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← Silo Financereviewed 2026-10-16 · 27 claims checked

Fact-check findings

What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Silo Finance against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.

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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.

“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.

Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.

disputed 2unverifiable 3link rot 4partially supported 7confirmed 116 corrections pending · 0 applied

disputed

2 claims

The reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.

  1. #5[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Security Incident: Interest Rate Manipulation Vulnerability (April–May 2023)
    “On April 27, 2023, a white-hat security researcher identified under the handle @kankodu submitted a critical vulnerability report to Silo Finance via the Immunefi bug bounty platform.”
    reviewerWhite-hat @kankodu submitted the IRMv1 vulnerability report on April 27, 2023.The page's own cited source gives April 28, not April 27. I found no source anywhere citing April 27.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    On April 28, 2023, a white-hat security researcher identified under the handle @kankodu submitted a critical vulnerability report to Silo Finance via the Immunefi bug bounty platform.
    citedmedium.com/immunefi/silo-finance-logic-e…iew-35de29bd934a
  2. #6[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
    “2023-04-27”
    reviewerWhite-hat researcher @kankodu reports the vulnerability on April 27, 2023 (timeline entry).Same underlying date error as the matching section-2 claim; timeline date field should be corrected, not just the prose.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    2023-04-28
    citedmedium.com/immunefi/silo-finance-logic-e…iew-35de29bd934a

unverifiable

3 claims

No source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.

  1. #19[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Governance, Tokenomics, and Token Performance
    “The protocol commits 50% of revenue to buying back SILO tokens from the open market for redistribution to xSILO stakers.”
    reviewerThe protocol commits 50% of revenue to buying back SILO tokens for redistribution to xSILO stakers.Could not independently confirm the specific 50% revenue-buyback figure; the resources.silo.finance source that would likely cover this is dead (see link-rot finding).
    citedsilopedia.silo.finance/silodao/usdsiloresources.silo.finance/governance/the-silo-dao
  2. #20[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Governance, Tokenomics, and Token Performance
    “The governance structure relies on a 48-hour timelock on executed proposals. There is no emergency admin veto function, a design intended to maximize decentralization; however, the absence of emergency pause mechanisms for core contracts has been noted as a risk.”
    reviewerSiloDAO governance relies on a 48-hour timelock on executed proposals with no emergency admin veto function.The cited source for this claim no longer resolves (DNS failure, see link-rot finding below), and I could not find an independent source confirming the specific 48-hour figure or the absence of a veto function.
    citedresources.silo.finance/governance/the-silo-dao
  3. #25[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: ZachXBT Flag and Community Signals
    “ZachXBT, a widely followed on-chain investigator known for identifying scams, rug pulls, and security failures in DeFi, has flagged Silo Finance in the context of security concerns.”
    reviewerZachXBT has flagged Silo Finance in the context of security concerns.The page itself acknowledges this could not be independently verified; my own search found no reporting connecting ZachXBT to Silo Finance specifically. The page's hedge is appropriate, but the claim as stated still cannot be substantiated.

partially supported

7 claims

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

  1. #7[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Security Incident: Interest Rate Manipulation Vulnerability (April–May 2023)
    “A proof-of-concept demonstrated that an attacker spending roughly 1 ETH could borrow approximately 450,000 XAI from a pool, with an estimated $3 million in Ethereum mainnet funds at aggregate risk.”
    reviewerThe IRMv1 PoC let an attacker spending ~1 ETH borrow ~450,000 XAI, with ~$3 million at aggregate risk on Ethereum mainnet.Core $3M figure is well supported; the specific PoC amounts are plausible but unverified against a primary source.
    citedmedium.com/immunefi/silo-finance-logic-e…iew-35de29bd934a
  2. #9[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Security Incident: Interest Rate Manipulation Vulnerability (April–May 2023)
    “Certora conducted formal verification of the fix between May 10 and May 24, 2023, confirming no remaining exploit vectors.”
    reviewerCertora conducted formal verification of the IRMv2 fix between May 10 and May 24, 2023, confirming no remaining exploit vectors.The May 10 start date, no-funds-lost outcome, and overall fix are real; the certainty of 'no remaining exploit vectors' is not supported by Certora's own more hedged conclusion.
    citedwww.certora.com/blog/silo-finance-post-mortemmedium.com/certora/silo-finance-post-mortem-3b690fffeb08
  3. #10[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
    “Certora confirms IRMv2 eliminates all identified exploit vectors; no user funds were lost.”
    reviewerCertora confirms IRMv2 eliminates all identified exploit vectors; no user funds were lost (timeline entry, May 24, 2023).Same underlying overstatement as the sections[1] finding on this topic.
    citedwww.certora.com/blog/silo-finance-post-mortem
  4. #14[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Audit Coverage and Deployed-vs-Audited Code Gap
    “During the Certora formal verification pass, five issues were uncovered — two rated high severity and three medium — that had not been identified by ABDK or Quantstamp.”
    reviewerCertora's formal verification pass uncovered five issues (two high, three medium) that ABDK and Quantstamp had not identified.The five-issue count and severities are solid; the specific claim that ABDK/Quantstamp missed them is plausible but not directly evidenced in the sources I could access.
    citedwww.certora.com/reports/silo-reportmedium.com/certora/silo-finance-post-mortem-3b690fffeb08
  5. #15[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Audit Coverage and Deployed-vs-Audited Code Gap
    “the developer documentation states: 'the core team cannot guarantee the security of any shipped deployments including the currently deployed version.'”
    reviewerThe developer documentation states: 'the core team cannot guarantee the security of any shipped deployments including the currently deployed version.'Minor misquote: the wording inside the quotation marks does not match the primary source word-for-word, though the underlying claim (deployed vs. audited code gap, no security guarantee) is real and well documented elsewhere on the page.
    citeddevdocs.silo.finance/security/audits-and…mal-verification
  6. #18[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Governance, Tokenomics, and Token Performance
    “SILO reached an all-time high of approximately $1.05 in April 2022 before declining roughly 94% through the end of 2022, in line with broader DeFi market conditions.”
    reviewerSILO reached an all-time high of approximately $1.05 in April 2022 before declining roughly 94% through the end of 2022.Directionally right (an April 2022 peak well under $2 that collapsed by year-end) but no source I found gives exactly $1.05; figures across sources range roughly $0.90-$1.16, and there are signs of a token/price-feed discontinuity that complicates a single-number verification.
    citedwww.coingecko.com/en/coins/silo-finance
  7. #26[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Risks and User Considerations
    “The Silo V1 documentation identifies multiple risk categories applicable to users.”
    reviewerThe Silo V1 documentation identifies multiple risk categories applicable to users, sourced in part from silodocs2.netlify.app.The risk categories described are plausible for V1 given shared architectural lineage, but the specific cited source documents Silo V3, not V1, which is a sourcing mismatch rather than a factual error in the risk content itself.
    citedsilodocs2.netlify.app/docs/security/risks/

confirmed

11 claims

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

  1. #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Overview
    “Silo V1 launched in beta on Ethereum mainnet in August 2022 with nine pools capped at 500 ETH each.”
    reviewerSilo V1 launched in beta on Ethereum mainnet in August 2022 with nine pools capped at 500 ETH each.Date, pool count, and 500 ETH cap are corroborated by independent reporting.
    citedmedium.com/silo-protocol/silo-is-live-in…net-94b6b0164258
  2. #2[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Overview
    “The protocol expanded to Arbitrum in February 2023 and subsequently to OP Mainnet, Base, and other chains.”
    reviewerSilo V1 deployed on Arbitrum in February 2023.Independently corroborated; OP Mainnet/Base presence is consistent with current chain-level TVL distribution.
    citeddefillama.com/protocol/silo-v1
  3. #3[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Overview
    “As of May 2026 the V1 deployment holds approximately $1.55 million in total value locked, distributed primarily on Arbitrum ($1.28 million) and Ethereum ($165,000), placing it among the smaller active lending protocols.”
    reviewerAs of May 2026 Silo V1 holds approximately $1.55 million TVL, with $1.28 million on Arbitrum and $165,000 on Ethereum.Directionally and proportionally consistent with an independently pulled DefiLlama snapshot; small variance is attributable to TVL being a moving target, not a sourcing error.
    citeddefillama.com/protocol/silo-v1
  4. #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Overview
    “Silo Finance also introduced a protocol-native stablecoin, XAI, as a cross-silo bridge asset; XAI was deprecated in early 2024 after adoption proved limited and pool imbalances destabilized its peg.”
    reviewerXAI stablecoin was deprecated in early 2024 due to limited adoption and peg instability.Primary source fetched directly and matches the page's characterization closely.
    citedgov.silo.finance/t/a-plan-to-deprecate-xai-stablecoin/443
  5. #8[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Security Incident: Interest Rate Manipulation Vulnerability (April–May 2023)
    “The white-hat researcher received a 100,000 USDC bounty.”
    reviewerThe white-hat researcher received a 100,000 USDC bounty.Directly confirmed.
    citedmedium.com/immunefi/silo-finance-logic-e…iew-35de29bd934a
  6. #11[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Security Incident: Interest Rate Manipulation Vulnerability (April–May 2023)
    “The vulnerability disclosure was published on June 6, 2023.”
    reviewerSilo Finance published the vulnerability disclosure on June 6, 2023.Confirmed by the cited source's own URL/date; this is Silo's own disclosure, separate from Immunefi's June 16 bugfix-review article.
    citedmedium.com/silo-protocol/vulnerability-d…-06-c1dfd4c4dbb8
  7. #12[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Security Incident: Incentives Contract White-Hat Drain (July 2023)
    “On July 21, 2023, at approximately 00:30 UTC, members of the RAMSES protocol discovered a vulnerability in Silo Finance's separate incentives contract that would have allowed any actor to drain all SILO tokens held in that contract — approximately $45,000 at the time.”
    reviewerOn July 21, 2023 at ~00:30 UTC, RAMSES discovered a drainable flaw in Silo's incentives contract worth ~$45,000; Immunefi closed the report as out-of-scope; RAMSES drained funds to its own treasury and later returned them after direct contact with Silo.Well supported by the cited primary write-up, which I fetched and read in full.
    citedhackmd.io/@yesthatdog/silo-whitehat
  8. #13[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Audit Coverage and Deployed-vs-Audited Code Gap
    “Silo V1.1.1 received full audits from ABDK and Quantstamp. Certora additionally performed formal verification of the base protocol between May 7 and July 15, 2022, as well as separate formal verification of the Chainlink price provider. ChainSecurity audited the Curve and Convex integrations.”
    reviewerSilo V1.1.1 received full audits from ABDK and Quantstamp; Certora performed base-protocol formal verification May 7–July 15, 2022 and separately verified the Chainlink price provider; ChainSecurity audited Curve/Convex integrations.All firm/scope/date details independently confirmed from primary sources.
    citeddevdocs.silo.finance/security/audits-and…mal-verificationwww.certora.com/reports/silo-report
  9. #16[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Audit Coverage and Deployed-vs-Audited Code Gap
    “Trail of Bits was retained for an audit of Silo V2 rather than commissioning a re-audit of V1.”
    reviewerTrail of Bits was retained for an audit of Silo V2 rather than commissioning a re-audit of V1.Confirmed; Certora and a Cantina public contest also later reviewed V2/V3, but that doesn't contradict Trail of Bits also being retained.
    citeddevdocs.silo.finance/security/audits-and…mal-verification
  10. #17[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Governance, Tokenomics, and Token Performance
    “Token allocation at launch was: community treasury 45% (linear vesting over three years), founding contributors 21.75% (three-year linear vest with six-month cliff), future contributors and advisors 10% (four-year linear vest with one-year cliff), early contributors 6.75% (four-year vest with six-month cliff), early investors and advisors 6.30% (two-year vest with six-month lock), and early community airdrop 0.2%.”
    reviewerSILO token allocation at launch: community treasury 45% (3yr linear), founding contributors 21.75% (3yr linear, 6mo cliff), future contributors/advisors 10% (4yr linear, 1yr cliff), early contributors 6.75% (4yr, 6mo cliff), early investors/advisors 6.30% (2yr, 6mo lock), airdrop 0.2%.Exact match to the cited source. Note the source also lists a separate 10% Genesis Protocol-Owned-Liquidity allocation not mentioned in the page's list, which is an omission rather than an error.
    citediq.wiki/wiki/silo-finance
  11. #27[confirmed][no action needed]in section: ZachXBT Flag and Community Signals
    “No evidence of rug pull, team fund misappropriation, or regulatory action against Silo Finance V1 was found in public records.”
    reviewerNo evidence of rug pull, team fund misappropriation, or regulatory action against Silo Finance V1 was found in public records.True as scoped to V1 specifically, but see coverage_gaps: the entity 'Silo Finance' had a materially sized 2025 incident on its V2/V3 leverage feature that the page does not mention anywhere, even in passing, despite discussing migration toward V2/V3.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.