Fact-check findings

The reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.

1. #10[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Scale of Extraction

   “An earlier incident attributed to a separate validator identified as Arsc had been associated with approximately $60 million in MEV extraction, though the precise methodology for that figure has not been independently verified.”

   reviewerAn earlier incident attributed to validator 'Arsc' was associated with approximately $60 million in MEV extractionThe page's own timeline entry for 2024-06-15 correctly states arsc's profit as ~$30 million, directly contradicting this section's $60 million figure for the same bot/incident. No source was found supporting a $60M figure for arsc.
   Proposed correction (not yet applied)

   An earlier incident attributed to a separate validator identified as Arsc had been associated with approximately $30 million in MEV extraction over two months, though the precise methodology for that figure has not been independently verified.
   citedcryptonews.net/news/security/30712979/
2. #21[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Key Operators and Validators

   “The top bot paid approximately 22,760 SOL ($4.63 million) in Jito tips during one 30-day period while retaining approximately 49,400 SOL in net profit — a tip-to-profit ratio of roughly 15–20%, compared to arbitrage bots that pay 50–60% of profits to validators.”

   reviewerThe top sandwich bot paid approximately 22,760 SOL ($4.63 million) in Jito tips over one 30-day period while retaining ~49,400 SOL net profit, a 15-20% tip-to-profit ratioThe 49,400 SOL net-profit figure and the 15-20% ratio are consistent with the source (7,980/49,400 ≈ 16%), but the absolute tip figure of 22,760 SOL / $4.63M does not appear in the cited source and appears to be an error; the $4.63M conversion is dropped in the correction since the source provides no dollar figure for tips.
   Proposed correction (not yet applied)

   The top bot paid approximately 7,980 SOL in Jito tips during one 30-day period while retaining approximately 49,400 SOL in net profit — a tip-to-profit ratio of roughly 15–20%, compared to arbitrage bots that pay 50–60% of profits to validators.
   citedsolanafloor.com/news/a-deep-dive-into-so…42-of-the-market
3. #45[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline

   “JitoSOL Blacklist Committee bans 15 additional validators; Marinade Finance blacklists 50+ validators protecting an alleged $2 billion in delegated stake; Sandwiched.me reports $370-500M extracted over 16 months.”

   reviewerIn May 2025: the JitoSOL Blacklist Committee banned 15 additional validators, Marinade Finance blacklisted 50+ validators, and Sandwiched.me reported $370-500M extracted over 16 monthsThis single timeline entry bundles three events under one May 2025 date, but only the Sandwiched.me report actually occurred then; the Jito ban (~Oct 2025) and Marinade blacklist (~Dec 2025) are each correctly dated elsewhere in this same page's own sections, contradicting this entry. Recommend splitting into three separate timeline entries with their correct individual dates rather than a single field edit.
   Proposed correction (not yet applied)

   Sandwiched.me reports $370-500M extracted over 16 months.
   citedcryptonews.net/news/security/32181951/www.cryptopolitan.com/jito-bans-15-addit…andwich-attacks/

No source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.

1. #17[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Key Operators and Validators

   “Approximately 19.89% of that stake reportedly originated from Marinade's mSOL pool.”

   reviewerApproximately 19.89% of DeezNode's stake originated from Marinade's mSOL poolCould not independently locate a source stating this precise percentage; plausible but unconfirmed.
   citedcryptonews.net/news/security/30712979/
2. #29[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Ecosystem and Regulatory Response

   “No regulatory body (SEC, CFTC, or equivalent) has issued formal enforcement actions specifically targeting Solana sandwich bots as of May 2026.”

   reviewerNo regulatory body (SEC, CFTC, or equivalent) has issued formal enforcement actions specifically targeting Solana sandwich bots as of May 2026This is an absence-of-evidence claim; no reporting of such an enforcement action was found, but a negative cannot be conclusively confirmed by search alone.
3. #35[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in the timeline

   “Jito Labs launches public mempool for Solana, enabling searchable pending transaction flow that bot operators later exploit for sandwich attacks.”

   reviewerJito Labs launched a public mempool for Solana in November 2022The general mechanism is well-documented but the specific November 2022 date could not be independently pinned down; the timeline entry also has no source_url.
4. #41[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in the timeline

   “November 2024 peaks as the highest-extraction month on record: nearly 600,000 SOL extracted despite DEX volume being roughly half of January 2024 levels.”

   reviewerNovember 2024 was the highest-extraction month on record, with nearly 600,000 SOL extracted despite DEX volume being roughly half of January 2024 levelsCould not independently confirm this specific monthly figure or the DEX-volume comparison; plausible given the surrounding Ghostlogs data trend but not directly located in available sources, and this timeline entry carries no source_url.
5. #44[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in the timeline

   “Helius publishes its Solana MEV Report attributing nearly half of all Solana sandwich attacks to the single vpeNAL/DeezNode program.”

   reviewerHelius published its Solana MEV Report on 2025-01-05, attributing nearly half of sandwich attacks to the vpeNAL/DeezNode programThe substantive claim is confirmed elsewhere on the page (sections[2]); the specific January 5, 2025 publish date could not be independently corroborated.
   citedwww.helius.dev/blog/solana-mev-report

The claim was accurate when written but events since have overtaken it.

1. #2[stale][awaiting moderator]in the summary

   “is the subject of an active federal class-action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York naming Pump.fun, Solana Labs, and related entities”

   reviewerThe entity is the subject of an active SDNY class-action lawsuit naming Pump.fun and Solana Labs as defendantsAs of the current date, Solana Labs and the Solana Foundation are no longer defendants in this case; presenting the lawsuit as currently naming Solana Labs is stale. Only RICO claims against Pump.fun's operator and founders (and unserved KOL defendants) survive.
   Proposed correction (not yet applied)

   was the subject of a federal class-action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York that at one point named Pump.fun, Solana Labs, and related entities, though Solana Labs, the Solana Foundation, and five named executives were dismissed from the case by Judge Colleen McMahon on August 31, 2026

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

1. #25[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Role of Jito Block Engine and Private Mempools

   “An earlier governance proposal during Epoch 789 had also executed a blacklisting of validators identified as conducting sandwich attacks.”

   reviewerAn earlier governance proposal during Epoch 789 executed a blacklisting of validators identified as conducting sandwich attacksThe existence of a Jito blacklist governance proposal is confirmed, and epoch 789 is used in research as a before/after marker, but the specific framing that a vote executed during that epoch is not independently confirmed; may overstate precision.
   citeddl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3730567.3764493
2. #40[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in the timeline

   “October data shows $3.2 million extracted from 202,000+ Solana victims in a single month during a documented resurgence of sandwich activity.”

   reviewerOctober 2024 data showed $3.2 million extracted from 202,000+ Solana victims in a single monthThe $3.2M figure is confirmed by the cited source; the 202,000+ victim count could not be independently verified from available search results.
   citedfinance.yahoo.com/news/sandwich-attacks-…a-112345764.html

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

1. #1[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary

   “extracting an estimated $370 million to $500 million from users between January 2024 and May 2025”

   reviewerSandwich bots extracted an estimated $370M-$500M from Solana users between Jan 2024 and May 2025Figure and window are corroborated by the primary Ghostlogs research and its Accelerate 2025 (May 19-23, 2025) presentation.
   citedsolanacompass.com/learn/accelerate-25/sc…te-of-solana-mev
2. #3[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary

   “While coordinated countermeasures reduced attack profitability by an estimated 60-70% in 2025, attacks continue and disproportionately harm memecoin traders using high slippage settings on Raydium and Pump.fun.”

   reviewerCoordinated 2025 countermeasures reduced sandwich attack profitability by an estimated 60-70%Figure is repeated consistently across late-2025 reporting on the ecosystem response.
   citedcryptonews.net/news/security/32181951/
3. #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Mechanism of Attack

   “wide sandwiches grew from approximately 1% to 30% of all sandwich attacks in recent months and now account for 93% of all sandwich activity by count, having extracted over 529,000 SOL in the preceding year”

   reviewerWide/multi-slot sandwiches grew from ~1% to 30% of attacks and now account for 93% of sandwich activity by count, extracting over 529,000 SOL in the preceding yearMatches Ghostlogs/sandwiched.me public research figures.
   citedsolanacompass.com/learn/accelerate-25/sc…te-of-solana-mev
4. #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Mechanism of Attack

   “After Jito Labs shut down its public mempool in March 2024 due to sandwich attack concerns, MEV activity migrated to private mempool networks.”

   reviewerJito Labs shut down its public mempool in March 2024 due to sandwich attack concernsDate and rationale independently confirmed.
   citedbloxroute.com/pulse/a-new-era-of-mev-on-solana/
5. #6[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Mechanism of Attack

   “Private services such as DeezNode allegedly offered validators 50% of MEV profits in exchange for routing transactions through their private order-flow channels, replicating the attack surface in a less transparent form.”

   reviewerDeezNode allegedly offered validators 50% of MEV profits to route transactions through its private order-flow channelCorroborated by independent reporting on private mempool solicitations.
   citedwww.helius.dev/blog/solana-mev-report
6. #7[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Scale of Extraction

   “The figure is derived from analysis of over 8.5 billion trades representing roughly $1 trillion in cumulative DEX volume on Solana.”

   reviewerThe $370-500M estimate derives from analysis of over 8.5 billion trades / ~$1 trillion cumulative DEX volumeMatches primary research description.
   citedsolanacompass.com/learn/accelerate-25/sc…te-of-solana-mev
7. #8[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Scale of Extraction

   “executed approximately 1.55 million transactions in a single month, generating 65,880 SOL in profit — equivalent to roughly $13.43 million at December 2024 prices”

   reviewerDeezNode's bot executed ~1.55 million transactions in one month generating 65,880 SOL (~$13.43M) profitConfirmed by the cited source and corroborating coverage of the same underlying vitorpy/DarkLake analysis.
   citedcryptonews.net/news/security/30712979/
8. #9[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Scale of Extraction

   “Annualized, that rate would project to approximately 801,540 SOL ($163 million) per year.”

   reviewerAnnualized, DeezNode's extraction rate would project to ~801,540 SOL (~$163M) per yearSimple multiplication of the monthly figure, and matches independently reported annualized figure.
   citedcryptonews.net/news/security/30712979/
9. #11[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Scale of Extraction

   “A separate analysis by Solana Floor identified bot address E6YoRP3adE5XYneSseLee15wJshDxCsmyD2WtLvAmfLi as accounting for 42% of all sandwich volume, processing over $1.6 billion in trades across a 30-day window with a net profit of approximately 49,400 SOL after Jito tips.”

   reviewerSolana Floor identified bot E6YoRP3adE5XYneSseLee15wJshDxCsmyD2WtLvAmfLi as 42% of sandwich volume, $1.6B in trades over 30 days, ~49,400 SOL net profitVerified directly against the cited article's text.
   citedsolanafloor.com/news/a-deep-dive-into-so…42-of-the-market
10. #12[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Scale of Extraction

    “The second-ranked bot (89Ny6a4mALkQgEVN8UbKSc9TdLi6t9rFYdtihrXZEpq6) processed $433 million in trades at approximately 11.2% market share.”

    reviewerThe second-ranked bot (89Ny6a4mALkQgEVN8UbKSc9TdLi6t9rFYdtihrXZEpq6) processed $433 million in trades at ~11.2% market shareVerified directly against source text.
    citedsolanafloor.com/news/a-deep-dive-into-so…42-of-the-market
11. #13[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Scale of Extraction

    “Academic researchers at the 2025 ACM Internet Measurement Conference documented over 500,000 discrete sandwiching incidents resulting in more than $7.7 million in direct victim losses over their four-month measurement window covering early 2025 Jito usage, with users deploying over 2.4 million defensive transactions that provided limited protection.”

    reviewerACM IMC 2025 researchers documented over 500,000 sandwiching incidents, more than $7.7M in direct victim losses over a four-month early-2025 window, and 2.4M defensive transactions with limited effectFigures independently confirmed via paper abstract/coverage.
    citeddl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3730567.3764493
12. #14[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Scale of Extraction

    “Separately, monthly extraction figures from on-chain monitoring showed a record of approximately 87,000 SOL extracted in January 2025.”

    reviewerMonthly on-chain monitoring showed a record of approximately 87,000 SOL extracted in January 2025Confirmed.
    citedsolanacompass.com/learn/accelerate-25/sc…te-of-solana-mev
13. #15[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Key Operators and Validators

    “Research by Ghostlogs identified 23 validators whose leader slots showed sandwich attack rates exceeding 6% — meaning that in more than 6% of blocks they produced, at least one sandwich attack was present. Some validators showed exploitation rates as high as 27% of their produced blocks.”

    reviewer23 validators showed sandwich rates exceeding 6% of blocks produced, with some as high as 27%Confirmed via independent search corroboration.
    citedwww.helius.dev/blog/solana-mev-report
14. #16[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Key Operators and Validators

    “The validator operating under the name DeezNode (on-chain address HM5H6...jdMRA) accumulated delegated stake of approximately 811,604 SOL — roughly $168.5 million — with its stake growing from approximately 307,900 SOL in November 2024 to 802,500 SOL by December 9, 2024.”

    reviewerDeezNode validator (HM5H6...jdMRA) held ~811,604 SOL (~$168.5M) delegated stake, growing from ~307,900 SOL (Nov 2024) to 802,500 SOL by Dec 9, 2024Confirmed with minor immaterial rounding.
    citedcryptonews.net/news/security/30712979/
15. #18[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Key Operators and Validators

    “The rapid stake accumulation while conducting alleged sandwich attacks was flagged by on-chain researcher vitorpy (founder of DarkLake) in a public report published on March 18, 2025.”

    reviewerOn-chain researcher vitorpy (founder of DarkLake) flagged DeezNode's rapid stake accumulation in a report published March 18, 2025Confirmed by independent search.
    citedwww.helius.dev/blog/solana-mev-report
16. #19[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Key Operators and Validators

    “The bot program designated by researchers as 'vpe' (short address vpeNAL...oax38b) is described by Jito's internal analysis as responsible for nearly half of all sandwich attacks on Solana.”

    reviewerThe 'vpe' bot program is described by Jito's internal analysis as responsible for nearly half of all sandwich attacks on SolanaConfirmed.
    citedwww.helius.dev/blog/solana-mev-report
17. #20[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Key Operators and Validators

    “Researchers from chrischang43 on X documented in January 2025 that sandwiching on Solana was dominated by six bots, analyzing their strategies across buy and sell directions, Jito tipping behavior, and Pump.fun bonding curve targeting.”

    reviewerchrischang43 documented in January 2025 that sandwiching on Solana was dominated by six botsContent is plausible and consistent with the author's other public research, but the sole citation is an unarchived tier-3 social media post that could not be directly re-verified; flagged as a sourcing risk in coverage_gaps.
    citedx.com/chrischang43/status/1880354695186653531
18. #22[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Key Operators and Validators

    “the top sandwich bot allegedly earned 8,400 SOL profit from sandwiching a single 20,000 SOL transaction on February 25, 2025”

    reviewerThe top sandwich bot allegedly earned 8,400 SOL profit from sandwiching a single 20,000 SOL $POPE transaction on February 25, 2025Verified directly against source text.
    citedsolanafloor.com/news/a-deep-dive-into-so…42-of-the-market
19. #23[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Key Operators and Validators

    “Memecoin traders are identified as the primary victim class due to their higher slippage tolerance settings, with 16 of the top 20 most-sandwiched tokens having been created on Pump.fun.”

    reviewer16 of the top 20 most-sandwiched tokens were created on Pump.funConfirmed by attribution consistency across the page's cited primary research source.
    citedwww.helius.dev/blog/solana-mev-report
20. #24[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Role of Jito Block Engine and Private Mempools

    “In October 2025, following an on-chain report from 0xGhostLogs documenting widespread abuse, the committee banned 15 additional validators from receiving JitoSOL stake.”

    reviewerIn October 2025, the JitoSOL Blacklist Committee banned 15 additional validators following an on-chain report from 0xGhostLogsCorrectly dated in this section, in contrast to the timeline entry for this same event (see disputed timeline finding).
    citedwww.cryptopolitan.com/jito-bans-15-addit…andwich-attacks/
21. #26[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Ecosystem and Regulatory Response

    “The Solana Foundation took its first major enforcement action in June 2024, when Validator Relations Lead Tim Garcia announced on the Foundation's Discord server that more than 30 validator operators had been removed from the Solana Foundation Delegation Programme for participating in mempools that enable sandwich attacks.”

    reviewerThe Solana Foundation removed more than 30 validator operators from its Delegation Programme in June 2024; Tim Garcia called the decisions 'final'Confirmed by primary tier-1 reporting.
    citedwww.theblock.co/post/299244/solana-found…sandwich-attacks
22. #27[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Ecosystem and Regulatory Response

    “Marinade Finance, operator of the mSOL liquid staking pool with approximately $2 billion in delegated user funds, announced in December 2025 that it had blacklisted over 50 validators identified through on-chain analysis as conducting sandwich attacks.”

    reviewerMarinade Finance announced in December 2025 it had blacklisted over 50 validators, protecting ~$2 billion in delegated fundsCorrectly dated in this section, in contrast to the same event's misdating in the timeline (see disputed timeline finding).
    citedcryptonews.net/news/security/32181951/
23. #28[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Ecosystem and Regulatory Response

    “The coordinated actions by Jito, Marinade, and the Solana Foundation were estimated to have reduced sandwich attack profitability by approximately 60–70% in 2025, with user complaints related to front-running and excessive slippage falling by roughly 60% across major Solana DEXs.”

    reviewerCoordinated actions reduced sandwich attack profitability by ~60-70% and front-running complaints by ~60% across major Solana DEXsConfirmed, though the 60% complaint-reduction figure specifically is harder to independently source and rests on the same secondary reporting.
    citedcryptonews.net/news/security/32181951/
24. #30[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Available Defenses and Limitations

    “Its Ultra V3 product, launched in October 2025, introduced what the company describes as 34x better MEV protection compared to competing trading UIs by routing trades through its Beam private delivery system rather than selling order flow to external MEV searchers.”

    reviewerJupiter's Ultra V3 (launched October 2025) offers 34x better MEV protection via its Beam private delivery systemConfirmed via multiple independent outlets.
    citedwww.theblock.co/post/375184/solana-decen…-gasless-support
25. #31[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Available Defenses and Limitations

    “Ellipsis Labs released Plasma, an audited open-source reference implementation of a sandwich-resistant AMM design, in which swaps execute at the price locked at slot start rather than mid-slot, breaking the timing window required for atomic sandwich attacks.”

    reviewerEllipsis Labs' Plasma AMM executes swaps at the price locked at slot start, breaking the atomic-sandwich timing windowConfirmed via primary source; not independently re-verified against a secondary outlet.
    citedwww.ellipsislabs.xyz/blog-posts/introducing-plasma
26. #32[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Available Defenses and Limitations

    “The Paladin Priority Port (P3) system, which attempts to enforce fair transaction ordering at the validator level, had approximately 80 validators representing 6% of network stake participating as of early 2025.”

    reviewerThe Paladin Priority Port (P3) system had ~80 validators representing 6% of network stake participating as of early 2025Confirmed.
    citedwww.helius.dev/blog/solana-mev-report
27. #33[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Available Defenses and Limitations

    “Multiple Concurrent Leaders (MCL) — a consensus architecture change that would remove single-validator block discretion — has been described by Solana developers as requiring 'several years of development' and is not near deployment.”

    reviewerMultiple Concurrent Leaders (MCL) has been described by Solana developers as requiring 'several years of development'Confirmed quote/paraphrase matches source.
    citedwww.helius.dev/blog/solana-mev-report
28. #34[confirmed][no action needed]in section: User Risk and Detection

    “Academic research at ACM IMC 2025 documented that users employed over 2.4 million 'defensive behaviors' during the measurement period that provided little or no measurable protection against sandwiching, suggesting users are attempting to defend themselves without adequate information about which measures are effective.”

    reviewerACM IMC 2025 documented users employing over 2.4 million defensive transactions/behaviors with little or no measurable protectionConfirmed; consistent internal use of the same statistic across sections.
    citeddl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3730567.3764493
29. #36[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline

    “MEV back-run bot extracts approximately $1.79 million in profit from a single $8.9 million DogWifHat (WIF) purchase, later cited as a catalyst for Jito's mempool shutdown.”

    reviewerA back-run bot extracted ~$1.79M profit from a single $8.9M DogWifHat (WIF) purchase on January 10, 2024The $1.79M figure falls within the range reported across outlets ($1.7M-$1.9M); considered confirmed within normal cross-outlet rounding variance.
30. #37[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline

    “Jito Labs announces shutdown of its public mempool after six weeks of failed technical attempts to block sandwich bundles.”

    reviewerJito Labs announced the mempool shutdown on 2024-03-08 after six weeks of failed technical attempts to block sandwich bundlesConfirmed.
31. #38[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline

    “Solana Foundation removes approximately 32 validator operators from its Delegation Program for running private mempools enabling sandwich attacks; Tim Garcia calls decisions 'final.'”

    reviewerOn 2024-06-10, Solana Foundation removed ~32 validator operators from its Delegation Program; Tim Garcia called decisions 'final'Date matches The Block's reporting date; minor one-day variance from the underlying Discord post date is immaterial.
32. #39[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline

    “MRGN Research founder Ben Coverston publicly identifies the 'arsc' MEV sandwich bot operator, revealing approximately $30 million in profits extracted over two months via wallets holding approximately $29.8 million.”

    reviewerOn 2024-06-15, Ben Coverston identified the 'arsc' bot, ~$30M in profits over two months, wallets holding ~$29.8MConfirmed; this entry is itself accurate and directly contradicts the $60M figure given for the same bot in sections[1] (see that disputed finding).
33. #42[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline

    “30-day documented run begins for the vpeNAL DeezNode sandwich bot: 1.55 million transactions, 88.9% success rate, 65,880 SOL ($13.43M) profit.”

    reviewerA 30-day documented run beginning 2024-12-07 for the vpeNAL/DeezNode bot: 1.55M transactions, 88.9% success rate, 65,880 SOL ($13.43M) profitCore figures confirmed; success-rate percentage not independently spot-checked.
34. #43[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline

    “DeezNode validator stake peaks at 802,500 SOL (~$168.5M delegated value), with 19.89% sourced from Marinade's mSOL liquid staking pool.”

    reviewerDeezNode validator stake peaked at 802,500 SOL (~$168.5M) on 2024-12-09, with 19.89% sourced from Marinade's mSOL poolStake figures confirmed; the specific mSOL-origin percentage carries the same unverifiable status noted for the equivalent sections[2] claim.
35. #46[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline

    “Consolidated amended class-action complaint filed in the Southern District of New York (SDNY) against Pump.fun, Solana Labs, Solana Foundation, Jito Labs, and executives, alleging $4-5.5 billion in user harm under securities law and RICO.”

    reviewerOn 2025-07-22, a consolidated amended complaint was filed in SDNY against Pump.fun, Solana Labs, Solana Foundation, Jito Labs, and executives, alleging $4-5.5 billion in harm under securities law and RICOAccurate as a historical description of the complaint's contents at the time of filing; note that by the current date this defendant roster is stale (Jito dropped Sept 2025; Solana Labs/Foundation/executives dismissed Aug 31, 2026) — see the related stale finding on the page summary.
36. #47[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline

    “SDNY Judge Colleen McMahon grants plaintiffs permission to amend complaint, admitting 5,000+ internal chat logs from a confidential informant as new evidence of alleged MEV manipulation at token launches.”

    reviewerOn 2025-12-09, SDNY Judge Colleen McMahon granted permission to amend the complaint, admitting 5,000+ internal chat logs from a confidential informantConfirmed; judge's identity and the chat-log evidence corroborated across multiple outlets.
37. #48[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline

    “Reports indicate coordinated 2025 ecosystem actions reduced sandwich attack profitability by an estimated 60-70% and reduced front-running user complaints by approximately 60% across major Solana DEXs.”

    reviewerOn 2025-12-24, reports indicated the coordinated 2025 ecosystem actions reduced sandwich attack profitability by ~60-70% and complaints by ~60%Confirmed; duplicates the sections[4] figure with matching date alignment.