Fact-check findings
What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Solidity Pro VSCode Extension (Malicious) against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.
These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.
“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.
Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.
disputed
2 claimsThe reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.
- #7[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Attribution to WhiteCobra Threat Cluster
“A leaked internal document referred to in reporting as 'DEPLOYMENT PLAN: Operation Solidity Pro' describes five campaign phases — packaging, deployment, promotion, inflation (artificial download count manipulation), and exfiltration — and allegedly lists revenue targets of $10,000 to $500,000 per hour.”
reviewerA leaked internal document, 'DEPLOYMENT PLAN: Operation Solidity Pro,' describes five campaign phases (packaging, deployment, promotion, inflation, exfiltration) and allegedly lists revenue targets of $10,000 to $500,000 per hour.This specific dollar range does not appear in any of the four sources cited for this section, including the one (Yeeth) that is the apparent origin of the 'five-phase deployment plan' description otherwise reproduced accurately. The surrounding factual detail (five phases, named phases) is correct; the revenue figure appears to be an invented addition not traceable to any source.Proposed correction (not yet applied)A leaked internal document referred to in reporting as 'DEPLOYMENT PLAN: Operation Solidity Pro' describes five campaign phases — packaging, deployment, promotion, inflation (artificial download count manipulation), and exfiltration. - #13[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Affected Versions and Indicators of Compromise
“Versions confirmed as malicious or under active investigation by Yeeth Security and SlowMist include: helper-beeps.solidity-pro versions 1.0.0 through 3.2.x (versions 1.0.0 and 4.0.0 assessed as clean decoys; versions 2.4.7 and 2.4.8 used heightened obfuscation; version 2.4.1 introduced the 24-48 hour delayed activation); web3devtoolsx.solidity-pro version 3.4.0 (the infostealer variant analyzed by SlowMist).”
reviewerAffected/malicious versions include helper-beeps.solidity-pro versions 1.0.0 through 3.2.x, with versions 1.0.0 and 4.0.0 assessed as clean decoys, versions 2.4.7/2.4.8 using heightened obfuscation, and version 2.4.1 introducing the 24-48 hour delayed activation; web3devtoolsx.solidity-pro version 3.4.0 is the infostealer variant.This is a clear misattribution: the page's own primary source states the 1.0.0/4.0.0 clean decoy releases belong to the web3devtoolsx publisher, while helper-beeps' version 1.0.0 is itself one of the malicious early-dropper hashes documented in the same source.Proposed correction (not yet applied)Versions confirmed as malicious or under active investigation by Yeeth Security and SlowMist include: helper-beeps.solidity-pro versions 1.0.0 through 3.2.x (versions 2.4.7 and 2.4.8 used heightened obfuscation; version 2.4.1 introduced the 24-48 hour delayed activation); web3devtoolsx.solidity-pro, including clean decoy releases at versions 1.0.0 and 4.0.0 and the version 3.4.0 infostealer variant analyzed by SlowMist.
partially supported
3 claimsThe cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.
- #9[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Attribution to WhiteCobra Threat Cluster
“Malpedia lists WhiteCobra as an active threat actor with no confirmed state attribution or geographic origin as of available public records.”
reviewerMalpedia lists WhiteCobra as an active threat actor with no confirmed state attribution or geographic origin as of available public records.The underlying fact (no public attribution exists) appears true based on everything else reviewed, but the page attributes an affirmative 'no attribution' statement to Malpedia specifically, when Malpedia is simply silent on the topic. Minor mischaracterization of what the cited source says. - #18[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“Open VSX flags helper-beeps publisher account as malicious and removes associated extensions from the registry.”
reviewerOpen VSX flags helper-beeps publisher account as malicious and removes associated extensions on 2026-08-06.The combined Aug 6-7 window is corroborated, but no source I could access independently confirms that helper-beeps specifically was flagged on Aug 6 as opposed to Aug 7. Not contradicted, but the specific day-to-publisher pairing is not independently verifiable from sources I could retrieve. - #19[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“Open VSX flags web3devtoolsx publisher account as malicious and removes associated extensions including web3devtoolsx.solidity-pro version 3.4.0.”
reviewerOpen VSX flags web3devtoolsx publisher account as malicious and removes associated extensions including web3devtoolsx.solidity-pro version 3.4.0, on 2026-08-07.Same caveat as the preceding helper-beeps timeline entry: the specific day assigned to this publisher is plausible but not independently confirmed by any source I could retrieve.
confirmed
17 claimsThe cited evidence supports the claim as written.
- #1[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary
“Two malicious Visual Studio Code extensions published under the names 'Solidity Pro' by publisher accounts helper-beeps and web3devtoolsx were confirmed in August 2026 to be credential-harvesting malware targeting Web3 and Solidity developers.”
reviewerTwo malicious VS Code extensions named 'Solidity Pro', published by helper-beeps and web3devtoolsx, were confirmed in August 2026 to be credential-harvesting malware targeting Web3/Solidity developers.Corroborated by three independent write-ups with matching extension IDs, timeframe, and behavior. - #2[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary
“Open VSX flagged and removed both publisher accounts on August 6-7, 2026; no official Microsoft Marketplace removal notice has been independently verified in available sources.”
reviewerOpen VSX flagged and removed both publisher accounts on August 6-7, 2026.The combined Aug 6-7 date matches CryptoTimes directly; the hedge about no verified Microsoft Marketplace notice is consistent with the absence of such a report in any source checked. - #3[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Overview and Publisher Identities
“The malicious packages were published under two distinct publisher accounts: helper-beeps (extension ID: helper-beeps.solidity-pro, with a related package helper-beeps.solidity-pro-ai-auditor) and web3devtoolsx (extension ID: web3devtoolsx.solidity-pro). A third impostor variant attributed to iktok90-design.solidity-pro was also flagged by Yeeth Security.”
reviewerThe malicious packages were published under helper-beeps (helper-beeps.solidity-pro, helper-beeps.solidity-pro-ai-auditor) and web3devtoolsx (web3devtoolsx.solidity-pro); a third impostor variant, iktok90-design.solidity-pro, was also flagged.Verified verbatim against the fetched article text. - #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Overview and Publisher Identities
“The GitHub repository web3devtoolsx/solidity-pro remained publicly accessible at the time of reporting in August 2026.”
reviewerThe GitHub repository web3devtoolsx/solidity-pro remained publicly accessible at the time of reporting in August 2026.Confirmed by two independently fetched sources, both time-bound to August 2026 as the page states. - #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Malware Capabilities and Data Exfiltrated
“Versions 3.0.0 and later — including web3devtoolsx version 3.4.0 — shifted to a self-contained information stealer.”
reviewerEarly versions (1.0.0-2.4.x) beaconed to Cloudflare Workers to download an AES-GCM encrypted Python payload executed via child_process.spawn; v3.0.0+ (including web3devtoolsx 3.4.0) became a self-contained Web3Analytics infostealer targeting wallets, cloud/API keys, SSH keys and .env files, exfiltrated via Cloudflare Workers and a Telegram bot /u endpoint; an AutoUpdater polled every 30 minutes without verification.Technical detail in this section matches the directly-fetched Yeeth Security write-up closely, including exact C2 domain fragments and hash algorithm (AES-GCM). - #6[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Evasion Techniques
“According to SlowMist's August 2026 analysis, version 2.4.1 under the helper-beeps publisher introduced a deliberate 24 to 48 hour activation delay that triggered only when a Solidity file was opened or a Hardhat or Foundry workspace was detected.”
reviewerVersion 2.4.1 under the helper-beeps publisher introduced a deliberate 24 to 48 hour activation delay, gated on opening a Solidity file or detecting a Hardhat/Foundry workspace, and exited if CI environment variables were present.Attributed correctly to SlowMist, whose reporting states this figure explicitly for v2.4.1. Yeeth's generic config sample (12-72h) covers the wider family and is not in conflict with a narrower, version-specific SlowMist figure. - #8[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Attribution to WhiteCobra Threat Cluster
“Koi Security researcher Yuval Ronen separately assessed that WhiteCobra has deployed at least 24 malicious extensions across VS Code and Open VSX registries.”
reviewerKoi Security researcher Yuval Ronen separately assessed that WhiteCobra has deployed at least 24 malicious extensions across VS Code and Open VSX registries.Well corroborated; the page's phrasing ('VS Code and Open VSX') is a slight narrowing since Koi's report also covers Cursor and Windsurf, but this does not misstate the core figure. - #10[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Attribution to WhiteCobra Threat Cluster
“The September 2025 WhiteCobra campaign distributed LummaStealer through VS Code extensions on Windows.”
reviewerThe September 2025 WhiteCobra campaign distributed LummaStealer through VS Code extensions on Windows.Matches independent reporting; page correctly scopes the LummaStealer claim to Windows only. - #11[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Marketplace Response and Current Status
“Separately, a prior incident in July 2025 — involving a different malicious Solidity-themed extension on Open VSX — resulted in a reported loss of approximately $500,000 for one blockchain developer, according to Malpedia and Meyka reporting; that incident predates the Solidity Pro campaign documented here and involves a distinct extension.”
reviewerA prior incident in July 2025, involving a different malicious Solidity-themed extension on Open VSX (distinct from Solidity Pro), resulted in a reported loss of approximately $500,000 for one blockchain developer.The page correctly distinguishes this incident from the Solidity Pro campaign; verified directly against the cited Meyka article. - #12[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Marketplace Response and Current Status
“A related malicious extension, ethdevtools.solidity-language-support, which impersonated a Solidity language-support tool and delivered a clipboard-based BIP-39 seed phrase stealer, was reportedly active in June 2026 and represents a parallel campaign in the same threat surface.”
reviewerethdevtools.solidity-language-support, a parallel malicious extension impersonating a Solidity language-support tool with a clipboard-based BIP-39 seed phrase stealer, was reportedly active in June 2026.Verified against the directly fetched article text. - #14[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Affected Versions and Indicators of Compromise
“SHA-256 hashes published by Yeeth Security include 0a9da2b33c94da3f1fc02502ab3caed6e1fbe40f9115422c09103c42a9f8b3d1 for helper-beeps version 1.0.0 and 20c2a806619e1f32b3adc78689366959089d1a5de17a59a924bf477284785b5f for helper-beeps version 3.1.0.”
reviewerSHA-256 hashes published by Yeeth Security include 0a9da2b33c94da3f1fc02502ab3caed6e1fbe40f9115422c09103c42a9f8b3d1 for helper-beeps version 1.0.0 and 20c2a806619e1f32b3adc78689366959089d1a5de17a59a924bf477284785b5f for helper-beeps version 3.1.0.Exact hash match confirmed by direct retrieval and comparison. - #15[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
“WhiteCobra threat cluster previously identified distributing LummaStealer via malicious VS Code extensions in an earlier campaign, establishing the operational pattern later applied to Solidity Pro.”
reviewerWhiteCobra threat cluster previously identified distributing LummaStealer via malicious VS Code extensions in an earlier campaign (timeline entry, September 2025).Date and attribution match independent reporting on the September 2025 Koi Security report. - #16[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
“A separate malicious Solidity-themed VS Code extension on Open VSX (distinct from the Solidity Pro campaign) reportedly resulted in a $500,000 loss for one blockchain developer, according to Malpedia and Meyka reporting.”
reviewerA separate malicious Solidity-themed VS Code extension on Open VSX reportedly resulted in a $500,000 loss for one blockchain developer (timeline entry, July 2025).Date precision ('2025-07') is consistent with the July 2, 2025 removal date found in the Meyka article. - #17[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
“Parallel malicious extension ethdevtools.solidity-language-support identified impersonating a Solidity language-support tool with clipboard-based BIP-39 seed phrase and Ethereum private key stealing functionality.”
reviewerParallel malicious extension ethdevtools.solidity-language-support identified in June 2026, impersonating a Solidity language-support tool with clipboard-based BIP-39/private key stealing functionality.Matches directly fetched source text. - #20[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
“Yeeth Security publishes primary technical analysis: 'Solidity Pro's WhiteCobra Chassis: Cloudflare C2 to Telegram Infostealer,' documenting the full version evolution, C2 infrastructure, IOCs, and attribution to the WhiteCobra threat cluster.”
reviewerYeeth Security publishes its primary technical analysis on 2026-08-06.Exact publish date verified directly. - #21[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
“The Hacker News and GBHackers publish coverage of the Solidity Pro malware campaign, citing Yeeth Security's analysis and providing broader developer-audience visibility.”
reviewerThe Hacker News and GBHackers publish coverage of the campaign on 2026-08-10.Both publish dates independently confirmed via direct retrieval. - #22[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
“SlowMist publishes independent technical analysis on Medium confirming credential-harvesting, remote payload execution, and remote update capabilities; specifically analyzes helper-beeps version 2.4.1 and web3devtoolsx version 3.4.0.”
reviewerSlowMist publishes an independent technical analysis on Medium on 2026-08-19, specifically analyzing helper-beeps version 2.4.1 and web3devtoolsx version 3.4.0.SlowMist's own Medium post returned HTTP 403 to direct fetch, but its content is independently and consistently reproduced by the CryptoTimes summary, which the page also cites for this section.