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← StablRreviewed 2026-10-17 · 26 claims checked

Fact-check findings

What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read StablR against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.

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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.

“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.

Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.

disputed 8unverifiable 3link rot 5partially supported 2confirmed 813 corrections pending · 0 applied

disputed

8 claims

The reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.

  1. #7[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Market Impact and Depeg
    “At the time of the Cryptonomist report, USDR and EURR had market capitalizations of approximately $20 million and $10 million respectively, meaning the $13.5 million in minted unbacked tokens represented a supply increase of 67% for USDR and 45% for EURR relative to the legitimate circulating supply.”
    reviewerAt the time of the Cryptonomist report, USDR and EURR had market capitalizations of approximately $20 million and $10 million respectively, representing a supply increase of 67% for USDR and 45% for EURR.The cited source does not contain this data at all; the dollar figures roughly resemble numbers from an uncited outlet, but the derived percentages could not be independently reconciled from any source checked.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    USDR and EURR had relatively small market capitalizations prior to the exploit, meaning the $13.5 million in minted unbacked tokens represented a large proportional increase in circulating supply relative to each token's legitimate float, though exact pre-exploit market capitalization figures are not firmly established across sources.
    citeden.cryptonomist.ch/2026/05/24/stablr-sta…eurr-usdr-depeg/
  2. #8[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: StablR's Official Response and Remediation
    “StablR issued an official statement on X (formerly Twitter) on May 26, 2026, confirming: 'We have identified an exploit affecting StablR and are actively working to contain it and minimize impact.'”
    reviewerStablR issued an official statement on X on May 26, 2026, confirming 'We have identified an exploit affecting StablR and are actively working to contain it and minimize impact.'The quote is real but was posted on May 24 as an initial acknowledgment; the fuller statement describing the minting/redemption freeze and the MiCA 1:1 shortfall admission (which the page bundles into the same paragraph) came separately, reported by CoinDesk on May 26. The page conflates the two into a single May 26 quote.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    StablR issued an initial statement on X (formerly Twitter) on May 24, 2026, confirming: 'We have identified an exploit affecting StablR and are actively working to contain it and minimize impact.'
    citedwww.coindesk.com/markets/2026/05/26/stab…-unbacked-tokens
  3. #9[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
    “2024-06-21”
    reviewerStablR received its Electronic Money Institution license from the MFSA on June 21, 2024.StablR's own press release gives July 1, 2024 as the grant date; a third-party wiki (IQ.wiki, not independently verifiable) gives June 21, 2024, and other FinTelegram pieces say July 2024. The cited source for this date does not contain a date at all. July 1, 2024 (the company's own stated date) is the better-supported figure.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    2024-07-01
    citedwhoswho.mt/en/malta-based-stablr-acquire…-in-crypto-space
  4. #10[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Background: StablR Corporate Structure and Investors
    “StablR is incorporated in Malta and holds an Electronic Money Institution license from the MFSA, received June 21, 2024.”
    reviewerStablR is incorporated in Malta and holds an Electronic Money Institution license from the MFSA, received June 21, 2024.Same underlying date error as the timeline entry; see that finding for sourcing detail.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    StablR is incorporated in Malta and holds an Electronic Money Institution license from the MFSA, received July 1, 2024.
    citedwhoswho.mt/en/malta-based-stablr-acquire…-in-crypto-space
  5. #11[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Background: StablR Corporate Structure and Investors
    “By mid-2025, EURR and USDR were listed on over 50 exchanges including Bitfinex, Bybit, and HTX, with StablR reporting over €3 billion in transaction volume.”
    reviewerBy mid-2025, EURR and USDR were listed on over 50 exchanges with StablR reporting over €3 billion in transaction volume.StablR's own press release headline figure is denominated in US dollars, not euros; the page's '€3 billion' appears to mislabel the currency, an error echoed in the timeline.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    By mid-2025, EURR and USDR were listed on over 50 exchanges including Bitfinex, Bybit, and HTX, with StablR reporting over US$3 billion in transaction volume.
    citedwww.globenewswire.com/news-release/2025/…tion-Surges.html
  6. #12[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
    “Kraken announces a strategic equity investment in StablR. By this point EURR and USDR are listed on 50+ exchanges with over €3 billion in reported transaction volume.”
    reviewerKraken's investment announcement noted EURR/USDR listed on 50+ exchanges with over €3 billion in reported transaction volume.Same underlying error as the section-level claim; see that finding.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    Kraken announces a strategic equity investment in StablR. By this point EURR and USDR are listed on 50+ exchanges with over US$3 billion in reported transaction volume.
    citedwww.globenewswire.com/news-release/2025/…tion-Surges.html
  7. #13[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Background: StablR Corporate Structure and Investors
    “FinTelegram has raised questions about Gijs op de Weegh's prior role as COO of Payvision, a Dutch payment processor where Dutch authorities filed a criminal complaint in 2020 related to alleged processing of funds for boiler room scams and binary options fraud.”
    reviewerDutch authorities filed a criminal complaint in 2020 against Payvision related to processing funds for boiler room scams and binary options fraud.Per FinTelegram's own more detailed reporting (its EBA letter), 2020 was when DNB's investigation report was delivered; the criminal complaint itself is dated to 2021. The page conflates these into a single 2020 'criminal complaint.'
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    FinTelegram has raised questions about Gijs op de Weegh's prior role as COO of Payvision, a Dutch payment processor that was the subject of a 2020 Dutch central bank (DNB) investigation report, with FinTelegram reporting that DNB filed a criminal complaint over the matter in 2021.
    citedfintelegram.com/payvision-scandal-dutch-…lecoin-provider/
  8. #14[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Alleged Prior Concerns: CEO Background (Low Confidence)
    “A Dutch central bank (DNB) criminal complaint filed in 2020 against Payvision is cited by FinTelegram in this context.”
    reviewerA Dutch central bank (DNB) criminal complaint filed in 2020 against Payvision is cited by FinTelegram in this context.Same underlying date error as the Background section claim; both should be corrected together.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    A Dutch central bank (DNB) investigation report from 2020, which FinTelegram says led to a criminal complaint against Payvision filed in 2021, is cited by FinTelegram in this context.
    citedfintelegram.com/questioning-the-transpar…ijs-op-de-weegh/fintelegram.com/stablrs-dutch-holding-we…ble-coin-issuer/

unverifiable

3 claims

No source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.

  1. #15[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Background: StablR Corporate Structure and Investors
    “StablR was founded by Gijs op de Weegh, who serves as CEO, and is co-controlled by op de Weegh and a co-founder identified in Dutch corporate records as Van der Meijden.”
    reviewerStablR is co-controlled by op de Weegh and a co-founder identified in Dutch corporate records as Van der Meijden.A person named Van der Meijden does appear to be linked to FinTelegram's StablR reporting, but I could not independently confirm the specific 'co-founder' / 'co-controlled' framing from any source I could access.
    citedfintelegram.com/%F0%9F%9A%A8-critical-re…ust-investigate/
  2. #21[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: ZachXBT Alert and Oobit Response
    “On-chain investigator ZachXBT publicly flagged the exploit via his Telegram investigations channel on the evening of May 24, 2026 (approximately 9:46 PM ET), initially estimating the exploit at approximately $10 million across EURR and USDR contracts.”
    reviewerZachXBT flagged the exploit at approximately 9:46 PM ET on May 24, 2026.The general sequence (ZachXBT flags the exploit Saturday evening, $10M initial estimate) is well supported; the precise minute-level timestamp could not be confirmed from any source I could access, partly because the CoinReporter source for the companion 11:52 PM ET claim is dead (see link_rot findings).
    citedwww.cryptotimes.io/2026/05/26/oobit-halt…gs-eurr-exploit/blockonomi.com/zachxbt-flags-possible-10…lecoins-sink-20/
  3. #22[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Technical Analysis: Multisig Architecture Failure
    “Attack addresses identified by ZachXBT include the primary address 0xea480c23d7b29a515856aafe0dc86f7519965a04 and at least seven associated addresses:”
    reviewerAttack addresses identified by ZachXBT include a primary address and at least nine associated addresses.Could not independently verify the exact address strings against an on-chain explorer or a source that reproduces them; the count (primary + 7 associated, plus a secondary and tertiary) is consistent with reporting that addresses existed, but the specific values are unverifiable from accessible sources.
    citedwww.coinreporter.io/2026/05/zachxbt-says…sdr-crash-by-20/blockonomi.com/zachxbt-flags-possible-10…lecoins-sink-20/

partially supported

2 claims

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

  1. #3[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Exploit Overview
    “Blockaid characterized the incident as 'a key management and governance failure,' not a smart contract vulnerability.”
    reviewerBlockaid characterized the incident, in a direct quote, as 'a key management and governance failure,' not a smart contract vulnerability.The substance (key-management/governance failure, not a smart contract bug) is well supported, but no source reproduces the exact phrase 'a key management and governance failure' as a Blockaid quote; it appears to be a paraphrase dressed as a direct quote.
    citedwww.theblock.co/post/402429/stablrs-eurr…multisig-exploit
  2. #6[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Market Impact and Depeg
    “EURR, the euro-denominated stablecoin, dropped approximately 20-39% below its intended peg, with various sources reporting it reaching as low as €0.70 (a 39% depeg) and trading at $0.548 by some CoinGecko readings in the aftermath.”
    reviewerEURR fell as low as €0.70, a 39% depeg, per the sources cited in this section.Depeg figures genuinely vary across outlets (confirmed range roughly 12%-30% in the sources actually cited for this section), but none of the three sources cited for this specific sentence reports €0.70/39% for EURR; that figure appears to come from an uncited French-language outlet (Cryptoast).
    citedu.today/usd-stablecoin-usdr-extends-de-p…vernance-exploitbeincrypto.com/stablr-stablecoin-depeg-exploit/en.cryptonomist.ch/2026/05/24/stablr-sta…eurr-usdr-depeg/

confirmed

8 claims

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

  1. #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Exploit Overview
    “Approximately 8.35 million USDR and 4.5 million EURR were minted in unbacked form, representing roughly $13.5 million at face value.”
    reviewerThe attacker minted approximately 8.35 million USDR and 4.5 million EURR, representing roughly $13.5 million at face value.Figures confirmed by both the cited source and an independent outlet.
    citedwww.theblock.co/post/402429/stablrs-eurr…multisig-exploit
  2. #2[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Exploit Overview
    “The attacker subsequently dumped all minted tokens on decentralized exchanges, realizing approximately 1,115 ETH (~$2.8 million net) due to thin DEX liquidity absorbing the sell pressure at steep discounts.”
    reviewerThe attacker realized approximately 1,115 ETH (~$2.8 million net) due to thin DEX liquidity.Figure consistently reported across multiple independent outlets.
    citedwww.theblock.co/post/402429/stablrs-eurr…multisig-exploit
  3. #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Technical Analysis: Multisig Architecture Failure
    “For comparison, the Harmony Horizon bridge operated under a 2-of-5 multisig before losing $100 million in 2022 — and that configuration was already considered under-secured.”
    reviewerThe Harmony Horizon bridge operated under a 2-of-5 multisig before losing $100 million in 2022, a configuration already considered under-secured.Matches well-documented public record of the June 2022 Harmony Horizon bridge hack.
    citedwww.cryptotimes.io/2026/05/25/can-mica-p…exposes-the-gap/
  4. #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Technical Analysis: Multisig Architecture Failure
    “The attacker's wallet was reportedly funded via Circle's Cross-Chain Transfer Protocol (CCTP) on the Noble blockchain prior to executing the exploit, suggesting deliberate preparation.”
    reviewerThe attacker's wallet was funded via Circle's CCTP on the Noble blockchain prior to the exploit.Confirmed, attributed consistently to ZachXBT across outlets.
    citedblockonomi.com/zachxbt-flags-possible-10…lecoins-sink-20/
  5. #23[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Background: StablR Corporate Structure and Investors
    “In December 2024, Tether made a strategic equity investment in StablR for an undisclosed sum — a notable arrangement given that Tether itself does not hold a MiCA license and reportedly retreated from EU markets ahead of MiCA's December 30, 2024 implementation deadline.”
    reviewerTether made a strategic equity investment in StablR for an undisclosed sum, coinciding with Tether's retreat from EU markets ahead of MiCA's December 30, 2024 deadline; StablR separately raised a €3.3 million seed round from Deribit, Theta Capital, Blocktech, and Folkvang.Seed round investors and amount confirmed exactly; the 'retreated from EU markets' characterization is a reasonable paraphrase of Tether's suspension of EURT and regulatory uncertainty, though the source frames it more as repositioning (investing in smaller compliant issuers) than an outright retreat.
    citedfinance.yahoo.com/news/tether-invests-st…o-055026417.html
  6. #24[confirmed][no action needed]in section: MiCA Compliance Implications
    “In its official statement, StablR acknowledged that 'the circulating supply of both tokens is currently not fully backed at the 1:1 ratio required by MiCA' — a direct admission of a regulatory compliance breach.”
    reviewerStablR acknowledged in its official statement that circulating supply was currently not fully backed at the 1:1 ratio required by MiCA.Direct quote confirmed against the cited source.
    citedwww.coindesk.com/markets/2026/05/26/stab…-unbacked-tokens
  7. #25[confirmed][no action needed]in section: MiCA Compliance Implications
    “While MiCA mandates 'operational resilience,' the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA, effective January 2025) was designed for traditional IT resilience and does not cover blockchain-specific vulnerabilities such as weak multisig configurations.”
    reviewerDORA became effective in January 2025 and was designed for traditional IT resilience, not blockchain-specific vulnerabilities such as weak multisig configurations.Confirmed against the cited source.
    citedwww.cryptotimes.io/2026/05/25/can-mica-p…exposes-the-gap/
  8. #26[confirmed][no action needed]in section: ZachXBT Alert and Oobit Response
    “Oobit stated: 'We detected the attempt, froze 6 figures in EURR, and shut down the off-ramp in less than 2 hours.' The company further stated: 'No user funds touched. No breach. No hesitation.'”
    reviewerOobit stated it detected the attempted off-ramp, froze six figures in EURR, and shut down the off-ramp in less than 2 hours, with no user funds touched.Direct quotes confirmed exactly.
    citedwww.cryptotimes.io/2026/05/26/oobit-halt…gs-eurr-exploit/
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.