reviewerTimeline: validators freeze ~$162M, dated 2025-05-22.Date field confirmed.
  38. #47[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
    On-chain community vote concludes with 90.9% of validator stake approving recovery of frozen Cetus funds. Vote sparks broad centralization debate across the crypto industry.
    reviewerTimeline: on-chain vote concludes with 90.9% approval, dated 2025-05-29.Date field confirmed.
  39. #48[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
    Mysten Labs submits written input to the SEC Crypto Task Force regarding blockchain asset classification.
    reviewerTimeline: Mysten Labs submits written input to SEC Crypto Task Force, dated 2025-05.Date field plausible and consistent with the filename; underlying document text could not be extracted to confirm with full certainty.
  40. #49[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
    Cetus Protocol relaunches 17 days after the exploit, backed by a $30 million Sui Foundation loan and recovered frozen funds.
    reviewerTimeline: Cetus relaunches with $30M loan, dated 2025-06-08.Date field confirmed.
  41. #50[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
    ZachXBT publicly announces he will no longer investigate Sui ecosystem cases, citing persistent lack of ecosystem support and inadequate blockchain analytics infrastructure on Sui.
    reviewerTimeline: ZachXBT announces withdrawal from Sui cases, dated 2025-07-06.Date field confirmed.
  42. #51[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
    Mysten Labs meets with the SEC Crypto Task Force, attended by Sidley Austin LLP, to discuss regulatory classification and framework for Sui.
    reviewerTimeline: Mysten Labs meets SEC Crypto Task Force with Sidley Austin, dated 2025-09.Date field confirmed against a primary SEC document.
  43. #52[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
    Canary Capital lists a spot SUI ETF with staking rewards on the Nasdaq, marking a milestone for institutional access to the SUI token.
    reviewerTimeline: Canary lists spot SUI ETF with staking on Nasdaq, dated 2026-02-18.Date field confirmed.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.