Fact-check findings

The reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.

1. #3[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Original Shai-Hulud Worm (September 2025)

   “The initial campaign ultimately led to more than 500 npm packages being compromised and credentials being harvested from upwards of 25,000 GitHub repositories.”

   reviewerThe original Shai-Hulud worm (first detected September 2025) led to more than 500 npm packages being compromised and credentials being harvested from upwards of 25,000 GitHub repositories.The page conflates two separate waves: the 25,000+ GitHub repository figure belongs to the November 2025 'Shai-Hulud 2.0' wave (correctly cited elsewhere in sections[2]), not the original September 2025 campaign, whose own contemporaneous reporting cites repo/account counts in the dozens.
   Proposed correction (not yet applied)

   The initial campaign ultimately led to more than 500 npm packages being compromised and credentials being harvested and leaked via a few hundred attacker-created GitHub repositories; the often-cited figure of 25,000+ affected GitHub repositories applies to the later November 2025 Shai-Hulud 2.0 wave, not this initial September 2025 campaign.
   citedunit42.paloaltonetworks.com/monitoring-n…y-chain-attacks/cybersecuritynews.com/shai-hulud-worm-steals-npm/
2. #4[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline

   “Original Shai-Hulud worm first detected in the npm ecosystem; earliest attributable TeamPCP supply chain operations begin. 500+ packages compromised via malicious preinstall hooks; credentials harvested from 25,000+ GitHub repositories.”

   reviewerTimeline entry for 2025-09 repeats the same 25,000 GitHub repositories figure for the original September 2025 Shai-Hulud wave.Same underlying error as the sections[1] finding above, duplicated into the timeline; grouped under the same defect_group so it is fixed once in both places.
   Proposed correction (not yet applied)

   Original Shai-Hulud worm first detected in the npm ecosystem; earliest attributable TeamPCP supply chain operations begin. 500+ packages compromised via malicious preinstall hooks; the 25,000+ GitHub repositories figure belongs to the later November 2025 Shai-Hulud 2.0 wave, not this initial campaign.
   citedunit42.paloaltonetworks.com/monitoring-n…y-chain-attacks/
3. #10[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Campaign Overview and Attribution

   “Phoenix Security describes the cumulative scale of operations through June 2026 as approximately 600 malicious npm packages, more than 2,500 compromised GitHub repositories, and confirmed active payload execution across multiple enterprise environments.”

   reviewerPhoenix Security describes the cumulative scale of TeamPCP operations through June 2026 as approximately 600 malicious npm packages, more than 2,500 compromised GitHub repositories, and confirmed active payload execution across multiple enterprise environments.The page attributes a single-wave figure to the whole campaign's cumulative scale through June 2026, which the cited source does not support; the numbers themselves are roughly accurate for the May 19 wave but mischaracterized as a campaign-wide running total.
   Proposed correction (not yet applied)

   Phoenix Security's May 19, 2026 report on the @antv/atool maintainer account compromise documented approximately 600 malicious npm package versions across 323 packages and more than 2,500 GitHub repositories created with stolen tokens, with confirmed active payload execution; these figures describe that single wave rather than the campaign's cumulative scale through June 2026.
   citedphoenix.security/teampcp-mini-shai-hulud…compromise-2026/

No source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.

1. #11[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Shai-Hulud 3.0 "The Golden Path" (December 2025)

   “A third variant, dubbed Shai-Hulud 3.0 "The Golden Path," was discovered by security researcher Charlie Eriksen on December 28, 2025, two days after the Trust Wallet exfiltration window closed.”

   reviewerShai-Hulud 3.0 'The Golden Path' was discovered by security researcher Charlie Eriksen on December 28, 2025.Charlie Eriksen is a real Aikido Security malware researcher who has previously been quoted on npm supply-chain incidents, and Aikido's Dec 28 report plausibly underlies this attribution, but neither of the page's own cited sources names him or confirms he was the discoverer; could not independently verify this specific attribution.
   citedsnyk.io/blog/shai-hulud-3-0/www.kodemsecurity.com/resources/guess-wh…-the-golden-path

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

1. #8[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Related Campaign: Mastra AI Compromise Attributed to North Korea (June 2026)

   “On June 17, 2026, 141 npm packages across the Mastra AI framework ecosystem were compromised in a 45-minute window. Mastra is an open-source TypeScript framework for building AI agents, workflows, and RAG pipelines, with approximately 8 million weekly downloads across the affected packages.”

   reviewerThe Mastra AI compromise affected 141 npm packages with approximately 8 million combined weekly downloads.Package count (141 vs. '140+') is close enough to be confirmed, but the 8-million weekly-download figure could not be verified against the primary Microsoft source and conflicts with at least one other cited-type research note reporting roughly 1.1 million; the page presents a single figure without flagging the disagreement.
   citedwww.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/20…hain-compromise/www.aikido.dev/blog/over-140-popular-mas…ply-chain-attack

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

1. #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Trust Wallet Chrome Extension Hack (December 24-26, 2025)

   “This data was transmitted to an attacker-controlled domain, api.metrics-trustwallet[.]com (the domain metrics-trustwallet.com having been registered on December 8, 2025). The attackers also redirected PostHog analytics traffic to their own infrastructure so that exfiltration appeared as routine telemetry. The active exfiltration window ran until 11:00 UTC on December 26, 2025, a period of approximately 46.5 hours.”

   reviewerThe Trust Wallet Chrome extension hack affected 2,520 wallets and total losses were approximately $8.5 million, during the December 24-26, 2025 window, with the exfiltration window closing at 11:00 UTC on December 26.Figures (loss amount, wallet count, exfiltration window) are confirmed directly against Trust Wallet's own incident update, matching the page's framing including the CoinDesk $7M vs. later $8.5M discrepancy.
   citedtrustwallet.com/blog/announcements/trust…community-updatewww.securityweek.com/shai-hulud-supply-c…st-wallet-heist/
2. #2[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Mini Shai-Hulud Wave 2: TanStack, Mistral AI, UiPath (May 2026)

   “In six minutes the attacker published 84 malicious package versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages, including @tanstack/react-router (approximately 12.7 million weekly downloads).”

   reviewerOn May 11, 2026 between 19:20 and 19:26 UTC, TeamPCP published 84 malicious package versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages in six minutes via a pull_request_target pwn request, GitHub Actions cache poisoning, and OIDC token extraction; CVE-2026-45321 (CVSS 9.6) was assigned.Well supported by the cited StepSecurity write-up and independently corroborated by other CVE trackers found via search.
   citedwww.stepsecurity.io/blog/mini-shai-hulud…he-npm-ecosystem
3. #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Bitwarden CLI Compromise and Checkmarx Breach (April 2026)

   “The malicious version was available on npm between approximately 5:57 PM and 7:30 PM ET, a window of roughly 93 minutes, before Bitwarden identified and removed it. An estimated 334 downloads of the malicious version occurred.”

   reviewerAn estimated 334 downloads of the malicious @bitwarden/cli@2026.4.0 occurred during a roughly 93-minute window (5:57 PM-7:30 PM ET) on April 22, 2026, and the payload embedded the string 'Shai-Hulud: The Third Coming'.Fully corroborated by the cited primary news source.
   citedthehackernews.com/2026/04/bitwarden-cli-…-in-ongoing.html
4. #6[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Mini Shai-Hulud Wave 3: AntV / atool Maintainer Compromise (May 2026)

   “Two repositories were published; they remained online for at least 12 hours before GitHub moderation intervened. Forks grew rapidly: one repository accrued 31 forks within hours of publication.”

   reviewerAfter TeamPCP open-sourced the Shai-Hulud worm on GitHub in May 2026, one repository accrued 31 forks within hours, and the repositories remained online for at least 12 hours before GitHub moderation intervened.Matches the cited Register article precisely.
   citedwww.theregister.com/security/2026/05/13/…n-github/5239319
5. #7[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Related Campaign: Mastra AI Compromise Attributed to North Korea (June 2026)

   “Microsoft's Defender Security Research Team and Threat Intelligence attributed this attack, in a blog post published June 17, 2026, to Sapphire Sleet, a North Korean state-sponsored group also known as BlueNoroff, CageyChameleon, Copernicium, and Stardust Chollima”

   reviewerMicrosoft attributed the June 17, 2026 Mastra npm supply chain compromise (via the compromised 'ehindero' maintainer account and the easy-day-js typosquat) to Sapphire Sleet, a North Korean state-sponsored group.Date, account name, typosquat package, and attribution all confirmed against the primary Microsoft source.
   citedwww.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/20…hain-compromise/
6. #9[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Downstream Compromises: OpenAI and GitHub

   “On May 19, 2026, a compromised maintainer account was used to publish 639 malicious package versions across 323 packages in approximately 22 minutes, the largest single-hour package count of any documented Shai-Hulud wave, representing approximately 16 million combined weekly downloads.”

   reviewerOn May 19, 2026, a compromised @antv/atool maintainer account was used to publish 639 malicious package versions across 323 packages in approximately 22 minutes.639/323 figures are corroborated by at least two independent write-ups (Aviatrix, Mend headline), though a third source (Chainguard) gives slightly different counts (637/314), indicating minor cross-source variance typical of fast-moving incident reporting.
   citedsnyk.io/blog/mini-shai-hulud-antv-npm-su…ly-chain-attack/phoenix.security/teampcp-mini-shai-hulud…compromise-2026/
7. #12[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Mini Shai-Hulud Wave 2: TanStack, Mistral AI, UiPath (May 2026)

   “Accounts differ on the memory-extraction technique: one description reads /proc/*/cmdline, while StepSecurity and other technical write-ups describe reading /proc/<pid>/mem.”

   reviewerThe Mini Shai-Hulud/TanStack campaign's compromised packages carried valid SLSA Build Level 3 provenance attestations, and the memory-extraction technique used to steal OIDC tokens is variously described as /proc/*/cmdline or /proc/<pid>/mem.The page's own hedge ('accounts differ') is itself well supported and accurately characterizes a real nuance in how different write-ups describe the same two-step memory-read mechanism.
   citedwww.stepsecurity.io/blog/mini-shai-hulud…he-npm-ecosystem