← Stake DAOreviewed 2026-10-16 · 20 claims checked
Fact-check findings
What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Stake DAO against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.
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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.
“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.
Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.
disputed
5 claimsThe reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.
- #3[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Overview
“SDT launched at approximately $3.90 per token on January 20, 2021, reached an all-time high of $16.63 on February 4, 2021, and had fallen to approximately $0.73 by January 2024 following the broader DeFi bear market.”
reviewerSDT launched at approximately $3.90 on Jan 20 2021, reached an all-time high of $16.63 on Feb 4 2021, and had fallen to approximately $0.73 by January 2024.Two figures in this sentence conflict with the page's own cited source (CoinGecko) and with independent trackers: the ATH figure matches CoinMarketCap rather than the cited CoinGecko page, and the January 2024 price appears to be the December 2024 level misdated. Launch price of $3.90 could not be independently confirmed either way.Proposed correction (not yet applied)SDT launched at approximately $3.90 per token on January 20, 2021, reached an all-time high of $17.38 on February 4, 2021, and had fallen to approximately $0.36 by January 2024 following the broader DeFi bear market. - #4[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“SDT reaches all-time high price of $16.63.”
reviewerSDT reaches all-time high price of $16.63 on February 4, 2021.Same underlying ATH figure error as the Protocol Overview section.Proposed correction (not yet applied)SDT reaches all-time high price of $17.38. - #5[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“2022-06-15”
reviewerSDT reaches all-time low of $0.1750 on June 15, 2022.Date field paired with the event-text finding below for the same underlying all-time-low error.Proposed correction (not yet applied)2022-10-28 - #6[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“SDT reaches all-time low of $0.1750 amid broader crypto bear market.”
reviewerSDT reaches all-time low of $0.1750 amid broader crypto bear market.This is an order-of-magnitude discrepancy against the page's own cited price source.Proposed correction (not yet applied)SDT reaches all-time low of $0.01523 amid broader crypto bear market. - #10[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: May 2026 vsdCRV Deployer Key Exploit (Critical Incident)
“Industry observers including OpenZeppelin co-founder Manuel Aráoz cited this incident as evidence that DeFi operational security remains fundamentally broken.”
reviewerIndustry observers including OpenZeppelin co-founder Manuel Aráoz cited this incident as evidence that DeFi operational security remains fundamentally broken.The page implies Aráoz's comment was made in response to the Stake DAO exploit, but reporting shows it preceded the hack's public disclosure; the causal framing is reversed.Proposed correction (not yet applied)Industry observers including OpenZeppelin co-founder Manuel Aráoz, who had posted hours before the incident became public that he now considered all of DeFi unsafe, pointed to the exploit as reinforcing that view of DeFi operational security.
unverifiable
2 claimsNo source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.
- #8[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Founder and Team Background
“No regulatory enforcement actions, fraud allegations, or sanctions against Bouteloup or Stake DAO's founding team have been identified in publicly available records as of May 2026.”
reviewerNo regulatory enforcement actions, fraud allegations, or sanctions against Bouteloup or Stake DAO's founding team have been identified in publicly available records as of May 2026.A negative claim of this kind cannot be conclusively verified; my own search likewise surfaced no enforcement actions, which is consistent with but does not prove the claim. - #14[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: March 2026 Votemarket Oracle Exploit
“The protocol identified and neutralized the attack vector and reported that a second exploitation attempt by the same attacker was blocked.”
reviewerA second exploitation attempt by the same attacker was blocked.Could not corroborate this specific detail; the primary source cited for it (an X/Twitter post) was inaccessible for verification.
partially supported
2 claimsThe cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.
- #13[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: March 2026 Votemarket Oracle Exploit
“Stake DAO stated that no core Votemarket contracts were affected and that only veCRV Round 234 claims were impacted.”
reviewerStake DAO stated that only veCRV Round 234 claims were impacted by the Votemarket incident.The 'no core contracts affected' portion is corroborated by the primary gov.stakedao.org report, but the specific 'veCRV Round 234' detail could not be independently verified because the primary cited source (X/Twitter post) was inaccessible. - #18[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Audit History and Operational Security
“The exploit is consistent with a pattern affecting multiple DeFi protocols in 2026, including Wasabi Protocol, Drift Protocol, and Kelp DAO, all of which also had audited codebases but suffered losses tied to compromised operational keys.”
reviewerThe exploit is consistent with a pattern affecting multiple DeFi protocols in 2026, including Wasabi Protocol, Drift Protocol, and Kelp DAO, all of which also had audited codebases but suffered losses tied to compromised operational keys.Wasabi and Drift fit the described pattern; Kelp DAO's incident is reported as a bridge-verifier/message-forgery vulnerability rather than a stolen operational key, so grouping it under 'compromised operational keys' overstates the commonality.
confirmed
11 claimsThe cited evidence supports the claim as written.
- #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Overview
“Stake DAO (stakedao.org) is a non-custodial DeFi platform launched in January 2021 by Julien Bouteloup through Stake Capital Group.”
reviewerStake DAO is a non-custodial DeFi platform launched in January 2021 by Julien Bouteloup through Stake Capital Group.Multiple independent sources (docs, profiles, podcasts) consistently describe this founding structure and date. - #2[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Overview
“It offers liquid staking via 'Liquid Lockers,' which allow users to deposit governance tokens (such as CRV from Curve Finance, FXS from Frax, BAL from Balancer, and PENDLE from Pendle Finance) in exchange for liquid sdToken derivatives that retain voting rights while remaining tradeable.”
reviewerStake DAO's Liquid Locker, sdToken, veSDT, and Votemarket mechanics are described accurately, including multi-chain deployment on Ethereum, Arbitrum and Base.Mechanics description matches Stake DAO's own documentation. - #7[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Founder and Team Background
“Beyond Stake DAO, Bouteloup founded BlackPool Finance (an NFT-focused investment fund) and Rekt News (a DeFi-focused media outlet covering protocol exploits and security incidents).”
reviewerJulien Bouteloup holds Master's degrees as described, founded BlackPool Finance and Rekt News, and has claimed credit for the first-ever flash loan.The flash-loan credit is appropriately hedged by the page ('claimed credit') and matches how independent profiles describe it as his own claim rather than independently verified fact. - #9[confirmed][no action needed]in section: May 2026 vsdCRV Deployer Key Exploit (Critical Incident)
“The entire operation, from peer reconfiguration to minting, completed within approximately 25 seconds.”
reviewerOn May 27, 2026, a compromised Stake DAO deployer private key was used to reconfigure the vsdCRV LayerZero v2 OFT peer and mint approximately 5.4 trillion vsdCRV on Arbitrum within about 25 seconds, detected by Blockaid and PeckShield and confirmed by BlockSec; the attacker realized approximately $91,000 (43.78 ETH) before DEX liquidity was exhausted, and Stake DAO secured the vsdCRV backing on Ethereum mainnet and shut down the bridge.Core mechanics, dollar figures, and detection/response chronology are well corroborated across multiple independent outlets and match the cited sources. - #11[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Audit History and Operational Security
“BlockSec's post-incident commentary stated: 'The attacker appears to have obtained the deployer's private key and set an arbitrary peer for vsdCRV.'”
reviewerBlockSec stated: 'The attacker appears to have obtained the deployer's private key and set an arbitrary peer for vsdCRV.'Quote corroborated by independent news coverage. - #12[confirmed][no action needed]in section: March 2026 Votemarket Oracle Exploit
“A vulnerability in a peripheral oracle contract was exploited, draining approximately $176,000 in rewards across 54 active campaigns on Arbitrum and Base.”
reviewerOn March 12, 2026, a Votemarket peripheral oracle vulnerability drained approximately $176,000 across 54 active campaigns on Arbitrum and Base.Dollar figure and campaign count are corroborated by the primary governance forum post and a secondary incident-tracking source. - #15[confirmed][no action needed]in section: March 2026 Votemarket Oracle Exploit
“Stake DAO subsequently published governance proposal SDGP-65, inviting veSDT holders to vote on reimbursing all affected users and protocols from the DAO treasury.”
reviewerStake DAO published governance proposal SDGP-65 inviting veSDT holders to vote on reimbursing affected users and protocols from the DAO treasury.Directly confirmed by the primary governance forum post. - #16[confirmed][no action needed]in section: November 2023 LiquidityGauge Deployment Error
“Total loss was documented at 1,767.117 CAKE tokens, valued at approximately $4,011 at the time.”
reviewerIn November 2023, an erroneous LiquidityGauge deployment on BNB Chain allowed an attacker to steal 1,767.117 CAKE (~$4,011), remediated via snapshot, new sdCAKE token, airdrop, and PancakeSwap coordination.Figures and remediation narrative match the primary GitHub disclosure precisely. - #17[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Audit History and Operational Security
“A ChainSecurity audit of the LiquidLockers codebase found no critical issues, identifying two medium-severity findings: 'Admin Set Too Early in LiquidityGaugeV4Strat' and 'Zero Address Reward Distributor.'”
reviewerA ChainSecurity audit of the LiquidLockers codebase found no critical issues, identifying two medium-severity findings: 'Admin Set Too Early in LiquidityGaugeV4Strat' and 'Zero Address Reward Distributor.'Exact match to the cited primary audit source. - #19[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Tokenomics and Governance
“SDT has a fixed total supply of 100,000,000 tokens.”
reviewerSDT has a fixed total supply of 100,000,000 tokens with the described initial distribution (1.5% airdrop, 36% contributors/investors/Foundation vested over 2 years, 4% Foundation, 57.35% emissions, 1.15% treasury) and adopted the veToken model in early 2022.All tokenomics figures match the primary documentation precisely. - #20[confirmed][no action needed]in section: May 2026 vsdCRV Deployer Key Exploit (Critical Incident)
“Stake DAO confirmed that contributors secured the vsdCRV backing on Ethereum mainnet before the attacker could seize it, and stated that Boosted Yields, Liquid Lockers, Votemarket, and Morpho lending products were unaffected.”
reviewerStake DAO confirmed contributors secured the vsdCRV backing on Ethereum mainnet before the attacker could seize it, and that Boosted Yields, Liquid Lockers, Votemarket, and Morpho lending products were unaffected.Matches the cited follow-up report closely.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.