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Siavash Kayvanpour — OFAC-Designated Shelbit Founderreviewed 2026-09-07 · 44 claims checked

Fact-check findings

What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Siavash Kayvanpour — OFAC-Designated Shelbit Founder against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.

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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.

“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.

Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.

disputed

2 claims

The reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.

  1. #5[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: OFAC Personal Designation (August 7, 2026)
    Simultaneously, four corporate entities controlled by Kayvanpour were designated: SHPS Shelbit (Republic of Georgia), Shelbit General Trading LLC (UAE), Shelbit Technologies Ltd (Poland), and two Dubai free-zone entities, Crypto Home DMCC and NFT Home DMCC.
    reviewerSimultaneously, four corporate entities controlled by Kayvanpour were designated, listing SHPS Shelbit, Shelbit General Trading LLC, Shelbit Technologies Ltd, Crypto Home DMCC and NFT Home DMCCThe sentence says 'four corporate entities' but then lists five. The page's own timeline entry (timeline[10]) correctly says 'five corporate entities,' so this section contradicts the page's own timeline as well as the Treasury source.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    Simultaneously, five corporate entities controlled by Kayvanpour were designated: SHPS Shelbit (Republic of Georgia), Shelbit General Trading LLC (UAE), Shelbit Technologies Ltd (Poland), and two Dubai free-zone entities, Crypto Home DMCC and NFT Home DMCC.
  2. #31[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Prior Regulatory Actions and Enforcement History
    VARA issued a second enforcement action against Shelbit in July 2026, ordering a full halt to unlicensed activity. One week later, on August 7, 2026, OFAC issued the personal designation of Kayvanpour and the designation of his corporate network.
    reviewerVARA issued a second enforcement action against Shelbit in July 2026, ordering a full halt to unlicensed activity, and one week later OFAC issued the personal designation on August 7, 2026The page's own timeline entry (timeline[8]) dates the second VARA action to 2026-07-24, which is exactly two weeks before the August 7, 2026 OFAC designation, contradicting the section's claim that it was 'one week later.'
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    VARA issued a second enforcement action against Shelbit in July 2026, ordering a full halt to unlicensed activity. Two weeks later, on August 7, 2026, OFAC issued the personal designation of Kayvanpour and the designation of his corporate network.

unverifiable

4 claims

No source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.

  1. #16[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: On-Chain Financial Flows and Scale
    Wallets rotated on a one-to-four month cadence, cycling through USD 100–350 million in volume before going dormant.
    reviewerWallets rotated on a one-to-four month cadence, cycling through USD 100-350 million before going dormantRotation cadence confirmed; the specific per-wallet dollar range is plausible but not independently verifiable from the sources this review could access.
  2. #36[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Shelbit's Denials and Cessation of Operations
    TRM Labs reported, however, that as of August 2026 the associated gambling network continued to operate without interruption despite Shelbit's website becoming non-functional.
    reviewerTRM Labs reported that as of August 2026 the gambling network continued to operate without interruption despite Shelbit's website becoming non-functionalPlausible given the broader reporting but not independently confirmed from sources this review could access.
  3. #37[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Shelbit's Denials and Cessation of Operations
    Kayvanpour did not respond to requests for comment from Reuters prior to the designation.
    reviewerKayvanpour did not respond to requests for comment from Reuters prior to the designationPlausible but not independently verified in the sources reviewed; a similar 'no response' framing does appear for Iranian authorities generally.
  4. #39[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Enforcement Complications and Multi-Citizenship Status
    No criminal indictment by U.S. prosecutors had been publicly filed as of the date of the OFAC action.
    reviewerNo criminal indictment by U.S. prosecutors had been publicly filed as of the date of the OFAC actionNo indictment was found in searches, which is consistent with the claim, but a negative claim like this cannot be conclusively verified.

partially supported

1 claim

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

  1. #26[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Iranian State Entity and Sanctioned Exchange Exposure
    Smaller flows connected to other previously sanctioned Iranian exchanges including Ramzinex, Wallex, Bit Pin, and Zedcex were also identified.
    reviewerSmaller flows connected to other previously sanctioned Iranian exchanges including Ramzinex, Wallex, Bit Pin, and Zedcex were also identifiedRamzinex, Wallex and Bit Pin are Iranian domestic exchanges sanctioned in the June 2026 Nobitex action, but Zedcex is a UK-registered, IRGC-linked exchange sanctioned separately in January 2026; grouping it under 'Iranian exchanges' mischaracterizes its jurisdiction, though the underlying dollar flows are otherwise supported.

confirmed

37 claims

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

  1. #1[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary
    U.S. Treasury's OFAC personally designated on August 7, 2026 under Executive Order 13224 for materially supporting Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
    reviewerOFAC personally designated Siavash Kayvanpour on August 7, 2026 under Executive Order 13224 for material support to the IRGCDirectly confirmed by the primary Treasury press release.
  2. #2[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary
    Blockchain investigators traced over USD 6.3 billion in flows through the Shelbit network between May 2024 and March 2026
    reviewerBlockchain investigators traced over USD 6.3 billion in flows through the Shelbit network between May 2024 and March 2026Figure and date range corroborated by TRM Labs and independently by Bloomberg coverage of the same report.
  3. #3[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary
    Kayvanpour holds citizenships in Iran, Dominica, and Afghanistan, complicating international enforcement of the designation.
    reviewerKayvanpour holds citizenships in Iran, Dominica, and AfghanistanMultiple secondary sources reporting on the designation repeat the same three citizenships.
  4. #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: OFAC Personal Designation (August 7, 2026)
    The action was co-developed with IRS Criminal Investigation.
    reviewerThe OFAC action was co-developed with IRS Criminal InvestigationConfirmed by primary source.
  5. #6[confirmed][no action needed]in section: OFAC Personal Designation (August 7, 2026)
    A separate entity, Aban Tether, was designated concurrently under Executive Order 13902.
    reviewerAban Tether was designated concurrently under Executive Order 13902Confirmed by primary source.
  6. #7[confirmed][no action needed]in section: OFAC Personal Designation (August 7, 2026)
    The OFAC press release stated that digital currency addresses linked to the IRGC sent over $1 million to Shelbit Exchange addresses, while Shelbit Exchange addresses sent over $2 million back to those same IRGC-linked wallets.
    reviewerIRGC-linked addresses sent over $1 million to Shelbit and Shelbit addresses sent over $2 million back to IRGC-linked walletsConfirmed verbatim against primary source.
  7. #8[confirmed][no action needed]in section: OFAC Personal Designation (August 7, 2026)
    Kayvanpour's own wallet addresses also sent over $2 million to Nobitex, Iran's largest cryptocurrency exchange, which had itself been designated by OFAC in June 2026.
    reviewerKayvanpour's own wallets sent over $2 million to Nobitex, Iran's largest exchange, designated by OFAC in June 2026Both the transfer amount and Nobitex's designation date/status are corroborated.
  8. #9[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Corporate Structure and Multi-Jurisdictional Footprint
    A technology subsidiary, Shelbit Technologies Ltd, was incorporated in Poland and placed in liquidation proceedings at some point prior to the OFAC designation.
    reviewerShelbit Technologies Ltd (Poland) was placed in liquidation proceedings prior to the OFAC designationConfirmed by the entity's official designated name.
  9. #10[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Corporate Structure and Multi-Jurisdictional Footprint
    TRM Labs reported that Shelbit shared a registered Dubai address with Velorix Watches Trading LLC in Deira's commercial district, suggesting a minimal physical footprint.
    reviewerTRM Labs reported Shelbit shared a registered Dubai address with Velorix Watches Trading LLC in DeiraCorroborated by multiple outlets describing the same Deira location and watch-shop front.
  10. #11[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Corporate Structure and Multi-Jurisdictional Footprint
    making extradition to U.S. jurisdiction significantly more difficult as none of those countries have straightforward extradition treaties with the United States
    reviewerNone of Iran, Dominica, Afghanistan or UAE have straightforward extradition treaties with the United StatesGeneral statement of extradition-treaty status is accurate as a matter of public record, not tied to a single cited source.
  11. #12[confirmed][no action needed]in section: On-Chain Financial Flows and Scale
    The exchange operated predominantly on the TRON blockchain, which accounted for approximately 88% of volume (approximately USD 5.56 billion), with the remainder distributed across Ethereum (6%), Bitcoin (4%), and BNB Smart Chain (2%).
    reviewerTRON accounted for approximately 88% of Shelbit's volume (~USD 5.56B), with Ethereum 6%, Bitcoin 4%, BNB Smart Chain 2%Exact match to the cited TRM Labs report.
  12. #13[confirmed][no action needed]in section: On-Chain Financial Flows and Scale
    Peak monthly volume reached USD 735 million in November 2025.
    reviewerPeak monthly volume reached USD 735 million in November 2025Confirmed.
  13. #14[confirmed][no action needed]in section: On-Chain Financial Flows and Scale
    The average transfer size on TRON was USD 54,500.
    reviewerThe average transfer size on TRON was USD 54,500Confirmed.
  14. #15[confirmed][no action needed]in section: On-Chain Financial Flows and Scale
    TRM Labs assessed that inbound and outbound values matched to within 0.1% and residual balances were effectively zero, indicating that Shelbit operated as a payment relay rather than a conventional exchange holding customer assets.
    reviewerInbound and outbound values matched to within 0.1% and residual balances were effectively zero, consistent with a payment relayConfirmed, including the framing as a settlement/relay rather than a custodial exchange.
  15. #17[confirmed][no action needed]in section: On-Chain Financial Flows and Scale
    Reuters, citing its own investigation, reported at least USD 676 million in flows from Shelbit-linked addresses to Binance, the world's largest cryptocurrency exchange, since May 2024 — with approximately USD 540 million of that arriving after VARA had already issued a cease-and-desist order in January 2025.
    reviewerReuters reported at least USD 676 million in flows from Shelbit-linked addresses to Binance since May 2024, with approximately USD 540 million arriving after VARA's January 2025 cease-and-desistConfirmed by The Block's writeup of the Reuters investigation.
  16. #18[confirmed][no action needed]in section: On-Chain Financial Flows and Scale
    Binance disputed those figures.
    reviewerBinance disputed those figuresConfirmed; Binance's substantive dispute and rebuttal statement are corroborated.
  17. #19[confirmed][no action needed]in section: On-Chain Financial Flows and Scale
    TRM Labs separately identified USD 5.6 million across 36 transfers to wallets associated with the IRGC; USD 2 million sent on September 17, 2025 to a wallet subsequently designated by Israel's National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing as Hamas infrastructure; and USD 318 million involving A7, a sanctioned Russian payment network.
    reviewerTRM Labs identified USD 5.6 million across 36 transfers to IRGC-associated wallets; USD 2 million on September 17, 2025 to a Hamas-designated wallet; and USD 318 million involving A7, a sanctioned Russian payment networkAll three sub-figures independently confirmed against the TRM Labs report.
  18. #20[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Iranian Gambling Network and Influencer Connections
    Shelbit's primary customer base was a Farsi-language illegal online gambling network comprising over 2,000 websites — described by TRM Labs as 'one of the largest illegal gambling operations yet identified anywhere.' TRM Labs traced USD 72.6 million across 55 gambling platforms to Shelbit.
    reviewerShelbit's primary customer base was a Farsi-language illegal online gambling network of over 2,000 websites, described by TRM Labs as one of the largest illegal gambling operations yet identified anywhere, with USD 72.6 million traced across 55 platformsConfirmed.
  19. #21[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Iranian Gambling Network and Influencer Connections
    The gambling network was publicly promoted by two Iranian influencers: Sasha Sobhani, based in Madrid, and Pooyan Mokhtari, a singer and social media figure with millions of followers.
    reviewerSasha Sobhani, based in Madrid, and Pooyan Mokhtari, a singer with millions of followers, publicly promoted the gambling networkConfirmed via the Reuters special report and secondary coverage.
  20. #22[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Iranian Gambling Network and Influencer Connections
    Kayvanpour, Sobhani, and Mokhtari were all convicted in absentia by Iranian courts in 2023 for illegal gambling activity. Kayvanpour received a three-month sentence for assisting the gambling operation; Sobhani and Mokhtari received two-year sentences.
    reviewerKayvanpour, Sobhani, and Mokhtari were convicted in absentia by Iranian courts in 2023; Kayvanpour got a three-month sentence, Sobhani and Mokhtari two-year sentencesConfirmed by secondary reporting on the Reuters investigation.
  21. #23[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Iranian Gambling Network and Influencer Connections
    Both Sobhani and Mokhtari publicly denied involvement in money laundering, sanctions evasion, and terrorism financing. Mokhtari additionally denied any links to the IRGC and stated he was unfamiliar with Shelbit.
    reviewerBoth Sobhani and Mokhtari publicly denied involvement in money laundering, sanctions evasion and terrorism financing; Mokhtari denied IRGC links and familiarity with ShelbitConfirmed in substance, though the exact wording attributed to Mokhtari regarding unfamiliarity with Shelbit specifically was not independently located verbatim.
  22. #24[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Iranian State Entity and Sanctioned Exchange Exposure
    According to TRM Labs, Shelbit processed approximately USD 125 million originating from Iran's central bank, which has itself been sanctioned under U.S. counterterrorism authorities since 2019.
    reviewerTRM Labs: Shelbit processed approximately USD 125 million originating from Iran's central bank, sanctioned under U.S. counterterrorism authorities since 2019Confirmed.
  23. #25[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Iranian State Entity and Sanctioned Exchange Exposure
    Shelbit also processed USD 2.6 million involving Aban Tether (simultaneously designated on August 7, 2026) and USD 1.9 million across 101 transfers to and from Nobitex (designated by OFAC in June 2026).
    reviewerShelbit also processed USD 2.6 million involving Aban Tether and USD 1.9 million across 101 transfers to and from NobitexConfirmed.
  24. #27[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Iranian State Entity and Sanctioned Exchange Exposure
    OFAC confirmed that Kayvanpour's personal wallet addresses sent over $2 million to Nobitex.
    reviewerOFAC confirmed that Kayvanpour's personal wallet addresses sent over $2 million to NobitexConfirmed; duplicate of the figure also stated in sections[0].
  25. #28[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Iranian State Entity and Sanctioned Exchange Exposure
    Reuters stated it 'could not determine whether the IRGC directly controlled Shelbit,' despite analyst assessments of IRGC financial involvement.
    reviewerReuters stated it 'could not determine whether the IRGC directly controlled Shelbit', despite analyst assessments of IRGC financial involvementConfirmed hedge is accurately represented, not overstated.
  26. #29[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Iranian State Entity and Sanctioned Exchange Exposure
    The OFAC action did not include a direct finding of IRGC ownership of Shelbit, but did designate Kayvanpour and Shelbit for providing material assistance to the IRGC.
    reviewerThe OFAC action did not include a direct finding of IRGC ownership of Shelbit, but did designate for material assistance to the IRGCAccurately characterizes the legal basis of the designation.
  27. #30[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Prior Regulatory Actions and Enforcement History
    Dubai's Virtual Assets Regulatory Authority (VARA) issued a cease-and-desist order against Shelbit General Trading LLC in January 2025, finding that the company was providing virtual-asset services in Dubai without a license, onboarding users without mandatory KYC checks, and marketing its services without authorization.
    reviewerVARA issued a cease-and-desist order against Shelbit General Trading LLC in January 2025 for operating without a license, KYC failures, and unauthorized marketingConfirmed directly against the VARA regulatory notice, which itself is dated July 24, 2026 but references the prior January 2, 2025 action.
  28. #32[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Prior Regulatory Actions and Enforcement History
    The OFAC action falls under the U.S. 'Economic Fury' campaign targeting Iran's crypto finance infrastructure, which also encompassed prior designations of Zedcex and Zedxion (January 2026) and Nobitex (June 2026).
    reviewerThe OFAC action falls under the 'Economic Fury' campaign, which also included prior designations of Zedcex and Zedxion (January 2026) and Nobitex (June 2026)Confirmed; campaign name and constituent designation dates check out.
  29. #33[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Prior Regulatory Actions and Enforcement History
    The U.S. State Department has a standing offer of a USD 15 million reward for information leading to disruption of IRGC financial mechanisms.
    reviewerThe U.S. State Department has a standing offer of a USD 15 million reward for information leading to disruption of IRGC financial mechanismsConfirmed.
  30. #34[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Shelbit's Denials and Cessation of Operations
    Shelbit publicly stated that it 'categorically rejected any suggestion that the company knowingly participated in money laundering, terrorist financing, illegal gambling activity, sanctions evasion, or activity on behalf of any sanctioned organization.'
    reviewerShelbit publicly stated it 'categorically rejected any suggestion' of knowing participation in money laundering, terrorist financing, illegal gambling, sanctions evasion, or activity for a sanctioned organizationSubstantively confirmed; the page's quotation lightly compresses 'sanctioned, military, or governmental organisation' to 'sanctioned organization' and shifts tense from present to past, but preserves the meaning.
  31. #35[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Shelbit's Denials and Cessation of Operations
    The company also stated that it had ceased operations in January 2026, prior to the OFAC designation.
    reviewerShelbit stated it had ceased operations in January 2026, prior to the OFAC designationConfirmed.
  32. #38[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Enforcement Complications and Multi-Citizenship Status
    Citizenship in Dominica is commonly available through investment programs, and the designation does not include public findings about how that citizenship was acquired.
    reviewerCitizenship in Dominica is commonly available through investment programs, and the designation includes no public findings on how Kayvanpour's was acquiredConfirmed as a general, well-established fact plus an accurate absence-of-detail observation about the designation.
  33. #40[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
    Siavash Kayvanpour, Sasha Sobhani, and Pooyan Mokhtari convicted in absentia by Iranian courts for illegal gambling activity. Kayvanpour received a three-month sentence for assisting the operation; Sobhani and Mokhtari received two-year sentences.
    reviewerTimeline: In 2023, Kayvanpour, Sobhani and Mokhtari were convicted in absentia; Kayvanpour got 3 months, others got 2 yearsConfirmed, duplicate of sections[3] claim.
  34. #41[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
    Dubai's Virtual Assets Regulatory Authority (VARA) issues cease-and-desist order against Shelbit General Trading LLC for operating without a license, failing KYC requirements, and marketing services in Dubai without authorization. VARA publishes a notice of fines.
    reviewerTimeline: Dubai's VARA issues cease-and-desist order against Shelbit General Trading LLC dated 2025-01-02Note: the notice of fines itself, containing this reference, is dated 24 July 2026 — the same document also underlies timeline[8]. Date field for this entry is correct.
  35. #42[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
    Researchers inform Binance about Shelbit's alleged ties to Iran. Binance disputes the allegations.
    reviewerTimeline: Researchers inform Binance about Shelbit's alleged ties to Iran in October 2025; Binance disputes the allegationsConfirmed via secondary sourcing of the Reuters investigation.
  36. #43[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
    Dubai's VARA issues a second enforcement action against Shelbit, ordering a complete halt to unlicensed virtual-asset operations.
    reviewerTimeline: VARA issues a second enforcement action against Shelbit dated 2026-07-24This correctly-dated entry is what exposes the 'one week later' math error in sections[5].
  37. #44[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
    OFAC personally designates Siavash Kayvanpour under Executive Order 13224, alongside five corporate entities (SHPS Shelbit, Shelbit General Trading LLC, Shelbit Technologies Ltd, Crypto Home DMCC, NFT Home DMCC). Aban Tether is simultaneously designated under Executive Order 13902. The action is coordinated with IRS Criminal Investigation.
    reviewerTimeline: OFAC personally designates Kayvanpour on 2026-08-07 alongside five corporate entities and Aban Tether under EO 13902, coordinated with IRS-CIThis entry is accurate and is the source of the 'shelbit-entity-count' contradiction with sections[0].
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.